Garcia v. People, No. 98SC794.
| Decision Date | 13 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98SC794. |
| Citation | 997 P.2d 1 |
| Parties | Eileen C. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
David Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Douglas D. Barnes, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Petitioner.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Alan J. Gilbert, Solicitor General, Lauren A. Edelstein, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent.
Today, we must decide whether a trial judge may dismiss a juror after the jury has commenced deliberations and without a record to support findings that the juror is biased or prejudiced. Because of the core importance of jury deliberations and because our review of the record does not disclose any inquiry by the trial judge into the foreperson's allegations that the juror was unwilling to follow the instructions given to all jurors, we conclude that the juror was improperly dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in People v. Garcia, 964 P.2d 619 (Colo.App.1998).1
Our analysis in this case is informed both by the core importance of jury deliberations and the crucial role juries play in the administration of justice. We hold today that if a trial court interrupts the deliberations of a jury and suspends its fact finding functions to investigate allegations of juror misconduct, its inquiry must not intrude into the deliberative process. We further hold that, in the exercise of judicial discretion, before a juror is dismissed from a deliberating jury due to an allegation of juror misconduct, there must be findings by the trial court that support a conclusion that the allegedly offending juror will not follow the court's instructions.
In September of 1994, Eileen C. Garcia (defendant) and her live-in boyfriend, Jonathan Montoya, began babysitting Montoya's nineteen-month-old niece, Grace, as well as Montoya's toddler nephews. From that time through the beginning of 1995, the children's mother, Karen Montoya, noticed that Grace had returned from defendant's home with bruises on her head and body. Defendant explained these bruises as the result of accidental falls.
On the morning of February 28, 1995, Jonathan Montoya telephoned Karen Montoya to tell her that Grace had fallen off of a slide and that defendant was bringing Grace to the hospital where Karen Montoya worked as a medical assistant. When they arrived, Grace was limp and non-responsive.
Karen Montoya brought her into the emergency room, where the medical staff diagnosed Grace with a subdural hematoma, a collection of blood between the brain and skull that creates potentially fatal pressure against the brain. Surgery to relieve the pressure on Grace's brain was unsuccessful and she never regained consciousness. She died that evening.
Defendant was charged in the District Court of El Paso County with one count of child abuse resulting in death. See § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I), 6 C.R.S. (1999). The main defense theory at trial was that Grace's injuries were accidental.2
First, evidence was presented that Grace's death resulted from the cumulative effect of three accidental falls occurring within four days of her death. Grace's mother, Karen Montoya, testified that on February 24, 1995, defendant called to inform her that Grace had fallen in the bathtub. Grace arrived home that evening with a bruise above her right eye. Grace's mother also testified that two days later, on February 26, Grace fell from her bunkbed at home. Further evidence introduced at the trial suggested that Grace had again fallen in the bathroom on the same morning of the events in question, this time striking her head on the toilet tank.
Supporting the defendant's claim that these incidents caused Grace's injury, the emergency room pediatrician who examined Grace on the day of her death testified that a bruise above her right eye was the only bruise on her head severe enough to be the likely cause of the injury to Grace's brain.3 The other emergency room physicians, with the exception of the partner of Grace's regular pediatrician, noted only that bruise as well.4 Second, defendant presented evidence that Grace's injuries resulted from a three-and-one-half-foot fall from a playground slide onto icy gravel on the day of her death. This was her explanation to police on the day of Grace's injury. Supporting defendant's claim that she did not cause Grace's injuries was the previously videotaped testimony of Grace's brother Michael. Michael, who was five years old at the time, testified that he saw Grace fall from a playground slide.5
The State called as witnesses several medical doctors who testified on direct examination that Grace's injuries were inconsistent with either of defendant's explanations. Instead, the doctors testified that Grace's injuries had been inflicted deliberately, as the result of forceful blows to the head and, possibly, violent shaking. Each doctor testified that he or she based the proffered conclusion on several factors. Those factors included the force necessary to cause a fatal subdural hematoma like Grace's and the fresh bruising on her right forehead, cheek, and eye, as well as fresh abrasions on her nose, lips, and mouth. In addition, the doctors considered the massive amount of blood collected at the back of Grace's eyes, a condition also known as "retinal hemorrhaging," and a swollen optic nerve.
On cross-examination, however, all of the medical experts conceded that a three-and-one-half-foot fall could result in a subdural hematoma. In fact, the same coroner who autopsied Grace had in the months before defendant's trial ruled an accidental fall from about that height onto a tile kitchen floor the cause of a fourteen-month-old child's subdural hematoma. Furthermore, the State's medical experts admitted that the injuries that caused Grace's death could also have been caused by a severe blow to the head, such as children suffer in car accidents or in falls from high places onto hard surfaces. They also conceded that a swollen optic nerve can be caused by a subdural hematoma itself, since a hematoma raises the pressure surrounding the optic nerve.
Finally, another doctor, the partner of Grace's regular pediatrician, testified that Grace had never exhibited signs of abuse. He testified that the only injury that Grace appeared ever to have suffered was the one that resulted in her death that day.
On these facts, Garcia was charged and tried before a jury for crimes that allegedly led to the injuries suffered by Grace. After a three day trial, the trial court instructed the jury and submitted the case to the jury for its deliberations.
Approximately one hour after the jury began to deliberate, the foreperson sent a note to the trial judge complaining about one of the jurors:
After consulting with both attorneys, the trial judge responded by sending a note to the jury. He advised the jury to review all of the jury instructions, particularly those having to do with "burden of proof (reasonable doubt), witness credibility and expert witnesses." Presumably, the jurors then reviewed the instructions and returned to their deliberations; the record does not indicate otherwise. In any event, the record does not reflect any communication to the trial judge that the jury had any difficulty following his suggestion or that they were unable to review the evidence or proceed with their deliberations.
About one hour later, the jury, still engaged in its deliberations, requested one of the dolls used for demonstrative purposes during the trial. The record does not indicate why the jury requested the doll; however, there is no indication at that time that deliberations had been suspended.
Then, the jury asked to have a yardstick or something measuring three feet long.6 As it had earlier, the court denied that request.
About one hour after those two evidentiary requests, the foreperson requested a copy of the jurors' oath. Over defense objection, the court provided the jury with a copy of the oath. The oath given to the jury reads as follows:
Do you and each of you swear or affirm that you will try the case now before the Court and arrive at a verdict according to the evidence and the law as contained in the instructions of the Court?
Shortly thereafter, the jury adjourned for the day, without any indication that any juror was not participating fully in deliberations or had refused to follow the court's instructions.
The next morning, about twenty-five minutes after the jury resumed its deliberations, the foreperson sent the court her fourth note. The foreperson stated in her note to the court that she believed that the same juror referred to in her first note was not complying with the jurors' oath. Specifically, she wrote:
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