Garcia v. Lamanna

• Decision Date: 20 November 2019
• Docket Number: 1:18-cv-5454 (AT) (KHP)
• Parties: ROLANDO GARCIA, Petitioner, v. JAMIE LAMANNA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

ROLANDO GARCIA, Petitioner,
v.
JAMIE LAMANNA, Respondent.

No. 1:18-cv-5454 (AT) (KHP)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

November 20, 2019

HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KATHARINE H. PARKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On June 15, 2018, Petitioner Rolando Garcia, proceeding pro se, filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 to challenge his 2014 conviction in New York state court. (Doc. No. 2.) In state court, Petitioner pled guilty to manslaughter in the first degree (New York Penal Law (“Penal Law”) Section 125.20(1)) and, as a condition of his guilty plea, waived his right to appeal. He was then sentenced to twenty-five years in prison followed by five years of post-release supervision. (Id. at 20, 25; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 6.) Petitioner now argues that: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) his sentence should be reduced “in the interest ofjustice”; and (3) his agreement to waive his right to appeal was invalid. (Doc. No. 2, 1-14.)

In opposing the Petition, Respondent maintains that this Court should reject Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as procedurally barred and because the New York state courts did not rely on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor on an unreasonable determination of the facts, to reject Petitioner's claims on appeal. (Doc. No. 14, 5-18.) Respondent also asserts that Petitioner's argument, that his prison sentence should be

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reduced “in the interest of justice,” may not be brought via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because Petitioner has not alleged that his prison sentence deprived him of any federal constitutional right and is procedurally barred. (Id. at 2-5.) Finally, Respondent maintains that Petitioner's claim, that his waiver of appeal was invalid, is moot because the New York Appellate Division already held that the waiver was invalid, but declined to reduce Petitioner's sentence. (Id.)

After carefully considering the parties' briefs and the record, this Court finds that Petitioner's claims do not warrant habeas relief and respectfully recommends that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2012, Petitioner shot and killed Kenia Castillo Reyes, a mother of two, on a public street. (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 4; Doc. No. 2, 61.) On October 16, 2012, the Bronx County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, charging him with: (1) murder in the second degree (Penal Law Section 125.25(1)); (2) manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law Section 125.20(1)); and (3) two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law Sections 265.03(1)(b) and (3)). (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 5; Doc. No. 2, 24-25.) Petitioner initially pled not guilty to these crimes.

On May 28, 2014, Petitioner appeared in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in Bronx County with his defense counsel to change his plea (the “Plea Hearing”). Petitioner withdrew his not guilty plea and, in satisfaction of all charges against him, pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter and waived his right to appeal. (Doc. No. 15, May 28, 2014 Plea Hearing Transcript (“Plea Hr'g Tr.”) 2:25-3:05.) Before Petitioner entered his guilty plea, the presiding

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judge explained the consequences of the plea to Petitioner, who is a native Spanish speaker, through a Spanish-language interpreter. (Id. at 3:06-10:01.) Among other things, the judge clarified that, because Petitioner is a citizen of the Dominican Republic and is not a citizen of the United States, he will likely be deported to the Dominican Republic upon his release and will be denied re-entry to the United States. (Id. at 3:17-4:10.) The judge also informed Petitioner that he would be sentenced to twenty-five years in prison followed by five years of post-release supervision (Id. at 4:15-25) and explained the consequences of waiving the right to a trial by jury and to appeal. (Id. at 5:01-10:15.) Petitioner then pled guilty and signed a written waiver form, which was translated from English to Spanish. (Id. at 10:08-13:09; see also Doc. No. 2, 20, 25-26, 53; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 6.) Petitioner appeared in court on June 13, 2014 to be sentenced (the “Sentencing Hearing”). As Petitioner was informed at the time of his plea, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate sentence of twenty-five years in prison followed by five years of post-release supervision. The Court also stated that Petitioner had waived his right to appeal. (Doc. No. 16, June 13, 2014 Sentencing Hearing Transcript 18:02-13; see also Doc. No. 2, 20, 25; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 6.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. PETITIONER'S DIRECT APPEAL

In March of 2016, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed a direct appeal of his conviction with the New York Appellate Division (the “Direct Appeal”). (Doc. No. 2, 35.) Petitioner argued that his sentence should be reduced “in the interest of justice” because he: (1) was employed full-time as a mechanic before his conviction and had no prior felony convictions; (2) pled guilty to the manslaughter charge, for which he received the maximum

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possible sentence; and (3) upon his release, will be over seventy years old and will be deported to the Dominican Republic, where he has not lived since 1995. (Doc. No. 2, 26; Doc. No. 13-1, 10-14.) Petitioner also argued that his waiver of his right to appeal was invalid because: (1) the trial court failed to “adequately inform” him that his right to appeal was not automatically forfeited when he pled guilty and (2) the written waiver form contained language that was substantially similar to language that was previously invalidated by the Appellate Division.^[1](Doc. No. 13-1, 10-12.)

On June 9, 2016, the Appellate Division unanimously held that Petitioner's waiver of his right to appeal was invalid, but declined to reduce his sentence. (Doc. No. 2-1, 2.); see also People v. Garcia, 31 N.Y.S.3d 883 (App.Div. 1st Dep't 2016). Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals on June 30, 2016 (Doc. No. 13-5, 1), and leave was denied on September 26, 2016. (Doc. No. 2-1, 2-4.) Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.

II. PETITIONER'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (“C.P.L.”) § 440.10 MOTION

On January 20, 2017, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to C.P.L. Section 440.10(1)(h) (the “440.10 Motion”). (Doc. No. 2, 46; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 11.) In the Motion, Petitioner claimed, for the first time, that he “lost [his] mind during the heated argument with Miss Castillo, and was out of his mind while he was shooting Miss Castillo” in a “jealous rage.” (Doc. No. 13-8, 3, 8 (alteration in original).) He also alleged

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that he was “inebriated” at the time of the shooting and, thus, he “may not have been able to even form the requisite intent to kill.” (Id. at 8.) Petitioner argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel before the trial court because his defense counsel: (1) never discussed the possibility of, or sought to introduce evidence to challenge his mental competency during the trial court proceedings, pursuant to C.P.L. Section 730^[2]; (2) did not raise an intoxication or extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”) defense (id. at 2-6); (3) failed to ensure that Petitioner understood the plea allocution; (4) forced Petitioner to enter a guilty plea through “persistent coaxing” (id. at 13-8, 2, 9); and (5) never showed Petitioner any “discovery material.” (Id. at 2.)

The Honorable Steven Barrett, Justice of the Bronx County Supreme Court, denied Petitioner's 440.10 Motion on March 31, 2017. (Doc. No. 13-11.) To start, Justice Barrett held that, “with respect to [Petitioner's] claim that his guilty plea was defective due to the insufficiency of the court's allocution or his lack of mental fitness at the plea proceeding,” such claims are not actionable under C.P.L. Section 440.10 because they are record-based and, thus, should have been raised on direct appeal. (Id. at 2 (citing C.P.L. § 440.10(2)(c)).)

On the merits, Justice Barrett found that Petitioner, who submitted a single “self-serving affidavit” to support his 440.10 Motion, failed to submit sufficient evidence to corroborate his claim that he was mentally incompetent when he killed Ms. Castillo Reyes or that his attorney forced him to plead guilty. (Id. at 1-2 (citing C.P.L. §§ 440.30(4)(b) and (d)(i)).) Justice Barrett explained that, absent corroborating evidence, such as affidavits from Petitioner's defense

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counsel and certified records from healthcare providers, the “transcript of the plea colloquy makes clear that counsel provided meaningful representation and that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary.” (Id. at 2-3.) The court also noted that Petitioner “told the Court that he had not been pressured or coerced, that he understood and desired to enter the guilty plea” and that the “transcript of the plea discloses that [Petitioner] was lucid, rational and unequivocal and does not give the slightest indication that [Petitioner] was uninformed, confused, or mentally incompetent.” (Id. (citing People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482,486 (2002)).)

Justice Barrett was also unmoved by Petitioner's claim that his rights were violated by his counsel's failure to raise an EED defense. The court explained that, even if Petitioner had proceeded to trial and successfully raised an EED defense to the second-degree murder charge, that defense would have reduced Petitioner's crime to manslaughter in the first degree. In other words, Petitioner obtained the same outcome by entering a guilty plea to the first-degree manslaughter charge that he would have obtained by going to trial and successfully asserting an EED defense. (Id. at 3 (citing C.P.L. 125.25(1)(a); 125.20(2)).) The court added...