Garcia-Melendez v. Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 21 September 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14–1560 (SEC)
• Citation: 227 F.Supp.3d 160
• Parties: Jarida GARCIA–MELENDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jose Rodriguez GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

227 F.Supp.3d 160

Jarida GARCIA–MELENDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jose Rodriguez GONZALEZ, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 14–1560 (SEC)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed September 21, 2016

Filed January 5, 2017

Jose A. Morales–Boscio, Harry Anduze–Montano, Harry Anduze Montano Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jaime J. Zampierollo–Vila, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, U.S. Senior District Judge

Jarida García and her immediate family (collectively, Plaintiffs) bring this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants, Agent José Rodríguez and Sergeant Luis López, violated their rights protected under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.¹ They also bring supplemental claims under Article II of the Commonwealth's Constitution and general tort claims under Puerto Rico law. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On the afternoon of July 17, 2013, Jarida García visited the Command Center of the Puerto Rico Police Department at Carolina (the police station) with her five year old daughter, V.B.G. Shortly after leaving the station, García noticed that an unmarked vehicle, without sirens or police lights, was tailgating her. She switched to the right lane to let the vehicle pass, but the vehicle followed her to the right lane. García became frightened and tried to call the police. Because the unmarked car was still following her, she exited to a side road and stopped to see whether the car would pass her. To García's surprise, the unmarked vehicle stopped behind her and she continued trying to call the police. When she looked back, she saw a man dressed as a police officer approaching her vehicle. García lowered her window and the officer, in an aggressive manner, ordered her to hand over her license and registration. Because the officer's uniform did not display his last name or his badge, García asked him to identify himself at least twice and inquired as to the reason he had stopped her. The officer, however, responded in a harsh tone: "I am the one asking questions here."

García told the officer that she did not feel safe and that she would give him her license and registration at the police station which she had just left. According to García, the unidentified officer, who was later revealed to be Defendant Agent Rodríguez, agreed to proceed with the traffic stop at the police station. Agent Rodríguez denies this, and instead alleges that García declined to turn over her license and registration, and fled the scene.

García then drove back to the police station and stopped at a traffic light on the left lane that turned towards the station. As she waited, Agent Rodríguez suddenly introduced his left hand through the window, grabbed García by the hair, and attempted to pull her out of her vehicle. García, in shock, held tightly to the steering wheel. She screamed in fear asking Rodríguez why he was attacking her. Her daughter, who witnessed the events, also started screaming. Realizing that García was still wearing her seatbelt, Agent Rodríguez grabbed her right arm, bent it towards her body, and handcuffed García. At some point, Agent Rodríguez managed to open the door and unlock García's seatbelt. He then pulled García out of the car and onto the street. While García was lying face-first on the pavement, Agent Rodríguez placed his knee and all of his weight on her back. García started yelling that she had a disability and that she was wearing a back brace

but Agent Rodríguez kept pulling her and tightening the handcuffs. Moments after Rodríguez arrested García, Agent Julio Toledo, two other female officers, and Sergeant López (Rodríguez's supervisor) arrived at the scene. Agent Toledo then took García to the Carolina Traffic Station in Canóvanas, where she was interviewed by Sergeant López. He noted that García had marks on her arms and that she was complaining about pain in her knees.

At approximately 7:30 p.m., García was taken to the Center for Diagnostic Treatment (CDT) in Canóvanas, where she was diagnosed with neck and back trauma. Five hours later, García was discharged with instructions to see a specialist due to the severity of her trauma. García's independent medical examiner, Dr. Fausto Boria, indicates in his expert report that, as a result of the incident, García suffered a herniated disc

; intercostal neuritis /neuralgia; fracture of the coronoid process or right ulna; right ulnar nerve entrapment ; and bilateral shoulder tendinitis, among other things. She also required a carpal tunnel decompression surgery. Dr. Boria concluded that García suffered a whole person impairment of 19% as a result of the traumas inflicted by Agent Rodríguez.

Immediately after being discharged from the CDT, García was taken to the Río Grande Courthouse where she was criminally charged with obstruction of justice pursuant to Article 246(a) of the Puerto Rico Penal Code of 2012. See P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 33, § 5336.² This provision makes it unlawful for any person to delay or interfere with any public officer or employee in the discharge or attempt to discharge any of his duties. see id. This misdemeanor carries a maximum prison sentence of six months or a fine not to exceed $5,000. See id. , § 5022. García was not represented by counsel at the probable cause hearing. The presiding judge found probable cause for her arrest. Following the judge's instructions, Agent Rodríguez, on behalf of V.B.G., filed a complaint for a protective order with the Puerto Rico Department of Family Affairs against García and her husband. On August 5, 2013, the complaint was dismissed.

On top of the obstruction of justice charge, Agent Rodríguez also issued two traffic tickets to García; one for talking on the phone while driving and another for disregarding his order to stop the vehicle. García filed a petition seeking review of the traffic tickets. On September 11, 2013, after a hearing where both García and Agent Rodríguez testified, the court dismissed the traffic violations stating that it gave "complete credibility to [García's] testimony." Docket # 60–5, p. 2.

A month later, on October 14, García was tried for the obstruction of justice charge. She was represented by counsel from the Puerto Rico Legal Assistance Society. Docket # 60–3, p. 3. At the hearing, the government introduced the testimony of Agent Rodríguez and Sergeant López. The record does not reveal whether defense counsel cross-examined either of these witnesses. The only evidence presented by the defense, as far as the record reveals, was García's testimony. The presiding judge convicted García for obstruction of justice and sentenced her to pay a $500 fine. Contrary to the judge that dismissed the traffic violations, the judge in the criminal trial said that she gave no credibility to García's testimony. See Docket # 49–2, p. 13. Defense counsel did not appeal her conviction.

On July 15, 2014, García and her immediate family filed this action against Agent Rodríguez and Sergeant López alleging a plethora of constitutional violations. In due course, Defendants moved for summary judgment raising several defenses, including collateral estoppel, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At this stage, it is axiomatic that courts "may not weigh the evidence," Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc. , 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994), and must construe the record in the "light most flattering" to the nonmovant. Soto–Padró v. Public Bldgs. Authority , 675 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2012). A court must similarly resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1863, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014).

III. Applicable Law and Analysis

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States by any person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory." See Grapentine v. Pawtucket Credit Union , 755 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2014). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) "that some person deprived him of a federal right," and (2) that such person "acted under color of state or territorial law." Id. (quoting Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) ). Here, Plaintiffs seek monetary compensation, inter alia, for damages suffered as a result of Defendants' alleged false arrest and excessive use of force against García.

The factual circumstances of the initial traffic stop and subsequent arrest leading to García's conviction are hotly contested. At the outset, Defendants seek to lock down Agent Rodríguez's version of the facts by arguing that, pursuant to the collateral estoppel doctrine, the criminal conviction precludes García from presenting her version of the facts surrounding her arrest. Because Defendants' motion relies heavily on Agent Rodríguez's version of the facts, the Court addresses their collateral estoppel defense first.

a. Collateral Estoppel

Federal courts must look to state law to determine whether a party to a § 1983 action would be barred from re-litigating an issue or claim that was raised or could have been raised in a previous state court action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ; Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) ; Arecibo Radio Corp. v. Puerto Rico , 825 F.2d 589, 591–92 (1st Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Puerto...