Garcetti v. Superior Court, B126210

• Citation: 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724,68 Cal.App.4th 1105
• Decision Date: 23 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. B126210,B126210
• Parties: , 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9343, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,993 Gilbert GARCETTI, as District Attorney, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Los Angeles, Respondent; Carnot Andres Lyles, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 724

80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724

68 Cal.App.4th 1105, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9343,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,993

Gilbert GARCETTI, as District Attorney, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Los Angeles, Respondent;

Carnot Andres Lyles, Real Party in Interest.

No. B126210.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Dec. 23, 1998.

Review Denied March 17, 1999.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran, and Fred Klink, Deputies District Attorney, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Alan Ross, Encino, for Real Party in Interest.

KLEIN, P.J.

The People seek a writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its order dismissing the People's petition for commitment of real party in interest Carnot Andre Lyles (Lyles) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP Act). (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6600 et seq.) ¹

The essential issue presented is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the People's petition on the ground it lacked jurisdiction because Lyles was not lawfully in custody at the time the People filed the petition for commitment.

We conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed on the petition for commitment, irrespective of the circumstances of Lyles's parole revocation. Therefore, we grant the People's petition for writ of mandate.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 15, 1979, in case number A558198, Lyles was convicted of nine felony counts including sodomy in concert (Pen.Code, § 286, subd. (d)) and was sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years and 8 months. On September 22, 1989, in case number A577027, Lyles was convicted of a lewd act upon a child (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to 8 years in prison.

Before Lyles was scheduled to be released on parole, he was screened by the Department of Corrections and the Board of Prison Terms to determine whether he fit the criteria for a sexually violent predator. It was determined that Lyles met the initial criteria based on his qualifying offenses, and on October 22, 1996, a memorandum was sent by the Board of Prison Terms and the Department of Corrections to the Department of Mental Health referring Lyles for clinical evaluation.

In November 1996, Lyles was evaluated by two psychologists, Drs. Inman and Hausman. Both experts concluded Lyles met the criteria as a sexually violent predator. The conclusion was based on Lyles' sexually violent offenses against two or more victims, a finding of a diagnosable mental disorder, and a finding that Lyles was likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior as a result of his diagnosed mental disorder.

On December 4, 1996, the People filed a petition for commitment of Lyles as a sexually violent predator, on the grounds Lyles has been convicted of sexually violent offenses within the meaning of subdivisions (b) and (e) of section 6600, he had a diagnosed mental disorder, and without appropriate treatment and custody, he was likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.

On July 27, 1998, following a probable cause hearing, the trial court found probable cause existed to believe Lyles was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 1. Lyles's motion to dismiss on the ground he was not lawfully in custody.

behavior upon his release and remanded Lyles to the custody of the county sheriff.

On August 26, 1998, Lyles filed a motion to dismiss the petition for commitment. Lyles sought dismissal on the ground his parole unlawfully was revoked and he was unlawfully in the custody of the Department of Corrections at the time he was referred for evaluation under the SVP Act, in that parole revocation for psychiatric treatment was prohibited by Terhune v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 841. The motion to dismiss included a procedural history of Lyles's custody.

The record shows: Lyles was scheduled to be released on parole on December 18, 1994, but on December 16, 1994, the Board of Prison Terms placed a parole hold on Lyles pending a parole revocation hearing for psychiatric treatment. On January 25, 1995, the hearing was held, parole was revoked and Lyles was returned to custody for 12 months. Thus, Lyles was scheduled to be released on December 18, 1995. However, on December 12, 1995, a parole hold again was placed on Lyles pending another revocation hearing for psychiatric treatment. On January 5, 1996, the hearing was held, parole was revoked for psychiatric treatment, and Lyles again was returned to custody for 12 months, with a new release date of December 17, 1996. However, on December 4, 1996, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office filed an SVP petition to commit Lyles.

Lyles argued he was entitled to dismissal because the SVP Act is intended to apply only to persons in custody, and he was in custody solely because his parole had been revoked twice for psychiatric treatment, on January 25, 1995 and again on January 5, 1996. Under Terhune, the revocations were illegal, and "[b]ut for the unlawful revocation of parole, [he] would not have been in custody and subject to SVP proceedings.... To proceed with the SVP case against [him] would be tantamount to going forward on evidence which is fruit of the poisonous tree."

2. The People's opposition, asserting trial court had jurisdiction to proceed.

The People argued Lyles's position was contrary to law in that Terhune did not mandate a dismissal of the People's petition. The People asserted the trial court's jurisdiction over an SVP petition was not dependent on the abstract concept of "legal" custody proposed by Lyles. Rather, all that is required under the SVP law is that the petition be filed prior to the inmate's actual release from custody. "If the individual is wrongfully incarcerated by the [Department of Corrections], the individual's remedy is to attempt to terminate the 'unlawful' custody by administrative appeal or writ of habeas corpus. However, under the unambiguous language of section 6601(a), as long as this individual is in 'actual custody under the jurisdiction of the [Department of Corrections]' nothing else is required to invoke the SVP process." The People also acknowledged, "[o]f course, if the custody [were] a complete sham without any pretense of legal authority, the [Department of Corrections] would not have 'jurisdiction' in any legal sense. This case does not present such an extreme situation."

3. Trial court's dismissal of SVP petition based on "unlawful custody."

The dismissal motion was heard on September 23, 1998. The trial court granted the motion, finding Terhune was dispositive. It ruled: "The cause under the Terhune case was the same cause for revocation as was the cause in this case. There appears to be no behavior or other documentation on the part of the Department of Corrections that would have justified either the first or second psychiatric hold placed against Mr. Lyles. Therefore, the Court, based upon Terhune, has to conclude that the revocation of his parole which led to the SVP proceeding was illegal under these circumstances. The Legislature doesn't talk about lawful custody. I don't think the Legislature presumes that the Department of Corrections would act unlawfully, and I'm sure that the Legislature intended that a person in custody subject to SVP review be lawfully in custody. It appears to the Court Mr. Lyles was not lawfully 4. The People's emergency writ petition granted.

in custody and that therefore had he not been in custody, there would have been no basis legally for initiating SVP review and the filing of the petition. So at this point, the Court concludes that the motion to dismiss must be granted under the authority of the Terhune case...." (Italics added.)

The People filed an emergency petition for writ of mandate and sought a stay of Lyles's release from custody. This court issued an alternative writ and stayed Lyles's release as well as all proceedings in the action.

CONTENTION

The People contend the trial court erred in ruling dismissal was mandated by Terhune. ²

DISCUSSION

1. The statutory scheme.

We begin with an overview of the SVP Act (§ 6600 et seq.), which was enacted in 1995.

The Legislature stated its purpose in adopting the SVP Act as follows: "The Legislature finds and declares that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders can be identified while they are incarcerated. These persons are not safe to be at large and if released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. The Legislature further finds and declares that it is in the interest of society to identify these individuals prior to the expiration of their terms of imprisonment. It is the intent of the Legislature that once identified, these individuals, if found to be likely to commit acts of sexually violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt, be confined and treated until such time that it can be determined that they no longer present a threat to society. [p] The Legislature further finds and declares that while these individuals have been duly punished for their criminal acts, they are, if adjudicated sexually violent predators, a continuing threat to society. The continuing danger posed by these individuals and the continuing basis for their judicial commitment is a currently diagnosed mental disorder which predisposes them to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. It is the intent of the Legislature that these individuals be committed and treated for their disorders only as long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive purposes." (Stats.1995, ch. 762, § 1, ch. 763, § 1.)

The SVP Act establishes a procedure that may result in the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator, which it defines as a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received...