Garcia v. Peake, Civil No. 08-1701 (FAB).
| Decision Date | 21 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 08-1701 (FAB). |
| Citation | 707 F.Supp.2d 275 |
| Parties | Renee P. GARCIA, Plaintiff,v.James B. PEAKE, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Elaine Rodriguez-Frank, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Fidel A. Sevillano-Del-Rio, United States Attorneys Office, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 15.) Having considered the arguments contained in defendant's motion, plaintiff's opposition, and defendant's reply, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion for summary judgment.
I. Background
On June 30, 2008, Renee P. Garcia (“Garcia” or “plaintiff”) filed a complaint against James B. Peake in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and gender. ( See Docket No. 1.) Specifically, plaintiff brings a hostile work environment claim and four disparate treatment claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 Id. Plaintiff's four claims of disparate treatment find their basis in her allegations that: (1) she was not selected for the position of Supervisor, Human Resources Specialist; (2) she was not selected for the position of Equal Employment Manager; (3) she was denied the opportunity for skill training; and (4) she was denied written performance evaluations for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-13.)
Defendant's motion for summary judgment argues that although plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex and national origin discrimination with regard to her first three disparate treatment claims, she cannot establish that defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons with regard to those claims are pretext for discrimination. ( See Docket No. 17 at 15-19.) Defendant does not properly address plaintiff's hostile work environment claim or her fourth disparate treatment claim.1 ( See Docket No. 17.) On February 23, 2010, plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, failing to address the issue of pretext. (Docket No. 22.) Plaintiff only reiterated her description of the events which she claims to be discriminatory. See id.
Local Rule 56(c) requires a non-moving party to file with its opposition “a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts” which shall “admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule.” Local Rule 56(c) also requires that, if the nonmoving party includes any additional facts, such facts must be in a separate section, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs, and be supported by a record citation.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly ... emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico].” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007). Rules such as Local Rule 56 “are designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is-and what is not-genuinely controverted.’ ” Id. (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006)). Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, “litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril.” Id. Where a party does not act in compliance with Local Rule 56, “a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated.” Id. (citing Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.2004)).
Plaintiff has largely failed to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56(c). Although plaintiff admitted several of the assertions contained in defendants' statement of material facts, she failed to deny or qualify properly most of the remaining assertions. ( See Docket No. 23.) Instead of supporting her denials of defendant's assertions with specific record citation as required by Local Rule 56, plaintiff denies assertions accompanied by one of a few repeated general explanations. See id. These general explanations include plaintiff's constant assertion that defendant's reference to the record is incorrect, lacks substance, or is too vague. See id. Only fifteen of these general explanations are correct in pointing out some fault with defendant's statement of uncontested facts, and all of them lack the specific citation to the record necessary to constitute a proper denial under Local Rule 56(c). ( See Docket No. 23 at ¶¶ 39-54, 56.) Accordingly, plaintiff's attempted denials in her opposing statement of uncontested facts at paragraphs 8-14, 17-19, 25-32, 35-37, 55, and 57-73, are hereby STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD.2 Defendant's corresponding assertions are DEEMED ADMITTED for the purposes of the factual background that follows.3
Given the concession of plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment by defendant and the limited nature of the motion for summary judgment, an extended factual background is unnecessary. What follows is a brief factual background composed of relevant uncontested facts meant to provide context for the Court's legal analysis. The Court may introduce further factual information or discuss submitted exhibits as necessary in the course of examining the contested claims.
Plaintiff is an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Juan, Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 23 at 10; Docket No. 27 at 5.) During 2006, plaintiff applied for two positions within the Department, for which she was not selected. ( See Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 5(a), 6(a); Docket No. 23 at 14, 16.) The first position, Supervisor, Human Resources Specialist, was listed in vacancy announcement # 2006-60. (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 5(a)-5(b); Docket No. 23 at 2; Docket No. 16-6 at 3.) Plaintiff applied for the position and interviewed with a selection panel composed of three members, Wilfredo Quiñones (“Quiñones”), Mariam Mendez Villanueva (“Villanueva”), and Lucy Reyes (“Reyes”). (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 5(b)-5(t); Docket No. 23 at 2-4; Docket Nos. 16-7, 16-8, & 16-9.) The selection panel assigned scores to candidates and referred those scores to the then Human Resources Manager, Helen Nunci (“Nunci”). Id. Plaintiff received the second highest score assigned by the interview panel, while another candidate, Omar Ahmed (“Ahmed”), received the highest score. Id. Nunci selected Ahmed for a second interview, and ultimately for the position of Supervisor, Human Resources Specialist. (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 5(t)-5(z); Docket No. 23 at 5; Docket No. 16-6.)
The second position, Equal Employment Manager, was listed in vacancy announcement # 2006-90. (Docket No. 16 at ¶ 6(a); Docket No. 23 at 5; Docket No. 16-6 at 4.) A similar panel was convened to rank the potential candidates for the position. (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 6(b)-6(e); Docket No. 23 at 5-6; Docket No. 16-12.) Plaintiff was not selected for the position. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 11.)
After Nunci selected Ahmed for the Supervisory Human Resources Specialist position, he learned of an opportunity to attend training seminars on the subject of “Administrative Investigations” outside Puerto Rico for which he could choose one the employees under his supervision. (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 7(a)-(n); Docket No. 23 at 8-10; Docket No. 16-16.) Plaintiff was one of the employees Ahmed could have selected for the training opportunity. Id. Ahmed chose to send another employee, Tito Santiago (“Santiago”), to the training seminars because Santiago had previously expressed an interest in the relevant subject matter. Id. Upon his selection as Supervisory Human Resources Specialist, Ahmed spoke with the employees under his supervision regarding their interest in particular areas of training. Id. Plaintiff expressed no particular interest in training. Id.
II. Legal AnalysisA. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states, in pertinent part, that the court may grant summary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000).
In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be “material” and the dispute must be “genuine.” Material means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is well settled that “[t]he mere existence of...
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