Garcia v. Shah

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Citation: Garcia v. Shah, 206 A.D.3d 626, 170 N.Y.S.3d 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)
• Decision Date: 01 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2019–09543, 2020–09741, (Index 609390/18)
• Parties: Imelda GARCIA, plaintiff, v. Darshan SHAH, et al., defendants third-party plaintiffs-respondents; Occidental Fire & Casualty Company of North Carolina, third-party defendant-appellant.

206 A.D.3d 626

170 N.Y.S.3d 117

Imelda GARCIA, plaintiff,

v.Darshan SHAH, et al., defendants third-party plaintiffs-respondents;

Occidental Fire & Casualty Company of North Carolina, third-party defendant-appellant.

2019–09543, 2020–09741, (Index 609390/18)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—March 10, 2022

June 1, 2022

Cozen O'Connor, New York, NY (Melissa F. Brill, Amanda L. Nelson, and Laura Dowgin of counsel), for third-party defendant-appellant.

Cordova & Schwartzman, LLP, Garden City, NY (Jonathan B. Schwartzman of counsel), for defendants third-party plaintiffs-respondents.

FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, ROBERT J. MILLER, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant appeals from (1) an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Antonio I. Brandveen, J.), dated June 28, 2019, and (2) a money judgment of the same court dated September 28, 2020. The order and judgment, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion of the third-party defendant pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third-party complaint or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 603 to sever the third-party action from the main action, granted those branches of the cross motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs which were for summary judgment declaring that the third-party defendant is obligated to indemnify the defendants third-party plaintiffs in the main action and for an award for attorneys’ fees against the third-party defendant, declared that the third-party defendant is obligated to indemnify the defendants third-party plaintiffs in the main action and awarded the defendants third-party plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined at a hearing. The money judgment, upon the order and judgment, and upon the third-party defendant's failure to appear at the hearing to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the defendants third-party plaintiffs, is in favor of the defendants third-party plaintiffs and against the third-party defendant in the principal sum of $16,437.

ORDERED that the appeal from the money judgment is dismissed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the cross motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs which was for an award of attorneys’ fees, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the cross motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof awarding the defendants third-party plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in an amount to be determined at a hearing; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, and the money judgment dated September 28, 2020, is vacated; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants third-party plaintiffs.

On December 22, 2017, the plaintiff, Imelda Garcia, allegedly was injured as a result of a trip-and-fall at the home of the defendants third-party plaintiffs, Darshan Shah and Ranjana Shah, who are husband and wife (hereinafter together the Shahs). The plaintiff commenced the main action against the Shahs to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident.

The Shahs made a demand upon their homeowner's insurance policy carrier, the third-party defendant, Occidental Fire & Casualty Company of North Carolina (hereinafter Occidental), to defend and indemnify them in the main action. Occidental disclaimed coverage on the ground that it had canceled the policy prior to the accident due to nonpayment of an outstanding premium balance. Thereafter, the Shahs commenced a third-party action against Occidental for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Occidental was obligated to defend and indemnify the Shahs in the main action, and for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the third-party action.

Occidental moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the third-party complaint or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 603 to sever the third-party action from the main action. In support of its motion, Occidental submitted, inter alia, a copy of the insurance policy, a copy of a purported notice of cancellation of insurance directed to the Shahs, a copy of an envelope addressed only to Darshan Shah in which the purported notice of cancellation of insurance allegedly was mailed, and a certificate of mailing allegedly showing that SageSure Insurance Managers, which allegedly performs insurance related services for Occidental, mailed the purported notice of cancellation to Darshan Shah on October 11, 2017. The Shahs opposed the motion, and cross-moved for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, including the third-party cause of action for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the third-party action.

By order and judgment dated June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Occidental's motion, granted the Shahs’ cross motion, and declared, inter alia, that the main action is covered by the terms of the insurance policy, and that Occidental is obligated to defend and indemnify the Shahs in the main action. The court also awarded the Shahs attorneys’ fees and set the matter down for a hearing on the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees. The Shahs appeared at the attorneys’ fees hearing, and Occidental did not. By money judgment dated September 28, 2020, the court awarded the Shahs attorneys’ fees in the principal sum of $16,437. Occidental appeals from so much of the order and judgment as denied its motion and granted those branches of the Shahs’ cross motion which were for summary judgment declaring that Occidental is obligated to indemnify the Shahs in the main action and for an award of attorneys’ fees and made a corresponding declaration and award. Occidental also appeals from the money judgment.

The appeal from the money judgment must be dismissed because no appeal lies from a judgment entered upon the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511 ; Kokolis v. Wallace, 202 A.D.3d 948, 163 N.Y.S.3d 541 ; Matter of Mayo v. Mays, 195 A.D.3d 619, 144 N.Y.S.3d 623 ; Murphy v. Shaw, 34 A.D.3d 657, 658, 824 N.Y.S.2d 421 ; Fishman v. Fishman, 50 A.D.2d 885, 885, 377 N.Y.S.2d 166 ).

A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) on the ground that a defense is founded on documentary evidence may appropriately be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law (see Kolchins v. Evolution Mkts., Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 100, 106, 73 N.Y.S.3d 519, 96 N.E.3d 784 ; Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190 ; Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ; Bonavita v. Govt. Empls. Ins. Co., 185 A.D.3d 892, 127 N.Y.S.3d 577 ). "To be considered documentary, evidence must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity, that is, it must be essentially unassailable" ( Bath & Twenty, LLC v. Federal Sav. Bank, 198 A.D.3d 855, 855–856, 156 N.Y.S.3d 316 ; see Cives Corp. v. George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 A.D.3d 713, 714, 948 N.Y.S.2d 658 ). "[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case" ( Bath & Twenty, LLC v. Federal Sav. Bank, 198 A.D.3d at 855, 156 N.Y.S.3d 316 [internal quotations marks omitted]; see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Klein, 178 A.D.3d 788, 790, 113 N.Y.S.3d 741 ). "Affidavits, deposition testimony, and letters are not considered documentary evidence within the intendment of CPLR 3211(a)(1)" ( Bonavita v. Government Empls. Ins. Co., 185 A.D.3d at 893, 127 N.Y.S.3d 577 ; see Rodolico v. Rubin & Licatesi, P.C., 114 A.D.3d 923, 925, 981 N.Y.S.2d 144 ).

In assessing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d at 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ). "Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate" ( Bonavita v. Government Empls. Ins. Co., 185 A.D.3d at 893, 127 N.Y.S.3d 577 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Greenberg v. Spitzer, 155 A.D.3d 27, 44, 62 N.Y.S.3d 372 ).

"The initial burden of demonstrating a valid cancellation of an insurance policy is on the insurance company which disclaims coverage" ( Matter of Unitrin Direct Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 186 A.D.3d 612, 613, 128 N.Y.S.3d 638 ; see Matter of Auto One Ins. Co. v. Forrester, 78 A.D.3d 1174, 911 N.Y.S.2d 660 ). Where, as here, a policy has been in effect for at least 60 days, cancellation is permitted only upon specified grounds listed in Insurance Law §...