Garcia v. Garcia (In re Garcia)

Decision Date04 August 2017
Docket NumberD070493
Citation221 Cal.Rptr.3d 319,13 Cal.App.5th 1334
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Florencia B. and Juan J. GARCIA. Florencia B. Garcia, Respondent, v. Juan J. Garcia, Appellant.

Scott B. Tepper for Appellant.

Marcus Family Law Center and Erin K. Tomlinson, El Centro, for Respondent.

IRION, J.

In an earlier action in which Florencia B. Garcia petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Juan J. Garcia (Dissolution Action), the family court found that Florencia did not meet her burden of establishing a valid marriage and quashed service as to Juan and dismissed the action.1 Florencia then filed the underlying action in which she petitions for nullity of marriage (Nullity Action). In the Nullity Action, Juan appeals from two orders of the family court: (1) an order in which the court found that Florencia is the spouse or putative spouse of Juan and ruled that she may proceed with the claims in her petition (Putative Spouse Order); and (2) an order in which the court directed Juan to pay Florencia spousal support arrears, ongoing spousal support and attorney fees and costs (Support Order).

In challenging the two orders, Juan raises a single legal issue for review on appeal: Under the doctrine of res judicata, does the judgment in the Dissolution Action bar the relief Florencia seeks in the Nullity Action?

Because the Dissolution Action and the Nullity Action involve different primary rights, we affirm the Support Order. Because the Putative Spouse Order is not a final order, we dismiss Juan's appeal from that order.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Dissolution Action

In June 2014, Florencia filed the Dissolution Action. She alleged that she and Juan married in October 1989 and separated in May 2014 (24 years seven months) and, on the basis of irreconcilable differences, petitioned for a dissolution of the marriage and a determination of property rights, spousal support, and attorney fees and costs. At the same time, Florencia filed a request for an order that Juan pay spousal support and attorney fees and costs.

In response, Juan filed a request for an order to quash service of the summons and petition and to dismiss the Dissolution Action. In support of his request, Juan included evidence that he contended established that he and Florencia were never married. Florencia filed an opposition that included evidence that she contended established that she and Juan were married legally in Mexico.

Shortly before the hearing on the parties' requests for orders, Juan submitted additional evidence in support of his position that the parties were never legally married.

Following hearing, the family court found that there was no marriage and granted Juan's request for an order.2 In November 2014, the court filed a written order quashing service and dismissing the Dissolution Action. Florencia did not appeal.

B. The Nullity Action

Approximately five months after dismissal of the Dissolution Action, Florencia filed the Nullity Action. Alleging a marriage to Juan in October 1989 and a separation from Juan in May 2014 (24 years seven months), Florencia petitioned for a judgment of nullity on the ground of fraud and a determination of property rights, spousal support and attorney fees and costs.

In response, Juan filed a request for an order quashing service of the summons and petition. Relying on the October 2014 order quashing service of the summons and petition in, and dismissing, the Dissolution Action—and, in particular, the family court's finding that there was no marriage between Florencia and Juan—Juan argued that "since there was no marriage, there is nothing to annul." (Capitalization omitted.)

In opposition, Florencia argued that her claims in the Nullity Action were not barred by the preclusive effect of the judgment in the Dissolution Action because the claims in the Nullity Action involved a different primary right than the claims in the Dissolution Action.

In a minute order filed in July 2015, the family court denied Juan's request for an order to quash service of the summons and petition.

When he responded to the petition, Juan again asserted that the parties were never married, further contending that at all times Florencia knew both that they were never legally married and that she had no marital rights. Juan requested a finding that Florencia is not a putative spouse and an order that Florencia pay his attorney fees and costs.

Meanwhile, Florencia had filed a request for an order that Juan pay guideline temporary spousal support and attorney fees and costs.3 She testified that Juan's motion to quash service of the summons and petition in the Dissolution Action was the first time that Juan had contended they were not legally married. From this evidence, Florencia countered that Juan had defrauded her and argued that she was a putative spouse entitled to property rights, spousal support and attorney fees and costs.

Juan filed a responsive declaration and other evidence in opposition to Florencia's request. For the most part, the evidence supported Juan's contention that he and Florencia were never married.

Florencia filed a reply declaration that contained evidence in support of her position that, in October 1989, she and Juan legally married.

In December 2015, the family court presided over a short cause trial to determine whether Florencia was a putative spouse4 —with the understanding that other issues would be tried later.5 In relevant part, in the findings and order after hearing (previously identified as the Putative Spouse Order), the family court found that "Florencia is the spouse or putative spouse of Juan" and concluded that "she may pursue her claims as set forth in her petition(s), including support, award of property and obligations, attorney fees, and litigation costs." (Some capitalization omitted.) The court continued the hearing until mid-January 2016 for the purpose of considering the requests for spousal support and attorney fees and costs.6

At the continued hearing, the family court presided over a short cause trial on the issues of temporary spousal support and attorney fees and costs. After considering the evidence presented and the argument of counsel, in the findings and order after hearing (previously identified as the Support Order), the court found that Florencia is entitled to putative spouse benefits and ordered Juan to pay Florencia: a lump sum of $19,026.48 as spousal support arrears; temporary monthly spousal support of $1,072 from and after September 2015; and $20,000 in attorney fees and costs.

In one notice of appeal, Juan timely appealed from both the Putative Spouse Order and the Support Order.

II.DISCUSSION

The pertinent ruling in the Putative Spouse Order is that Florencia is Juan's "spouse or putative spouse" and that she may proceed with the claims in her Nullity Petition. The pertinent ruling in the Support Order is that Juan must pay Florencia specified amounts of spousal support arrears, temporary monthly spousal support and attorney fees and costs. Juan argues that, in reviewing these rulings, we must decide whether the judgment of dismissal in the Dissolution Action bars Florencia's claims in this Nullity Action.

We review de novo a trial court's ruling on the application of the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. ( Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, 156, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 173.)

We affirm the Support Order. As we will explain, because the Dissolution Action and the Nullity Action involve different primary rights, the judgment of dismissal in the Dissolution Action is not a bar to the Nullity Action. First, however, we dismiss Juan's appeal from the Putative Support Order. As we will explain, because the Putative Spouse Order is not an appealable order, we lack jurisdiction.

A. Putative Spouse Order

Substantively, the Putative Spouse Order provides in full as follows: "Without determining at this time whether Florencia is actually married to Juan, the Court finds that Florencia is the spouse or putative spouse of Juan such that she may pursue her claims as set forth in her petition(s), including support, award of property and obligations, attorney fees, and litigation costs."7 (Some capitalization omitted.) The family court continued the hearing to a date certain for the purpose of considering Florencia's requests for spousal support and attorney fees and costs.

Appellate courts have jurisdiction over a direct appeal, like the present one, only where there is an appealable order or judgment. ( Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149, 23 P.3d 43.) "The right to appeal is wholly statutory." ( Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 571, 243 P.3d 575, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1 ; accord, In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685, 687, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 94 ( Griffin ), citing § 904.1.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), subject to statutory exceptions inapplicable here, an appeal may be taken only from "a judgment" of the superior court. The judgment contemplated by this statute is " "one final judgment in an action ... which in effect ends the suit in the court in which it was entered, and finally determines the rights of the parties in relation to the matter in controversy." " ( Bank of America v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 697, 701–702, 128 P.2d 357 ; see Code Civ. Proc., § 577 ["A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding."].) The intent of this statute is to codify the " final judgment rule ,’ " part of our common law, by which " ‘a [ppellate] review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case " in order to avoid " ‘piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action.’ " ( Griffin , supra , 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 687, 19...

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