Garcia v. Scolari's Food & Drug
| Decision Date | 29 January 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 50046.,50046. |
| Citation | 200 P.3d 514 |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
| Parties | Kathy GARCIA, Appellant, v. SCOLARI'S FOOD & DRUG, Respondent. |
This appeal seeks our review of a district court order denying a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision that denied occupational disease benefits. During the district court proceedings, appellant sought to have the matter remanded to the appeals officer pursuant to NRS 233B.131(2), which provides that the district court may order additional evidence to be taken before an administrative agency if the evidence is material and good reasons exist for failing to present it during the administrative proceeding. Appellant argued that her attorney negligently failed to introduce material evidence during the administrative proceedings. The district court denied appellant's request, however, after determining that appellant had failed to establish good reasons.
We take this opportunity to provide guidance on the good reasons standard set forth in NRS 233B.131(2). We conclude that good reasons do not exist when a party's attorney deliberately decides not to present available evidence during the course of an administrative proceeding and that party then seeks remand for reconsideration with that evidence after an adverse decision by the administrative agency. Here, appellant did not establish good reasons for her failure to present the additional evidence to the appeals officer, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to remand the matter for consideration of additional evidence. Moreover, having reviewed the record, we conclude that the appeals officer did not commit clear error or an abuse of discretion in determining that appellant had failed to show that her condition was work-related. We therefore affirm the district court order denying appellant's petition for judicial review.
In April 2005, proper person appellant Kathy Garcia submitted an occupational disease claim for pain in her arms and shoulders to her employer, respondent Scolari's Food & Drug. After reporting her claim, Garcia's condition was evaluated on several occasions. None of the physicians or nurse practitioners who evaluated Garcia during these initial visits connected the pain in her arms and shoulders to her employment at Scolari's. Garcia subsequently was referred for an independent medical evaluation by Donald S. Huene, M.D. Dr. Huene offered nonindustrial diagnoses of lateral epicondylitis, myofascitis, possible fibromyalgia, and possible radial tunnel syndrome. Dr. Huene attributed the cause of Garcia's condition to the aging process, concluded that the condition was not work-related, and stated that "work has aggravated [Garcia's] symptoms but is not the primary cause." Based on this evaluation by Dr. Huene, Garcia's claim for occupational disease benefits was denied.
Garcia, through counsel, administratively appealed, and a hearing was held before an appeals officer. The only evidence Garcia presented at the hearing was her own testimony. Apparently relying on the medical evidence provided by Scolari's—in particular, the portion of Dr. Huene's report describing Garcia's symptoms as having been aggravated by her work—Garcia's attorney argued that the work-related aggravation of a nonindustrial condition is compensable. Scolari's argued, however, that Dr. Huene's report did not establish a compensable claim because the doctor concluded that Garcia did not have an occupational disease.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeals officer indicated that the parties would be allowed additional time to submit further information before a decision was made. Although not specifically reflected in the record, both parties acknowledge that the appeals officer delayed issuing a decision in this matter to allow Garcia's attorney to submit two additional documents: a functional capacity evaluation confirming that Garcia had "cervical/shoulder/scapular issues" and a letter from Dr. Glenn Miller that purportedly connected Garcia's condition to her employment, both of which were available at the time of the hearing. When no further evidence was submitted, however, the appeals officer concluded that Garcia had failed to meet her statutory burden of establishing industrial causation and denied Garcia's claim for benefits. In explaining the decision, the appeals officer noted that, based on the submitted evidence, none of the physicians who had seen or treated Garcia suggested that Garcia's condition was caused by her employment. The appeals officer also noted that while Dr. Huene had indicated in his report that Garcia's employment had aggravated her nonindustrial condition, under NRS 617.366, such an aggravation is not compensable unless an occupational disease is also independently established.
Garcia subsequently filed, in proper person, a petition for judicial review in the district court, contending that the appeals officer's decision was improper and rendered without the benefit of all the relevant evidence. Garcia then moved the district court for leave to present additional evidence under NRS 233B.131(2). The district court denied Garcia's motion to present additional evidence, concluding that she had failed to establish good reasons for failing to submit the evidence during the administrative proceeding. The district court subsequently denied Garcia's petition for judicial review, and this proper person appeal followed. As directed, respondent has filed a response.
On appeal, Garcia asserts that the attorney who represented her during the administrative proceedings was neglectful of her claim and negligently failed to present any medical evidence to support her claim. Specifically, Garcia points to the functional capacity evaluation confirming that she had "cervical/shoulder/scapular issues" and Dr. Miller's letter, which she claims connected her arm and shoulder condition to her employment. Garcia argues that she relied on her attorney to provide this medical evidence, especially after the appeals officer allowed additional time to do so, and she asserts that she was unaware of her attorney's failure to provide this evidence until she received the appeals officer's decision denying her claim.
In its response, Scolari's argues that the above evidence is not material and that Garcia failed to demonstrate good reasons for her failure to present the evidence to the appeals officer in the first instance. Scolari's notes that the evidence was available at the time of the hearing and asserts that attorney negligence should not excuse Garcia's failure to present the evidence. Scolari's also contends that substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's decision to deny Garcia's claim.
We conclude that good reasons do not exist when a party's attorney deliberately decides not to present available evidence during the course of an administrative proceeding and that party then seeks remand for reconsideration with that evidence after an adverse decision at the administrative level. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that good reasons did not exist under NRS 233B.131(2) to remand this matter to the appeals officer for consideration of additional evidence. Further, based upon the evidence presented in the record, substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's decision denying Garcia's occupational disease claim.
Denial of Garcia's request to supplement the record
Under NRS 233B.131(2), when a party to an administrative proceeding seeks to present additional evidence that was not presented to the agency during the administrative hearing, the district court may order that such evidence be taken by the agency:
[i]f, before submission to the court, an application is made to the court for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency.
Thus, the two principal inquiries under NRS 233B.131(2) are whether the evidence sought to be added is material and whether "good reasons" exist for the failure to present the evidence to the administrative agency. Because NRS 233B.131(2) provides that the district court "may order that the additional evidence and any rebuttal evidence be taken before the agency" (emphasis added), the decision to grant or deny a request to remand a matter for the consideration of additional evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Minton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 110 Nev. 1060, 1081, 881 P.2d 1339, 1354 (1994) ().
Here, we are concerned with the second prong of the analysis—whether the district court properly found that no "good reasons" existed for Garcia's failure to present the functional capacity evaluation and Dr. Miller's letter to the appeals officer. Although this court has not yet considered what constitutes a good reason for failing to present evidence at an administrative hearing under this statute, this issue has been addressed in a number of other states with similar statutes. See, e.g., Salmon v. Department of Public Health, 259 Conn. 288, 788 A.2d 1199, 1220-21 (2002) (); Northern Illinois Gas v. Industrial Com'n, 148 Ill.App.3d 48, 101 Ill. Dec. 145, 498 N.E.2d 327, 332 (1986) (); Pannoni v. Board of Trustees, 321 Mont. 311, 90 P.3d...
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