Garcia v. General Motors Corporation

• Decision Date: 13 December 1995
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-2763 (AJL).
• Citation: 910 F. Supp. 160
• Parties: Maryjane GARCIA, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

910 F. Supp. 160

Maryjane GARCIA, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 95-2763 (AJL).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

December 13, 1995.

Allyn Z. Lite, Goldstein, Till & Lite, Newark, New Jersey, Edward A. Grossmann, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, New York City, for Plaintiffs.

Lawrence N. Lavigne, Cynthia E. Appel, Hanlon, Lavigne, Topchik, Herzfeld & Rubin, Edison, New Jersey, Daniel V. Gsovski, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York City, for Defendant.

OPINION

LECHNER, District Judge.

This action by plaintiff MaryJane Garcia ("Garcia"), on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (collectively, the "Putative Plaintiffs"), alleges violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq., breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and common-law fraud and deceit against defendant General Motors Corporation ("GMC"). Removal jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("Section 1441(a)").

Currently before the court is the question whether this matter should be remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County (the "Superior Court") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("Section 1447(c)").¹ For the reasons set forth below, this matter is remanded to the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

On 1 May 1995, Garcia filed a "class action complaint" (the "Complaint") in the Superior Court, bearing docket number L-4394-95. Garcia's allegations against GMC concern an automobile known as a W-Body Car ("W-Body Car"), which is defined as any Buick Regal, Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme, Pontiac Grand Prix or Chevrolet Lumina for the model years 1988 to 1993. Complaint, ¶ 1. Garcia alleges she owns a 1990 Chevrolet Lumina. Id., ¶ 4.

Garcia alleges GMC "marketed, advertised and sold W-Body Cars in a deceptive manner by misrepresenting their quality and safety and actively concealing the fact that the W-Body Cars contain a hidden defect, which poses an unreasonable safety risk, as well as the need for costly repairs." Complaint, ¶ 2. Garcia alleges that GMC "knew or, in reckless disregard for the truth, failed to know," that the rear disc brakes on W-Body Cars, which were manufactured by a division of GMC, contain "defective rear disc brake caliper pins ... which tended to corrode." Id. Garcia further alleges that "such corrosion renders the rear disc brakes unusable, creating both a safety hazard and premature wearing of the front and rear disc brakes...." Id. Garcia alleges that, as a result of these allegedly defective caliper pins, current and prior owners or lessees of W-Body Cars "suffered a diminution in the value of the vehicles.... and damages ... for costly repairs." Id. "Plaintiffs ... specifically do not seek damages for personal injuries...." Id.

Garcia alleges that the Putative Plaintiffs in this matter are "all persons or entities in the United States who currently own or lease" a W-Body Car, "or who previously owned or leased a ... W-Body Car and suffered economic damage as a result of the defect in the caliper pins in ... W-Body Cars." Complaint, ¶ 6. Garcia alleges "approximately three million ... W-Body Cars have been sold in the United States." Id., ¶ 7; see Moving Brief at 14 n. 4 (alleging there are three million Putative Plaintiffs).

GMC filed a Verified Petition for Removal (the "Removal Petition") with the Clerk of the court. The Removal Petition alleges jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ("Section 1332(a)(1)") and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ("Section 1367"). Id., ¶¶ 6-7. The Removal Petition alleges Garcia is a resident of the State of New Jersey, id., ¶ 1, and also alleges GMC is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in the State of Michigan. Id., ¶ 2. GMC alleges that "the claims asserted by Plaintiff, if proven, exceed the value of $50,000.00." Id., ¶ 6.

Discussion

A. Background

Under the general Federal removal statutes, an action brought in state court can be removed by a defendant to a Federal district court if that Federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. See Section 1441(a).² A defendant seeking to remove a case must file "a notice of removal ... containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served...." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

The removing party must show Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists and removal is proper. Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S.Ct. 959, 112 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1991); Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dism'd sub nom. American Standard, Inc. v. Steel Valley Auth., 484 U.S. 1021, 108 S.Ct. 739, 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988); Moore v. DeBiase, 766 F.Supp. 1311, 1315 n. 5 (D.N.J.1991); Mountain Ridge State Bank v. Investor Funding Corp., 763 F.Supp. 1282, 1288 (D.N.J.1991).

An action removed to Federal court may be remanded to state court "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. ..." Section 1447(c). When confronted with a motion to remand, the removing party has the burden of establishing the propriety of removal. Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111; Steel Valley, 809 F.2d at 1010; Moore, 766 F.Supp. at 1315 n. 5. Moreover, "removal statutes `are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts resolved in favor of remand.'" Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111 (quoting Steel Valley, 809 F.2d at 1010); see Moore, 766 F.Supp. at 1315 n. 5; Mountain Ridge, 763 F.Supp. at 1288.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)

As stated, removal under Section 1441(a) is proper if a Federal court to which the action is removed would have jurisdiction over the matter had it been filed there originally. GMC alleges jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a)(1). Removal Petition, ¶ 6. Subject matter jurisdiction under Section 1332(a)(1) is proper only in a civil action between citizens of different states "where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs...." Section 1332(a)(1).

1. Class Action Issues

"In a Federal class action only the citizenship of the named class representatives must be diverse from that of the defendants." In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1317 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 1058, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969)), cert. denied sub nom. United States Gypsum Co. v. Barnwell Sch. Dist. No. 45, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1623, 113 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

In the instant matter, Garcia, the named plaintiff, alleges she is a citizen of the State of New Jersey. Complaint, ¶ 4. GMC is a resident of Delaware and Michigan. Removal Petition, ¶ 5; Affidavit of Sandra J. Donovan, ¶ 2. Accordingly, there is diversity of citizenship between the parties in this matter.

In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973), a class action brought under Section 1332(a)(1), the Court reaffirmed the established rule that each plaintiff in the class must independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. at 301-02, 94 S.Ct. at 512; see Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Upp v. Mellon Bank, N.A., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 440, 126 L.Ed.2d 373 (1993); Asbestos Litigation, 921 F.2d at 1315.

GMC argues that the amount-in-controversy inquiry is only appropriate as to Garcia, the named plaintiff, because no plaintiff class has yet been certified. Opp.Brief at 7. It further argues: "`Class actions are not created by mere allegations in a complaint.'" Id. (quoting Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1304 (4th Cir.1978)). Neither logic nor the case law supports this argument. On the one hand, GMC argues that the Complaint meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, asserting that allegations in the Complaint must be accepted unless it appears "`to a legal certainty'" that Garcia cannot recover more than $50,000.00. Opp.Brief at 8 (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)). On the other hand, GMC argues that the allegations in the Complaint concerning the class of Putative Plaintiffs should be ignored. GMC contends that: "Notwithstanding plaintiff's aspirations to class status, this case is not now a class action, and will not be unless and until this Court certifies it as such.... Jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, accordingly, is to be evaluated as in an individual action." Opp. Brief at 7. GMC cannot have it both ways: If GMC seeks to extend the St. Paul rationale to one part of the amount-in-controversy inquiry, it makes sense to apply it to a related part of the analysis.

Likewise, the case law cited by GMC is unavailing.³ The courts that have considered the issue have held that a suit should be treated as a class action for purposes of Federal jurisdiction whether or not the class has been certified. Eagle v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 769 F.2d 541, 545 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 1465, 89 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986); City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir.1971); Visintine v. Saab Auto. A.B., 891 F.Supp. 496, 497 n. 3 (E.D.Mo.1995); Fountain v. Black, 876 F.Supp. 1294, 1297 n. 5 (S.D.Ga.1994); Mayo v. Key Fin. Svcs., Inc., 812 F.Supp. 277, 278 n. 1 (D.Mass.1993); Lailhengue v. Mobil Oil Corp., 775 F.Supp. 908, 911 (E.D.La.1991); Craig v. Congress Sportswear, Inc., 645 F.Supp. 162, 163 n. 1 (D.Me.1986).

GMC argues that Section 1367 overrules Zahn, thereby precluding an inquiry into whether the Putative Plaintiffs each satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. Opp.Brief at 13. Section 1367...