Garcia v. Gasparri

• Decision Date: 12 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 3:00CV1576(JBA).,3:00CV1576(JBA).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Gabriel GARCIA v. Robert GASPARRI

193 F.Supp.2d 445

Gabriel GARCIA v. Robert GASPARRI

No. 3:00CV1576(JBA).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 12, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John R. Williams, Dawne Westbrook, Williams & Pattis, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, Office of the City Attorney, Bridgeport, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. # 25]

ARTERTON, District Judge.

This suit was brought by Gabriel Garcia against Robert Gasparri, a detective in the Bridgeport Police Department in Connecticut. In February 1999, Garcia was arrested pursuant to a warrant sought by Gasparri, which alleged that Garcia had perpetrated a robbery. After being acquitted of the charges¹ by a jury, Garcia brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut law. Garcia alleges that Gasparri procured the arrest warrant from a Superior Court Judge by recklessly withholding and concealing evidence that was material to a determination of probable cause, and that the judge would not have issued the warrant for his arrest if the information were included.

Gasparri has moved for summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs claims, claiming that the undisputed facts demonstrate that there was probable cause to arrest Garcia. Alternatively, he argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

For the reasons set out below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Standard

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute will be satisfied if he or she can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, must come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party").

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, "`the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). However, a party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e).

II. Factual Background

On July 15, 1998, five friends, sitting in an area by the Long Island Sound known as St. Mary's By The Sea, were robbed at gunpoint by a man and a woman. The male robber brandished a silver handgun and took money and jewelry from the five victims.² After the robbery, the victims stopped a patrol car and reported the robbery. They indicated to the reporting officer that they knew the identities of the individuals who robbed them, and named Gabriel Garcia and Maylene Doyle as suspects. Two of the victims, Conrad and Merly, recognized Garcia from Notre Dame Catholic High School, where they all attended school together.

The next day, Lebedevitch brought a copy of the 1998 Notre Dame Catholic High School yearbook, given to her by Karowski, to the precinct to show the police a photo of Garcia. On July 18, Gasparri was assigned as the detective to investigate the case. He spoke on the phone with Lebedevitch and attempted to contact the other four victims. One of the victims brought a 1997 yearbook from Notre Dame Catholic High School to the precinct to aid in Gasparri's investigation.

Gasparri interviewed Perry on October 17, 1998. During this interview, Perry picked out Garcia from a photo line-up, which used photos from a high school yearbook. Perry was unable to identify Doyle, the alleged accomplice. In November, Gasparri interviewed Lebedevitch. He showed her a photo line-up, using the 1998 yearbook picture of Garcia, but she was not able to pick him out. Lebedevitch had, however, brought a copy of the 1997 school yearbook with her, and showed the photo of Garcia to Gasparri as the man who committed the robbery. Gasparri then assembled a second photo line-up, using the 1997 yearbook photo, from which Lebedevitch positively identified Garcia. Lebedevitch explained to Gasparri that Garcia's hair in the first photo she was shown was different from the way it appeared both at the scene of the crime and in the second photo. Lebedevitch, too, was unable to identify Doyle.

The three male victims never gave statements or positively identified Garcia as the perpetrator. Conrad and Merly had indicated to Gasparri in October that they would provide statements regarding Garcia, but in November they reneged and said that they did not think they could identify the suspect. Krasowski identified Garcia as the male perpetrator in a telephone conversation, but never showed up for his interview appointment with Gasparri.

In his affidavit supporting the application for an arrest warrant for Garcia, Gasparri wrote that there were five victims of the robbery. Further, he noted that Lebedevitch told him that two of the male victims, Merly and Conrad, recognized Garcia from Notre Dame Catholic High School. Gasparri's affidavit also described his interviews with Perry and Lebedevitch, in which they identified Garcia as the male perpetrator, including Lebedevitch's inability to identify the first photo of Garcia. The affidavit does not describe the circumstances of the three male victims's (Merly, Conrad and Krasowski) failures to provide identifications of Garcia, nor does the affidavit describe the inability of Perry and Lebedevitch to positively identify Doyle.

Based on Gasparri's affidavit, a Judge of the Superior Court of Connecticut issued the arrest warrant on February 2, 1999. Garcia was subsequently arrested and charged in connection with the robbery. He was acquitted of the charges by a jury and thereafter filed this suit.

III. Analysis

A. Probable Cause

The threshold question for the Court is whether, on the facts alleged, Garcia's right to be free from arrest without probable cause was violated. This question is primary both for a § 1983 false arrest or malicious prosecution analysis and for a qualified immunity analysis. First, the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a civil rights claim alleging false arrest or malicious prosecution. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir.2001) ("no factual civil rights claim for false arrest can exist where there is probable cause"), citing Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1995). Second, the analysis for assessing Gasparri's qualified immunity defense requires a determination of probable cause, because the Court first inquires as to whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged, and only if the answer is in the affirmative determines whether the officer's conduct, though violative of the defendant's rights, is protected by qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ("If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity."). Thus, in the case at bar, the primary and dispositive question for the Court is whether the undisputed facts establish that Gasparri had probable cause to arrest Garcia.

An arrest pursuant to a warrant signed by a neutral judge or magistrate normally carries a presumption that it was made with probable cause. Artis v. Liotard, 934 F.Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y.1996) ("A magistrate's finding of probable cause in issuing a warrant creates a presumption that probable cause existed."); see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) ("Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to [search] warrants."). And, a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces "heavy burden." Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1991), citing Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir.1991). However, "a plaintiff can demonstrate that this right [not to be arrested without probable cause] was violated where the officer submitting the probable cause affidavit `knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in his affidavit' or omitted material information, and that such false or omitted information was `necessary to the finding of probable cause.'" Soares v. State of Conn., 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir.1993), quoting Golino, 950 F.2d at 870-71; see also Artis, 934 F.Supp. at 103 (presumption of validity "is rebuttable only though proof of fraud, perjury or the misrepresentation or falsification of evidence"); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Recklessness may be inferred where the omitted information was critical to the probable cause determination. Golino, 950 F.2d at 871.

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