Garcia v. Burlington Northern R. Co., Civ. A. 82-C-1260.

• Court: United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
• Writing for the Court: John L. Pilon, Burlington Northern Railroad Co., Denver, Colo., for defendant
• Citation: 597 F. Supp. 1304
• Parties: Joe E. GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.
• Docket Number: Civ. A. 82-C-1260.
• Decision Date: 29 November 1984

597 F. Supp. 1304

Joe E. GARCIA, Plaintiff,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. 82-C-1260.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

November 29, 1984.

Douglas John Traeger, Denver, Colo., Norman Perl, Michael L. Weiner, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

John L. Pilon, Burlington Northern Railroad Co., Denver, Colo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CARRIGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Joe E. Garcia has moved for an award of prejudgment interest following a jury verdict and judgment entered in his favor on February 24, 1984. Defendant Burlington Northern Railroad Company opposes this motion. The parties have briefed the issues thoroughly and oral argument would not assist in resolving them.

On July 14, 1982, Garcia was seriously injured while working on the defendant's tracks near Wheatland, Wyoming. As a result, his left leg was amputated. He sued for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq., (1982), and a jury returned a verdict in his favor for $2,000,000.

Plaintiff now claims that he is entitled to prejudgment interest. Defendant responds that the governing statute in cases arising under federal law does not allow prejudgment interest. The statute provides,

"Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court .... Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of judgment ...."

597 F. Supp. 1305

28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). Burlington Northern seeks a strict construction of § 1961 that would preclude awarding prejudgment interest.

Federal courts may exercise equitable powers to grant prejudgment interest in certain cases arising under federal law. Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 68 S.Ct. 5, 92 L.Ed. 3 (1947). Absent an unequivocal statutory prohibition, a trial court may award prejudgment interest where that action would promote the congressional purposes in adopting the legislation giving rise to the claim. Id. at 373, 68 S.Ct. at 6. In Rodgers, the court reviewed the purposes of penalties imposed under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq., and concluded that prejudgment interest was not appropriate.

The Tenth Circuit, in Casto v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 562 F.2d 622, 624 (10th Cir.1977), discussed applicability of § 1961 in diversity cases. Although the court there decided to apply state law governing interest, it noted obiter dicta that § 1961 if applicable, would not have barred prejudgment interest.

Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund v. Taiariol, 671 F.2d 988 (6th Cir.1982), involved a damages award to employees under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for their employer's failure to deposit sufficient funds into employee trust funds. Relying on a narrow reading of § 1961, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that "Section 1961 does not by its silence bar the awarding of prejudgment interest in cases whose jurisdiction is grounded in the resolution of a federal question." Id. at 989 (citing many cases). The opinion declared that "traditional equitable principles would govern the award of such compensation." Id. See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Texas Eastern Trans. Corp., 551 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.1977); Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Export Drum Co., 359 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir.1966); Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 509 F.Supp. 353, 356 (E.D.N.Y.1981); Cris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F.Supp. 507, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).¹

Plaintiffs in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.1983), sued under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982), for injuries and deaths that occurred on a drilling platform ninety miles off the coast of Louisiana. Under the OCSLA, federal law governs fixed structures erected on the outer continental shelf. The OCSLA declares that where federal law is incomplete, the law of the state within which the structure would be located if the state's boundaries were extended seaward is to be applied as federal law. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1982). The court reviewed several cases applying § 1961 to OCSLA cases and adopted the "better view" that § 1961 does not prevent a trial judge from granting prejudgment interest where such an award is justified by "other principles of law."²

In the oft cited case of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d

597 F. Supp. 1306

583, 592-595 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989, 82 S.Ct. 606, 7 L.Ed.2d 526 (1962), the Second Circuit recognized that § 1961 does not foreclose prejudgment interest on personal injury awards. Claimants there brought an admiralty action under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when a steamship capsized. The court rejected the "hoary distinction" between liquidated and unliquidated damages and found strong policy considerations supporting a prejudgment interest award. First, the court recognized that the purpose of the Death on the High Seas Act, like that of the FELA, was to provide full compensation to injured parties. Second, the court noted that claimants could not be fully compensated without prejudgment interest. Finally, the court sought to deter tactical use of delay by defendants.³

Examination of the FELA's legislative history suggests that awarding prejudgment interest in FELA cases would promote the beneficent purposes which gave rise to the Act. Congress enacted the FELA to broaden and clarify the law applicable to parties injured while working for railroads, and to abrogate the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence in such cases. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Amending the Employers' Liability Act, S.Rep. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939). In Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432, 78 S.Ct. 394, 398, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958), the United States Supreme Court explained, "It is clear that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers...."

Apparently Congress intended the FELA to replace and expand the state law rights of injured railroad employees. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported on an early version of the Act:

"It is manifest from a consideration of the reports, both of the Senate and House committees, when the measure was pending before these bodies prior to its enactment, that the purpose of the statute was to extend and enlarge the remedy provided by law to employees engaged in interstate commerce in cases of death or injury to such employees while engaged in such service. No purpose or intent on the part of Congress can be found to limit or to take away from such an employee any right theretofore existing by which such employees were entitled to a more extended remedy than that conferred upon them by the Act."

Senate Judiciary Committee, Report on the 1910 Amendments to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 Cong.Rec. 4048 (1910) (quoted in Kozar v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 449 F.2d 1238, 1240 n. 1 (6th Cir.1971)).

Courts applying the FELA have recognized the underlying congressional intent by granting full recovery, liberally interpreting the Act to allow damages for medical and hospital expenses,⁴ lost earnings,⁵ loss of earning capacity,⁶ pain and suffering,⁷ fear and anxiety,⁸ and aggravation of prior conditions.⁹

In addition to the non-FELA federal question cases allowing prejudgment interest, many states allow such awards. Several states have statutes granting prejudgment

597 F. Supp. 1307

interest in personal injury cases as a matter of right.¹⁰ Other states allow prejudgment interest at the court's discretion.¹¹

The legislative history and subsequent judicial applications of the FELA demonstrate that granting prejudgment interest in FELA cases would promote the policies underlying the Act. Under Rodgers v. United States, supra, and the above cited cases allowing prejudgment interest, it seems clear that the law...