Garcia v. Shinn
| Decision Date | 20 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CV-15-00025-PHX-DGC |
| Parties | Alfredo Lucero Garcia, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
DEATH PENALTY CASE
Before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Alfredo Lucero Garcia, an Arizona death row prisoner. (Doc 22.) Respondents filed an answer opposing the petition. (Doc 29.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
On the afternoon of May 21, 2002, Garcia and co-defendant James Sheffield robbed a bar called Harley's 155 Club (“Harley's”) in Phoenix. During the robbery, the bar's owner, Steven Johnson, was shot to death. In 2007 a Maricopa County jury convicted Garcia of armed robbery and first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death on the murder count. The Arizona Supreme Court, in its opinion affirming Garcia's conviction and sentence, discussed the circumstances surrounding the murder. State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 7, 226 P.3d 370, 376 (2010).
Daniel Anderson was tending bar at Harley's when Garcia entered and asked to use the restroom. Anderson and Johnson directed him to the rear of the bar. Shortly thereafter, Johnson went to the back of the bar to work on a broken ATM. He was kneeling beside the machine with a stack of $20 bills when Garcia burst through the back door shouting “drop the money.” Sheffield was directly behind Garcia, carrying a gun. Johnson stood, threw the $20 bills to the ground, and said “just get out, get out of here.” Garcia pushed him against the wall.
Anderson ran to the bar's office, pushed an alarm button, and escaped. He heard a gunshot before entering the office and sounds of a struggle and a second gunshot as he fled.
Anderson went to another bar and called the police. When they arrived at Harley's, they found Johnson's body outside the back door with $20 bills scattered nearby. Police also viewed video recordings from bus security cameras that showed Garcia and Sheffield boarding a bus near the crime scene and later getting off at the same stop. The investigation led to Garcia's arrest on June 1, 2002, and Sheffield's arrest on June 6.
Garcia and Sheffield were each indicted on one count of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery. Their trials were severed. A jury found Garcia guilty on both counts. After learning of possible juror misconduct, the trial court empaneled a new jury for the aggravation and penalty phases of trial.
During the aggravation phase, the second jury found that Garcia was a major participant in the felony and was recklessly indifferent to Johnson's life.[1] The jury also found two aggravating factors: Garcia had previously been convicted of a serious offense, see A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(2), and he committed the murder for pecuniary gain, see § 13-751(F)(5). The jury concluded that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and determined that Garcia should be sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 226 P.3d 370.
Garcia filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), which the state court denied. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.
Federal habeas claims are analyzed under the framework of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).[2] Pursuant to AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly-established federal law, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly-established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court precedent, reaching a conclusion on a matter of law opposite that reached by the Supreme Court, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see, e.g., Hooper v. Shinn, 985 F.3d 594, 614 (9th Cir. 2021). Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407; see, e.g., Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 997 (9th Cir. 2014).
“Clearly-established federal law” refers to the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412.
“[C]ircuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law'” and “cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012); see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2006). A reviewing court may, however, “look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it has already held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. For a state court's decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law, “the ruling must be ‘objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.'” Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017) (quoting Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam)); see Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S.Ct. 517, 523 (2020); Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797, 805 (9th Cir. 2021). The burden is on the petitioner to show “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). This standard is meant to be “difficult to meet.” Kayer, 141 S.Ct. at 523 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).
Under § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available if the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). “[A] decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A state court's factual determination is presumed correct and a petitioner bears the burden of overcoming that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. at 340. A state court's “factual determination is not unreasonable merely because [a] federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010); see Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015) (); Walden v. Shinn, 990 F.3d 1183, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2021).
For claims not adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal review is generally not available when the claims have been denied pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). In Arizona, there are two avenues for petitioners to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). For unexhausted and defaulted claims, federal habeas is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation or show that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
Coleman held that ineffective assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings did not establish cause for the procedural default of a claim. Id. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012), however, the Court established a “narrow exception” to that rule. Under Martinez an Arizona petitioner may establish cause and prejudice for the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by demonstrating that (1) PCR counsel performed ineffectively by failing to raise the underlying ineffective assistance claim and (2) the underlying claim is substantial or has some merit. See Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14).
The Martinez exception applies only to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. It has not been expanded to excuse the default of other types of claims. Martinez (Ernesto) v. Ryan, 926 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2019) (); Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015); Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2013); see Davila v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2062-63, 2065-66 (2017) ().
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