Garcia v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co
| Decision Date | 10 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 07-23044-CIV. |
| Citation | 712 F.Supp.2d 1316 |
| Parties | Esperanza GARCIA, as Representative of the Estate of Paola Penafiel, Plaintiffv.GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE CO., Defendant.Geico General Insurance Co., Plaintiffv.Edgar Baena, Miguel Baena, Esperanza Garcia, as personal representative of the Estate of Paola Penafiel, Enterprise Leasing Co., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Arturo C. Martinez, Esq., Shutts & Bowen LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Marc R. Ginsberg, Esq., Miami Lakes, FL, for Defendant.
Amended Order on Motions for Summary Judgment 1
On Saturday night, December 16, 2006, Miguel Baena and his fraternal twin, Edgar, went to a Miami Heat basketball game at the American Airlines Arena in downtown Miami. Little did they know, when they headed to the game, that an evening of fun would turn into a night of tragedy. At around 6:30 a.m. the following morning, Edgar-driving a car Miguel had rented from Enterprise-was involved in an accident that left Paola Penafiel dead.
These two consolidated cases concern a dispute about whether there is insurance coverage for Ms. Penafiel's death. In one case, Geico General Insurance Company seeks a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage under the policy that it had issued to Edgar. In the other case, Esperanza Garcia, the representative of Ms. Penafiel's estate, sues Geico for bad faith to recover a $5 million consent judgment entered against Edgar.
All parties have filed motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motions for summary judgment [D.E. 91, D.E. 92 in Case No. 07-23358, & D.E. 68, D.E. 69 in Case No. 07-23044] are Denied.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party fails to prove an essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted. See id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. That is, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (). In making this assessment, the court “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” and “resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the nonmovant.” See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997).
On December 14, 2006, Miguel, who lived in New Jersey, flew to South Florida for vacation. At the Fort Lauderdale Airport, he rented a Mercedes-Benz sedan from Enterprise. When asked by an Enterprise representative if there would be any other drivers, Miguel said no. See Dep. of Miguel Baena at 10. The rental agreement therefore stated, “no other drivers permitted,” and Miguel initialed the section containing that language. See Enterprise Rental Agreement at 1. Miguel purchased a damage waiver from Enterprise for any damage to the car, but did not purchase liability insurance, even though he did not have automobile insurance of his own. See Dep. of Rosemary Kelly at 27-28.
Edgar, who lived in South Florida, was not with Miguel when he rented the car, and was not privy to the terms of the rental agreement. See Dep. of Miguel Baena at 6; Dep. of Edgar Baena at 19-21. Edgar generally knew, however, that an additional authorized driver had to be listed on the rental agreement if that person was known to the renter. See Dep. of Edgar Baena at 16-18.2
On Saturday, December 16, 2006, the Baena brothers went to a Miami Heat basketball game. Miguel drove, in the Enterprise vehicle he had rented. After the game, Miguel and Edgar visited Bayside marketplace (located next to the American Airlines Arena), and then headed to South Beach, where they had dinner. From there, they drove to a club in downtown Miami and stayed there until the wee hours of the next morning. In total, Miguel had a couple of alcoholic drinks that night, while Edgar had one. See Dep. of Miguel Baena at 13-14; Dep. of Edgar Baena at 21-22, 24-25. On Sunday morning, at around 6:30 a.m. on State Road 112 in Miami, with Edgar at the wheel, the Mercedes-Benz crashed into the car driven by Ms. Penafiel. She was pronounced dead at the scene.
According to Edgar, Miguel asked him to drive home because he was tired. See Dep. of Edgar Baena at 25-26. Edgar believed he had Miguel's permission to drive the car, but did not think he had anyone else's permission to do so. See id. at 25.
Miguel has given different accounts of what happened during the early morning hours of December 17, 2006, so there is conflicting evidence regarding the circumstances that put Edgar behind the wheel. At his deposition, Miguel testified that he asked Edgar to drive home. Miguel felt tired, thought he had drunk too much to take a chance on driving, and wanted to sleep in the backseat on the way home. Miguel also testified that, when he asked Edgar to drive, he did not think about the prohibition against other drivers in the rental agreement. See Dep. of Miguel Baena at 13-15. Edgar corroborated Miguel's version of events. See Dep. of Edgar Baena at 25-26. But in an interview with an Enterprise representative after the accident, Miguel said that had “no clue” as to why Edgar was driving the car. See Dep. of Patricia Schillaci at 19-20.3 If that earlier statement is credited, it is possible that Miguel did not give Edgar permission to drive the car, and that Edgar took it upon himself to drive home.
Edgar's automobile insurance policy with Geico provides coverage against “damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of ... bodily injury sustained by a person ... [a]rising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned auto or a non-owned auto.” The policy goes on to state that, with respect to a “non-owned auto” (e.g., the Mercedes-Benz that Miguel rented from Enterprise), “[s]uch use must be with the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permission, of the owner and within the scope that permission.”
After the accident, Geico denied coverage under Edgar's policy. Ms. Garcia, as representative of Ms. Penafiel's estate, reached a Coblentz agreement with Edgar, in which he agreed to the entry of a consent judgment in the amount of $5 million, in resolution of the estate's wrongful death action against him. See Complaint at ¶¶ 5-10, 28, & Exh. F; Coblentz v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 416 F.2d 1059, 1062-63 (5th Cir.1969). As noted earlier, Ms. Garcia is proceeding against Geico on a theory of bad faith under Florida law to recover the $5 million judgment, while Geico seeks a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage for the accident under Edgar's policy.
The parties have stipulated that denied coverage to Edgar because it concluded that his use of the rental car did not fall within the policy's “non-owned auto” provision. For purposes of these summary judgment motions, it is undisputed that Edgar believed that his use of the rental car was with Miguel's permission, and that Edgar did not have Enterprise's permission to drive the car. See Dep. of Edgar Baena at 25; Enterprise's Response to Request for Admissions at ¶ 4. Thus, the critical issues at the summary judgment stage are whether Miguel gave Edgar permission to drive the car, and whether Edgar reasonably believed that he had Enterprise's permission to drive the car.
Although there is unanimity between the parties that the undisputed evidence forecloses any triable question of fact, the sides are decidedly at odds as to whom the benefit of summary judgment should inure. Geico argues that, because Edgar did not know who owned the car see Dep. of Edgar Baena at 20, he could not have reasonably believed he had Enterprise's permission to drive it. Edgar and Ms. Garcia contend that Edgar reasonably believed he had Enterprise's permission because Miguel (who was in lawful possession of the vehicle) gave him permission to drive and because Edgar was unaware of the rental agreement's “additional driver” prohibition.
The nuances of this case apparently present a novel issue in Florida. Until recently, Enterprise and/or its insurer would have been strictly and vicariously liable for the accident under Florida's “dangerous instrumentality” doctrine. See, e.g., Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 63 (Fla.2000) (); Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832, 835-36 (Fla.1959) (); Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) (). In 2005, however, the United States Congress pre-empted the application of vicarious/dangerous-instrumentality liability to rental-car companies with the passage of the so-called Graves Amendment:
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