Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of Texas Inc., 02-21378.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
Citation351 F.3d 636
Docket NumberNo. 02-21378.,02-21378.
PartiesHector GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, Hector Garcia, Inland Ocean Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KOCH OIL COMPANY OF TEXAS INC.; Koch Gathering Systems Inc.; Koch Service Inc.; Koch Oil Company, Koch Industries Inc.; Koch Pipelines Inc.; Pipeline Company LP, Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date18 November 2003

Ralph Stephen Carrigan (argued) and Mark A. Carrigan, Law Office of Mark A. Carrigan, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Charles F. Webber (argued), Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before KING, Chief Judge, DENNIS, Circuit Judge, and LYNN,* District Judge.

KING, Chief Judge:

This case comes to us on an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). At issue is the proper way to measure the amount in controversy, required for federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, in the context of a suit seeking, inter alia, an equitable accounting. The district court held that the defendants' costs for performing the accounting may be considered in calculating the amount in controversy. We reverse.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 3, 1999, Plaintiffs Hector H. Garcia and Inland Ocean, Inc.1 filed a putative class action in the 49th Judicial District Court of Zapata County, Texas, on behalf of all Texas royalty and leasehold interest holders "from whom [the defendants] purchased oil and/or condensate between January 1, 1975 and December 31, 1989." Alleging that the defendants surreptitiously failed to reimburse them for certain oil and gas overages, the plaintiffs sought (1) an equitable accounting to determine whether any part of the overages could be attributed to individual plaintiffs' well sites, (2) restitution damages, and (3) attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiffs did not demand a specific amount of monetary damages, as the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit a plaintiff from doing so. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 47(b).

The defendants timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) based on federal diversity jurisdiction, asserting that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and that the parties are diverse.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). The plaintiffs then filed a motion to remand claiming that the defendants had failed to proffer evidence that the requisite amount in controversy had been met. The district court denied the motion, however, when the defendants produced an affidavit stating that it would cost more than $75,000 per plaintiff to perform the requested accounting.

On agreement of the parties, the case was transferred to the Houston Division of the district court. The plaintiffs filed a second motion to remand on the basis that the costs of performing an equitable accounting should not be considered part of the "amount in controversy" under § 1332. On August 27, 2002, a magistrate judge recommended that the plaintiffs' motion be denied, because the defendants' affidavit "makes it clear that the costs of an accounting for even a single claimant in this matter would exceed the jurisdictional amount." The district court subsequently adopted the magistrate's findings in full and denied the motion to remand. At the plaintiffs' request, however, the district court stayed the case pending an interlocutory appeal to this court on the following controlling question of law: "In a class action seeking damages and an accounting, assuming diversity, [may] accounting costs to defendants in a range of $322,800 to $899,400 for examining the claim of a single plaintiff meet the amount in controversy requirement of the diversity statute?" We hold that they may not.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir.1995); see also Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir.1996) (explaining that removal is an issue of statutory construction).

B. Burden of Proof

In resolving this question, we recognize that "[t]he intent of Congress drastically to restrict federal jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of different states has always been rigorously enforced by the courts." St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938). Thus, in § 1332 Congress instructs that a suit between diverse parties may be adjudicated in a federal forum only if "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." The party seeking to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing both that the parties are diverse and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.1998). The question in this case is whether the second burden has been met. In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity, the Supreme Court delineated the general method for measuring the amount in controversy: "[U]nless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith." 303 U.S. at 288, 58 S.Ct. 586.

Here, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure barred the plaintiffs from requesting a specific amount of damages in their state court petition. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 47(b). In a similar case, we held that "[w]hen the plaintiff's complaint does not allege a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant must prove by a pre-ponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds" the jurisdictional amount. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1993). This burden may be fulfilled in one of two ways. First, jurisdiction will be proper if "it is facially apparent" from the plaintiffs' complaint that their "claims are likely above [$75,000]." Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335. If the value of the claims is not apparent, then the defendants "may support federal jurisdiction by setting forth the facts[either] in the removal petition [or] by affidavit — that support a finding of the requisite amount." Id. Critically, the defendants may not aggregate the claims of different plaintiffs in order to satisfy the $75,000 jurisdictional amount in this putative class action. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-38, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969).

To date, no party has attempted to establish that the defendants owe more than $75,000 in restitution damages to any individual plaintiff in this case. In fact, the value of each plaintiff's property, which was allegedly converted by the defendants, will not be determined unless the plaintiffs achieve the equitable accounting relief they have requested. Nonetheless, the district court held that the defendants satisfied their burden of establishing that more than $75,000 is "in controversy" in this case. In a sworn affidavit, the defendants' accountant estimated that it will cost at least $300,000 per plaintiff to determine the amount of oil and gas condensate removed from each plaintiff's well sites during the years in question. The plaintiffs did not proffer any evidence disputing the cost of the equitable accounting,3 and the court concluded that the requisite jurisdictional amount was satisfied.

C. Analysis

Whether the district court's conclusion that the defendants have met their burden is correct, the plaintiffs argue, depends on the viewpoint by which the amount in controversy is measured. Plaintiffs claim that our precedent dictates that "the value of the plaintiff's right sought to be enforced must exceed the jurisdictional amount in order to confer federal jurisdiction." Vraney v. County of Pinellas, 250 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1958); see also Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir.1962) (refusing to consider the potential loss to defendants because "[t]he value to the plaintiff of the right to be enforced or protected determines the amount in controversy"). The plaintiffs argue that the instant case should be remanded to state court because the accounting is of no "value" to them; rather it is merely a means to discover the amount of restitution damages they are owed. Therefore, they believe that the monetary damages, not the accounting costs, are the true amount in controversy. The plaintiffs conclude that because the defendants have not alleged that any one plaintiff will recover more than $75,000, the jurisdictional amount is unsatisfied.

The defendants argue that it does not matter which viewpoint we follow. Alternatively, they urge us to follow an "either-party viewpoint" for determining the amount-in-controversy requirement. Emphasizing that the accounting relief requested by the plaintiffs is equitable in nature, the defendants argue that we should consider the costs of providing that relief as the amount in controversy. According to the defendants, because it will cost them more than $75,000 to provide the equitable relief requested by each plaintiff, we must recognize these costs as a "pecuniary consequence" of the litigation that satisfies the jurisdictional amount.4

We conclude that the defendants are correct when they argue that it does not matter from which viewpoint the amount in controversy is viewed. Unlike the defendants, however, we believe that the costs of an equitable accounting should not be considered in determining the sum or value of the matter in controversy in the instant case. These costs are collateral to the true object of the litigation: reimbursement to the plaintiffs for the oil and gas condensate allegedly converted by the defendants.

The defendants urge us to remember that the first form of relief demanded by the plaintiffs is an "equitable accounting." If a court eventually determines that the plaintiffs have established a right to...

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