Garcia v. Roden
| Decision Date | 03 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08-10692-WGY. |
| Citation | 672 F.Supp.2d 198 |
| Parties | Jose GARCIA, Petitioner, v. Dennis RODEN,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Superintendent of MCI Norfolk, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Jose Garcia, Norfolk, MA, pro se.
James J. Arguin, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA, for Respondent.
Jose Garcia ("Garcia") brings this pro se petition against then Superintendent Luis Spencer ("Respondent") seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pet. [Doc. No. 9]. Petitioner presents eight grounds for relief. His claims, however, actually develop but five issues: (1) whether the search warrant was properly issued (Ground 8); (2) whether Garcia's attorney had a conflict of interest (Ground 2); (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to find Garcia guilty (Ground 3); (4) whether laboratory certificates admitted as prima facie evidence shifted the burden of proof to Garcia (Ground 6); and (5) whether Garcia was deprived of his right to confront a witness (Ground 7).
Respondent denies each of these claims. Resp. Mem. Opp. Pet. [Doc. No. 13].
A Worcester County grand jury indicted Garcia for (1) trafficking in over 200 grams of cocaine and (2) possession with intent to distribute lidocaine, a class E controlled substance. Before trial, Garcia moved to suppress evidence discovered during a warrant search at 58-60 Chatham Street, Worcester. At first the motion was granted in part and denied in part, but after the prosecution moved for reconsideration, the entire motion ultimately was denied.
After a two-day jury-waived trial Garcia was convicted of both charges. The judge granted a required finding of not guilty as to Garcia's co-defendant, Angel Bauza ("Bauza"). Garcia escaped during a break in the trial. He was apprehended and sentenced several years later. He timely appealed from his conviction. He also moved for, and was denied, a new trial. He appealed the denial. Garcia's appeal from his conviction and his appeal from the denial of new trial were consolidated. In an unpublished decision issued under Massachusetts Appeals Court Rule 1:28, the Appeals Court on August 12, 2005 rejected all the issues raised by Garcia. Resp. Supp. Ans., Vol. I, Ex. G [hereinafter "Vol. ___, Ex. ___"]. The opinion specifically addressed three issues: the no-knock warrant, conflict of interest, and insufficiency of evidence. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied him further appellate review.
In June 2006, Garcia filed a second motion for a new trial. The judge denied it for the reasons presented in the Commonwealth's memorandum. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial in an unpublished decision on November 28, 2007. Vol. I, Ex. P. In that decision the court addressed the issue of the reliability of the confidential informant and the issue of the admission of certificates of analysis. All other issues were determined by the Appeals Court to have no merit or to fail to comply with requirements for an appellate brief. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review.
Garcia timely brings this petition for habeas corpus.
On June 17, 1993 police executed a search warrant in the basement apartment and the cellar at 58 Chatham Street, Worcester. Bauza and a Spanish-speaking woman were present in the cellar during the search, claiming that they were doing laundry. Over 200 grams of cocaine and over 500 grams of lidocaine were discovered in the ceiling of the cellar. Money in small denominations, an electronic digital scale, rubber bands, and ziploc baggies were also found.
The basement apartment was rented by Garcia's uncle, Raul. At the time of the search, Garcia was in the basement apartment, where he then resided. Garcia's personal papers were discovered in a bureau drawer in what appeared to be a man's bedroom. Several items that indicated drug dealing activity, such as crib notes, a sifter, surgical masks, $4,000 in small denominations, and cut corner bags, were discovered in the apartment. No drugs were found in the apartment. In close proximity to Garcia's personal papers, a bag with an Apple insignia was found. It matched the baggies found in the cellar.
This Court may exercise jurisdiction over Garcia's petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") a district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). The habeas corpus petition should be granted if the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) explains that a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court] cases" or if "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court] precedent." Id. A state court's decision that is "diametrically different" from, "opposite in character or nature" from, or "mutually opposed" to Supreme Court case-law satisfies the "contrary to" test. Id.
An unreasonable application of federal law occurs when a state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [U.S. Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The unreasonable application must be more than an erroneous one, and must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Garcia claims that there was an insufficient basis to issue a no-knock warrant and that the warrant was issued upon information from an unreliable informant who had no personal knowledge. Pet. at 11, 41. He also alleges, without further detail, that he was denied the appointment of counsel. Id. at 12.
With regard to Fourth Amendment rights, "a federal habeas corpus court cannot revisit a state court's disposition" except where the prisoner "had no realistic opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim fully and fairly in the state system." Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2001) (). "[A] full and fair opportunity to litigate means that the state had made available to defendants a set of procedures suitably crafted to test for possible Fourth Amendment violations." Sanna, 265 F.3d at 9 (citing Pigone v. Sands, 589 F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation omitted).
In this case, Garcia had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in state court. Throughout these proceedings, he was represented by counsel.2 His motion to suppress on the ground of the alleged inadequacy of the warrant was denied after an evidentiary hearing and serious consideration by the trial judge. The issue of the no-knock warrant was brought up again during the appeal from his conviction. The Appeals Court noted that the confidential informant's statement to the police that she had seen a handgun at Petitioner's apartment, Vol. I, Ex. G at 2, was sufficient to obtain a no-knock warrant. Id. at 3. Furthermore, in his second motion for a new trial, Garcia acting pro se, attempted to undercut the confidential informant's reliability. Affirming the denial of his motion, the Appeals Court stated that these allegations were without any support in the record, and that the informant had personal knowledge regarding the drugs and was reliable because she had previously provided information resulting in convictions. Vol. I, Ex. P at 1.
Garcia fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Appeals Court has in any way mischaracterized the evidentiary record or misapplied federal law as declared by the Supreme Court.
Garcia alleges that because his attorney also represented his co-defendant Bauza, the attorney was acting with a conflict of interest, and thus Garcia suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel. Pet. at 12-16. Garcia raised this issue in his motion for a new trial. The Superior Court denied Garcia's claim, Vol. I, Ex. C, and the Appeals Court affirmed, Vol. I, Ex. P.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate defective performance of counsel and prejudice resulting therefrom. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant against the simultaneous representation of conflicting interests. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in part dissenting in part), but "multiple representation does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of interest." Id. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (). "An actual conflict of interest negates the unimpaired loyalty a defendant is constitutionally entitled to expect and receive from his attorney." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Therefore, when counsel actively represents conflicting interests and an actual conflict of interest adversely affects counsel's...
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