Garcia v. Guerra, 83-2318
| Decision Date | 29 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-2318,83-2318 |
| Citation | 744 F.2d 1159 |
| Parties | 20 Ed. Law Rep. 412 Maria Carlota GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ramiro M. GUERRA, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Raul Noriega, TX Rural Legal Aid, Inc., San Antonio, Tex., Jose R. Rodriguez, Director, Farm Worker Div., Laurence E. Norton, II, Weslaco, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.
George P. Powell, McAllen, Tex., for Progreso.
Robert L. Galligan, Weslaco, Tex., for Weslaco.
Travis Hiester, Michael Mills, McAllen, Tex., for Hidalgo.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before RANDALL, TATE and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Appellants appeal from the district court's denial of their request for attorney's fees made under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 l(e) and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. 1 Finding that appellants meet the requirements of a "prevailing party" set out in Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.1982), as against appellees Hidalgo County and Ramiro M. Guerra, but not as against the appellee school districts, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Appellants, Mexican-American farmworkers, filed this action pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973c, against Hidalgo County, Texas, Ramiro M. Guerra, County Judge of Hidalgo County, and the Progreso and Weslaco Independent School Districts. 2 They sought to enjoin the holding of an election scheduled for August 14, 1982, a time when migrant farmworkers who were registered to vote in Hidalgo County were away on their yearly migration. These farm workers are virtually all Hispanic. The purpose of the election was to decide if the Progreso School District, a district predominantly composed of Hispanic students, should be consolidated with the adjacent Weslaco School District, a district predominantly composed of non-Hispanic white students.
Regular elections involving the school districts in Hidalgo County had traditionally been held in April pursuant to article 2.01b(a) of the Texas Election Code. Article 2.01b(a) provides four dates on which the State's political subdivisions may hold elections. These dates are the third Saturday in January, the first Saturday in April, the second Saturday in August, and the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Prior to enactment of the Texas statute, all four dates were precleared by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Appellants' action sought to enjoin the holding of the August election on the grounds that the appellees had failed to submit the April-to-August change in election dates to the United States Attorney General pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. In response, appellees maintained that since the August date had already been precleared, they were not required to resubmit the date for further preclearance.
After a hearing on July 26, 1982, the district court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining appellees from holding the consolidation election until a three-judge panel could be convened to decide the issue. Before the three-judge panel had an opportunity to hear the case, Hidalgo County, following the suggestion of the district court judge, voluntarily submitted a preclearance application to the United States Department of Justice to preclear a date for an election on the consolidation issue. After delays with the Justice Department, the election was precleared for April 2, 1983. The election was held on that date, and the school district consolidation was defeated.
Following the consolidation election, appellants moved for attorney's fees and costs asserting that since appellants had received the primary relief sought, i.e., a change from the scheduled August election date and submission of a later date for preclearance, they were prevailing parties. The district court denied appellants' motion, holding that "[t]he voluntary submission of the election for preclearance by Defendants, while rendering moot the issues involved in this action, did not cause the Plaintiffs to become prevailing parties in the eyes of the Court." Appellants challenge this decision.
In Williams v. Leatherbury, supra, 672 F.2d at 550, we acknowledged that "[v]ictory by judgment or an opponent's concession is not essential to identification of the 'prevailing party' entitled to recovery of an attorney's fee under the Act." We stated that if a defendant unilaterally undertakes action that moots the controversy, a plaintiff nevertheless may recover attorney's fees if he can show (1) a causal connection between the filing of the suit and the defendant's action; and (2) that the defendant's conduct was required by law. Id. at 551; Wooten v. Housing Authority of City of Dallas, 723 F.2d 390, 391 (5th Cir.1984); Posada v. Lamb County, Texas, 716 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir.1983).
In defining "causal connection," we stated that the plaintiff's suit must have been " 'a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior.' " Leatherbury, 672 F.2d at 551, quoting Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 466 (5th Cir.1981). There is no serious question that appellants have met the requirements of the first prong of the Leatherbury test. It is clear from the record that had appellants not filed this lawsuit, the County would have held the consolidation election on August 14, 1982, without seeking preclearance of the April-to-August date change. In fact, absentee balloting had already commenced approximately four hours before issuance of the TRO.
The difficult question is whether the action taken by the appellees was required by law, 3 the second prong of the Leatherbury test. In answering this question, we do not decide definitively whether preclearance of the April-to-August change was required by law. A definitive answer would require a decision on the merits of appellants' claim. Such a decision properly should be made by a three-judge panel pursuant to Section 5. Hence, if a definitive answer were required, we would have to remand the case for a decision by a three-judge panel. Such action would totally obviate the time and financial benefits that flow from a resolution of a lawsuit prior to a full blown hearing on the merits.
The second prong of the Leatherbury test, consequently, does not require appellants to show that they would have won on the merits. Rather, as the Leatherbury- case said, appellants need only show that the action taken by the appellees was "not a wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless." 672 F.2d at 551. A claim is not frivolous if it is arguably supported by case or statutory law. It is with this standard in mind that we proceed to analyze whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the August date needed to be submitted for preclearance and whether the appellees' actions in not holding the election in August and in submitting a later date for preclearance were therefore not merely "gratuitous."
The district court was not convinced that further preclearance of the August election date was required by law. The court stated:
The consolidation election being challenged by this action was designated to be held on a date that was both precleared by the United States Department of Justice and approved by the Texas Legislature. Furthermore, the election was called by Ramiro M. Guerra, County Judge of Hidalgo County, Texas, as required by Section 19.232 of the Texas Election Code.
For the reasons discussed in Part IV infra, we disagree with the district court's conclusion.
Sections 19.232 and 19.233 of the Texas Education Code require that upon petition by a requisite number of qualified voters in adjacent school districts, the county judge must call an election to allow voters in the school districts to decide if they desire a consolidation of the school districts.
The school districts correctly point out that Secs. 19.232 and 19.233 impose no obligations or duties with regard to election activities upon the school districts which are the subject of a consolidation election. Hence, we conclude that the district court correctly denied appellants' recovery of attorney's fees as against the school districts since they were not required by law to submit the election date for preclearance or to do anything else in connection with the consolidation election.
Article 2.01b of the Texas Election Code does not address the question of whether a change of the type involved in this case should have been submitted for preclearance. We therefore look to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, its implementing regulations, and the relevant case law to determine whether the date change should have been submitted for preclearance.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1975, provides that whenever a State or political subdivision covered by the Act shall enact or seek to administer "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972 ... no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure" unless the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision has submitted the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure to the Attorney General of the United States "and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission." 4
The Act defines the terms "vote" and "voting" to include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general...
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