Garcia v. City of Lubbock

• Decision Date: 26 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 5:20-CV-053-H,5:20-CV-053-H
• Citation: Garcia v. City of Lubbock, 487 F.Supp.3d 555 (N.D. Tex. 2020)
• Parties: Raul GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEXAS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

487 F.Supp.3d 555

Raul GARCIA, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEXAS, et al., Defendants.

No. 5:20-CV-053-H

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Lubbock Division.

Signed June 26, 2020

Stanley Rafe Foreman, Hutchison & Stoy PLLC, Lubbock, TX, Susan E. Hutchison, Hutchison & Stoy PLLC, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff.

Jeff C. Hartsell, City of Lubbock, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant City of Lubbock, Texas.

Matt D. Matzner, Morgan Day Vaughan, Crenshaw DuPree & Milam, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant Texas Lubbock County.

Nichol L. Bunn, Amber Rochelle Pickett, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant Wellpath LLC.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) AND THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Raul Garcia brings several civil-rights claims, including (1) deliberate-indifference claims against individual employees of the Lubbock County Detention Center (LCDC); (2) failure-to-train claims against supervisors in the Lubbock County Sheriff's Office (LCSO); and (3) deliberate-indifference and false-arrest claims against the arresting police officers. While the Court recognizes the gravity of Garcia's allegations, the Court concludes that Garcia's claims against the individual defendants must be dismissed under binding precedent. First, Garcia fails to allege sufficient facts to state deliberate-indifference claims against any of the individual jail employees, except that the Court declines to rule on whether he has adequately stated a claim against Natalie Ybarra because, in any event, she is entitled to qualified immunity. Second, although Garcia adequately states failure-to-train claims against LCSO supervisors, the supervisors are likewise entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, Garcia has failed to adequately state false-arrest claims or deliberate-indifference claims against the police officers, who are also entitled to qualified immunity, because his allegations are consistent with the officers' position that they arrested Garcia and transported him to jail because they believed Garcia was intoxicated. Thus, the Court grants the individuals' motions to dismiss with prejudice, except that the Court grants Garcia leave to amend as to his deliberate-indifference claim against Ybarra and his failure-to-train claims against Rowe and Hood. This dismissal does not affect Garcia's claims against the City of Lubbock, Lubbock County, or Wellpath, LLC.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

The following alleged facts are taken from Garcia's First Amended Complaint, which the Court must accept as true when resolving the motions to dismiss. Dkt. No. 33; Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016). Garcia alleges that he has been diagnosed as a diabetic and underwent chemotherapy for cancer. See id. at 3. According to Garcia, he was wearing two medical bracelets at the time of the incidents in question: one to inform responders of his chemotherapy port and the other to inform responders of his diabetes. Id. at 4. Garcia entered United Supermarket in Lubbock, Texas at approximately 12:45 p.m. on May 18, 2018. Id. While in the store, Garcia began to experience a hyperglycemic episode, which resulted in dizziness, confusion, and difficulty communicating. Id. Because Garcia exhibited those symptoms, the manager of the supermarket escorted Garcia from the store and called the police. Id. at 4–5.

Officers Mark Ellison and Joshua Conklin allegedly arrived at the supermarket at approximately 1:30 p.m. Id. at 5. The officers questioned Garcia, but they became annoyed by his lack of responsiveness and handcuffed him. Id. Garcia alleges that, although the medical bracelets were clearly visible to the officers and Garcia did not smell of alcohol or drugs, the officers did not inquire about Garcia's medical condition. Id. The officers arrested Garcia for public intoxication, placed Garcia in the back of Officer Ellison's patrol car, and transported him to jail. Id.

Per Garcia, he was in and out of consciousness while en route to jail, but the officers yelled at him to remain awake. Id. at 6–7. Ellison labeled Garcia as uncooperative upon their arrival at the jail at approximately 2:02 p.m. Id. at 7. Garcia further alleges that he has not been provided any video of what events transpired between 2:35 p.m. and 5:08 p.m. Id. Ellison indicated on his arrest report that he did not believe that Garcia was at risk due to a medical condition, and he omitted any mention of Garcia's medical bracelets from the report. Id. at 8.

Several individual defendants interacted with Garcia at LCDC. Lauren Maldonado was the "receiving officer" who received and booked Garcia into the jail. Id. at 7. Natalie Ybarra, a jailer, observed Garcia being escorted into the jail, at which time he was still wearing his medical bracelets. Id. at 8. Paul Cartwright and Christopher Mendez, who are also jailers at LCDC, escorted Garcia to a cell. Id. at 8. Christopher Martinez, also a jailer, patted down Garcia and removed his handcuffs. Id. At some point, Garcia's medical bracelets were removed. Id. Maldonado catalogued Garcia's property, but she did not include any mention of the medical bracelets. Id. at 9.

Jail records indicate that Garcia was placed on a "15[-]minute close watch due to his medical screening being incomplete." Id. On May 18, 2018, Cleadon S. Bigham and Monica Lopez were responsible for completing Jail Security Checks and Close Watch Checks at the jail. Id. Garcia alleges that Bigham and Lopez failed to conduct those checks but instead fraudulently entered records indicating that they had done so. See id. at 9–10. Bigham later stated that, at 4:50 p.m., he observed Garcia laying on the floor on his stomach. Id. at 10. Further, Bigham stated that he and Dustin Hood then rolled Garcia onto his side and advised medical staff of the need for assistance via radio. Id.

Ybarra gave a statement in which she indicated that, at 4:40 p.m., she heard that Garcia was unconscious. Id. While Ybarra claims that she contacted emergency personnel for assistance at 5:00 p.m., Garcia alleges that Ybarra's statement is contradicted by the video. Id. Ultimately, EMS transported Garcia by gurney out of the jail at approximately 5:31 p.m. Id. at 11. Garcia alleges that Cartwright and Ybarra then created an incident report, in which they fraudulently labeled him an "uncooperative inmate" and stated that "medical [evaluation or treatment] was offered, but inmate denied." Id.

Upon his arrival at University Medical Center in Lubbock, Garcia was diagnosed with diabetic ketoacidosis, a life-threatening complication of diabetes. He alleges that he suffered complications and permanent effects as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis and the delay in receiving treatment. Id. Lab tests at the hospital confirmed that no alcohol or narcotics were present in Garcia's system. Id.

B. Procedural History

Garcia filed his Original Complaint on March 6, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. On April 2, 2020, Lubbock County, Rowe and Hood, and the individual jail employees (except Bigham, Mendez, and Lopez) moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos. 22–24. Bigham, Mendez, and Lopez later filed separate motions to dismiss on the same grounds. Dkt. Nos. 28, 39. Officers Conklin and Ellison did not move to dismiss the claims against them, but they asserted qualified immunity in their Answers. Dkt. Nos. 22, 38.¹ The individual jail employees and Lubbock County also asserted qualified immunity and asked the Court to limit discovery. Dkt. No. 30.

In response to the motions to dismiss, Garcia asked the Court to extend the time period to respond to those motions and to allow Garcia access to discovery. Dkt. No. 27. Garcia then filed his First Amended Complaint on April 23, 2020. Dkt. No. 33. On May 4, 2020, the Court denied Garcia's motion for discovery, ordering him to respond to the motions to dismiss and file Rule 7(a) replies on the qualified-immunity issue. Dkt. No. 37. The Court, however, permitted limited discovery on the issue of qualified immunity to proceed because the parties represented that they had agreed to a period of such limited discovery. See id. at 10. Garcia filed his Rule 7(a) replies on May 22, 2020. Dkt. No. 45. The motions to dismiss and the issue of qualified immunity have been fully briefed, and these issues are ripe for disposition.

2. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter which, when taken as true, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. , 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Richardson v. Axion Logistics, L.L.C. , 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc. , 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Court does not "accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Gentilello v. Rege , 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc. , 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) ). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Turner v. Pleasant , 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

When a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim, a court should generally give the plaintiff at least one chance to amend before dismissing the action with prejudice. See Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ("The court should freely give leave...