Garcia v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 12 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 97-0005(GK).,CIV. A. 97-0005(GK). |
| Citation | 56 F.Supp.2d 1 |
| Parties | Frede GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Sarah Mortenson, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, Washington, D.C.
John F. McCabe, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Washington, D.C.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs Frede Garcia, Lawrence Caldwell, and Antonio Tirado are District of Columbia Department of Corrections inmates. They bring this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Department of Corrections employees Rosamaria Chapa, James Harvey, Luis Stevens, and Cheryl Brown in their individual capacities and the District of Columbia in its municipal capacity. Plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory relief. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Having considered Defendants' Motion, Plaintiffs' Opposition, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set out below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs assert that on September 3, 1996, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Corporal Rosamaria Chapa, a Mexican-American, entered the two-person room of Plaintiffs Garcia and Caldwell in Unit 2-Down at the Lorton Medium Security Facility ("MSF"), and ordered Plaintiff Garcia, a Mexican-American, to dress and report to her at the Officer's Desk. Complaint ("Compl."), ¶ 10. When Plaintiff Garcia reported to Corporal Chapa, Plaintiffs allege, she "made an unsolicited sexual proposition" and Plaintiff Garcia refused. Compl., ¶ 10. The conversation was held in Spanish and "there were no other witnesses."1 Compl., ¶ 10. On September 6, 1996, during the midnight count, Corporal Chapa observed Plaintiff Garcia making a sandwich and informed him that he would receive a disciplinary report. Compl., ¶ 11. Later that night, Plaintiff Garcia was taken to the Control Center where he was interviewed by Lieutenant Harvey. Id. Plaintiffs assert that Lieutenant Harvey stated that Plaintiff Garcia should accept fourteen (14) days of `extra duty' for the offense of having bread in his cell. Plaintiff Garcia then told Lieutenant Harvey that Corporal Chapa was retaliating against him for refusing to enter into a sexual relationship with her. Id. Plaintiffs claim that Lieutenant Harvey ignored Plaintiff Garcia's allegation of sexual harassment. Compl., ¶ 11. From September 7 to September 20, 1996, Corporal Chapa would enter Plaintiff Garcia's room at about 3:30 a.m., order him to dress and report to the Control Center. Compl., ¶ 12. While at the Control Center, Plaintiff Garcia would inform Lieutenant Harvey of Corporal Chapa's sexual harassment and retaliation but Lieutenant Harvey "failed to advise his supervisors". Id.
On September 10, 1996, Plaintiff Garcia with the assistance of Plaintiffs Caldwell and Tirado filed a formal grievance asserting that Corporal Chapa was sexually harassing him. Compl., Exhibit 1. Plaintiffs allege that as a result, Corporal Chapa started writing disciplinary reports against them. Plaintiff Caldwell filed two grievances against Corporal Chapa asserting that Corporal Chapa was harassing him. Compl., Exhibits 7 & 8. Plaintiff Caldwell was informed that a Fact-Finding Committee was created to investigate his allegations. Compl., ¶ 20 & Exhibit 9.
On September 13, 1996, Plaintiff Garcia met with Lieutenant Stevens who informed Plaintiff Garcia that he must sign a "Cease and Desist" order. Compl., ¶ 11. Lieutenant Stevens, in Spanish, incorrectly described the order as stating that Plaintiff Garcia had filed a charge against Corporal Chapa when it actually stated that "an allegation of sexual misconduct has been filed against you by the referenced officer." Id. & Compl., Exhibit 2. Plaintiff Garcia signed the order. On November 4, 1996, Plaintiff Garcia pointed out the error in the order to Associate Warden Lynch who stated Plaintiff Garcia would receive a correct order. Compl., ¶ 24. On November 13, 1996, Plaintiff Garcia received the correct order and signed it. Compl., ¶ 24 & Exhibit 15.
On September 24, 1996, Plaintiff Garcia was advised that a Fact-Finding Committee was being formed to investigate his allegations against Corporal Chapa. Compl., ¶ 16. It was comprised of Corporal Brown, who is African-American, and Lieutenant Stevens, who Plaintiffs assert is African-Hispanic. Compl., ¶¶ 7 & 8. During Plaintiff Caldwell's interview by the Committee, Lieutenant Stevens asked Plaintiff Caldwell, who is Irish-American, what he was going to do when Plaintiff Garcia changed his story. Compl., ¶ 18. Plaintiffs assert that the Fact-Finding Committee refused to call two of Plaintiff Garcia's witnesses, Plaintiff Tirado and Carlos Contreas, and that the Committee was prejudiced because Plaintiff Garcia was not African-American. Id. By a memorandum dated October 23, 1996, from Deputy Director Poteat, Plaintiff Garcia was informed that the "Committee found that there was no probable cause of sexual misconduct by Officer Chapa" against him and the Committee did not make any recommendations. Compl., Exhibit 11. On October 24, 1996, Deputy Director Poteat asked that the Committee be reopened so that Plaintiff Garcia's two additional witnesses could be interviewed. Compl, Exhibit 12. On November 12, 1996, the Committee interviewed Plaintiff Tirado. Compl., ¶ 28.
Plaintiffs assert that Corporal Chapa wrote one or more disciplinary reports against all the inmates in Unit 2-Down. Compl., ¶ 22. The MSF administration held a meeting of all the Hispanic residents at MSF. Compl., ¶ 24. In addition, at the request of Warden Elizie, a town meeting of all the residents of Unit 2-Down was held on November 9, 1996 by the prison officials. Compl., ¶ 25.
On the morning of December 3, 1996, a "mass shakedown" of Unit 2-Down occurred and Plaintiffs assert that they were "targeted" for "special handling". Compl., ¶ 32. Plaintiffs' rooms were thoroughly searched and Plaintiffs Tirado and Garcia were issued disciplinary reports for possession of contraband and for creating a fire hazard. Id. Plaintiffs assert that the contraband items were sugar and cigarettes, both of which are available for purchase from the canteen truck at MSF. Id. & Exhibit 19. Additionally, Plaintiff Tirado's AM/FM radio was confiscated as "contraband" and no receipt was issued for it nor has it been returned. Compl., ¶ 33.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert that they are each scheduled for parole within the next twelve months and parole may be denied for negative institutional behavior. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' actions were "intended to intimidate, annoy, alarm and verbally abuse Plaintiffs and deliberately and intentionally inflict humiliation and degradation upon them." Compl., 2. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, Department Order 3350.2A and the Lorton Regulations Approval Act ("LRAA").
In their Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs did not present clear and convincing evidence of retaliatory motive nor did they demonstrate that they have been injured in the exercise of their constitutional rights. Defendants argue that the individual Defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity and that Defendant Harvey is not liable because there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The factual allegations of the complaint must be presumed true and liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Shear v. National Rifle Ass'n of America, 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C.Cir. 1979).
Under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) Fed. R.Civ.P. Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering a summary judgment motion, "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C.Cir.1989). The non-moving party's opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party is "required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find" in its favor. Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants retaliated against them for filing grievances against Corporal Chapa. To state a claim for retaliation, Plaintiffs must allege: (1) that they were engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) that prison officials impermissibly...
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