Garcia v. Davis

Decision Date16 November 2018
Docket NumberCivil No. SA-17-CA-01078-XR
PartiesSIMON RENE GARCIA, TDCJ No. 01953699, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioner Simon Rene Garcia's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1), Petitioner's Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 7), and Respondent's Amended Answer (ECF No. 15).1 Having reviewed the record and pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is also denied a certificate of appealability.

Procedural History

The facts of Petitioner's offense were accurately summarized by the Fourth Court of Appeals on direct appeal:

This case stems from the murder of Samuel Wass on March 26, 2012. [Petitioner Garcia] was driving his Toyota Tundra truck on the day in question. [Petitioner Garcia] stopped the vehicle near where Wass was sitting, and [Petitioner] and an unidentified third-party exited the vehicle. An argument ensued. The argument escalated and the unidentified individual shot Wass several times with a .45 Glock firearm. [Petitioner Garcia] and the unidentifiedindividual then left in [Petitioner Garcia]'s vehicle, with [Petitioner Garcia] in the driver's seat.

Garcia v. State, 486 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref'd); ECF No. 13-3 at 1.

Petitioner was indicted for Wass's murder on December 12, 2012. ECF No. 13-12 at 6 (Indictment). On August 19, 2014, a jury returned a guilty verdict pursuant to the law of parties and assessed punishment at thirty years of imprisonment. State v. Garcia, No. 2012-CR-10101 (175th Dist. Ct., Bexar Cnty., Tex. Aug. 19, 2014); ECF No. 13-12 at 121 (Judgment). Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review on July 27, 2016. Garcia v. State, No. 0308-16 (Tex. Crim. App.); ECF No. 13-11. Petitioner admits he has not filed a state habeas corpus application challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. ECF No. 1 at 3.2

Instead, Petitioner filed the instant petition for federal habeas corpus relief on October 24, 2017. ECF No. 1. In the petition, Petitioner raised two grounds for relief: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction for murder under the law of parties and (2) the trial court committed jury-charge error by failing to instruct the jury that each of the two murder application paragraphs should be considered in tandem with its own law of parties instruction. On February 12, 2018, Petitioner filed a Memorandum in Support wherein he provided supplemental briefing on the insufficient evidence claim and waived his second claim alleging jury-charge error. ECF No. 7 at 2, n2. The Director, relying exclusively on the state court's adjudication of the sufficiency claim on direct appeal, argues federal habeas relief is precluded under the AEDPA's deferential standard. ECF No. 15.

Standard of Review

Petitioner's federal habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided by the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. Under § 2254(d), a petitioner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). This intentionally difficult standard stops just short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).

A federal habeas court's inquiry into unreasonableness should always be objective rather than subjective, with a focus on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable" and not whether it was incorrect or erroneous. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable, regardless of whether the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion itself. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Instead, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, which is a "substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). So long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness of the state court's decision, a state court'sdetermination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In other words, to obtain federal habeas relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court, Petitioner must show that the state court's ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; see also Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011).

Analysis

Petitioner contends the State failed to present legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for murder under the law of parties. Specifically, Petitioner contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he (1) intended to kill the victim and (2) he assisted the gunman in doing so. Petitioner's allegations were rejected by the state appellate court on direct appeal and again by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals when it refused Petitioner's PDR. As discussed below, Petitioner fails to show that either court's determination was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, federal law, or that it was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record.

I. Relevant Facts

On direct appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals accurately summarized the evidence presented at Petitioner's trial:

The State's case was tediously presented through the testimony of twenty witnesses and the admission of over fifty exhibits. Because most of [Petitioner Garcia]'s appellate issues revolve around the sufficiency of the State's evidence, a more detailed version of the testimony is provided below.

A. Responding Officers

San Antonio Police Officer Jose Rojas responded to an emergency signal and a report of shots fired. By the time he arrived at the scene, the victim, Samuel Wass, was being attended to by emergency personnel. Officer Rojas was able toidentify five witnesses: Jennifer Guzman, Bernabe Robledo Jr., Marissa Casanova, Sally Garcia, and Domingo Perales.
During the officer's attempts to identify the individuals involved in the shooting, several witnesses identified [Petitioner Garcia] as the driver of the vehicle and an unidentified individual as the passenger and shooter. [Petitioner Garcia] was described as wearing a red shirt, dark hair, medium-skin tone, and smaller than the passenger. The passenger, and the shooter, was unknown to the witnesses. The witnesses described the passenger as heavy-set with a goatee, medium complexion, and wearing a white, polo shirt with stripes. The witnesses were also able to describe the vehicle being driven by [Petitioner Garcia] as a silver-gray Toyota Tundra and to provide a license plate.
San Antonio Police Officer Faras Khalaf arrived shortly after the shooting. He observed Guzman providing medical attention to Wass. Officer Khalaf further relayed hearing Marissa Casanova scream, "It was Simon. It was Simon." Marissa did not, however, provide the officer with a last name. Finally, Officer Khalaf's investigation also supported the vehicle contained two individuals, but only the passenger was shooting.
Officer Randall Matthey, also with the San Antonio Police Department, testified the vehicle was originally identified as a silver-colored Dodge. The identification was later corrected to a silver-colored, four-door, Toyota Tundra with a matching hard cover.

B. The Eye-Witnesses

The State called several witnesses that either witnessed the shooting or arrived shortly thereafter.
1. Bernabe Robledo Jr.
The State's first lay witness was Bernabe Robledo Jr. At the time of the shooting, Robledo, an insurance adjuster, was sitting in his vehicle writing an estimate for Domingo Perales. Robles [sic] testified a red Honda Civic pulled in behind him and, while the female exited the vehicle and entered the residence, the male stayed in the vehicle. Robledo testified that, shortly thereafter, a silver truck pulled up and the two individuals in the truck were arguing with the male in the Honda. Robledo described two Hispanic men exiting the truck; the shorter one from the driver's side and the bigger one from the passenger door.
As the arguing continued, Robledo saw the driver yelling at the Honda passenger. Robledo was trying to mind his own business and finish the estimate when he heard shots fired. When he looked up, Robledo identified the bigger guy as the shooter and further testified he saw a black .45 Glock in the passenger's hand. Robledo heard the shooter say something akin to, "I told you not to do that shit and I told you," before firing several more times at the victim. When the victim "rolled out of the car," Robledo testified the passenger shot him again asthe victim tried to duck behind the car towards the curb. When questioned, Robledo believed h
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