Garcia v. Snedeker

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: BAIME
• Citation: Garcia v. Snedeker, 489 A.2d 175, 199 N.J.Super. 254 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1985)
• Decision Date: 25 February 1985
• Parties: Thomas GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifford W. SNEDEKER, Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, and the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, and Underwriters Adjusting Company, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 254

199 N.J.Super. 254

489 A.2d 175

Thomas GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifford W. SNEDEKER, Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, and the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, and Underwriters Adjusting Company, Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted Jan. 22, 1985.

Decided Feb. 25, 1985.

Daidone & Engrissei, Voorhees, for plaintiff-appellant (Lawrence P. Engrissei, Voorhees, on brief).

Pennington & Thompson, Haddonfield, for defendants-respondents (William J. Bryers, Haddonfield, on brief).

Before Judges MICHELS, PETRELLA and BAIME.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BAIME, J.A.D.

This appeal presents difficult questions pertaining to whether the limitations period imposed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a) under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (the No Fault Law), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 et seq., is applicable in a suit instituted against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund to recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. We hold that such actions must be brought within the time periods mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a). ¹ Since plaintiff's complaint was filed beyond the appropriate limitations period, we would ordinarily affirm the trial judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, the record presents substantial questions with respect to whether defendants should be equitably estopped from claiming the benefit of the statute of limitations. These questions were not directly raised by plaintiff and hence were not addressed by the trial judge. We are, thus, constrained to remand the matter to insure full exploration of the factual issues presented.

The sparse record discloses the following facts. On December 5, 1980, plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile owned by Garcia Fernando and operated by Celedonia Sepleveda. Neither plaintiff, Fernando nor Sepleveda was insured. On January 19, 1981, plaintiff filed a notice of intention to submit a claim with the Fund pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-65 and N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.5. The Fund acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's notice and in a letter dated March 13, 1981, stated that it would subsequently determine whether he was an eligible claimant. On April 7, 1981, plaintiff's attorney wrote to the Fund requesting that it "expedite assigning a file number" to the case to insure that medical care would continue. Several weeks later, the Fund provided plaintiff with various information forms with the direction that they be completed within 20 days. The accompanying letter, dated May 1, 1981, stated that once the completed forms were received the Fund would "register" plaintiff's claim and "in all probability ... process it." Pursuant to the Fund's request, the forms were timely mailed along with various medical bills. In the following months, plaintiff's attorney continued to send medical bills to the Fund. On August 17, 1981, Underwriters Adjusting Company, which had been assigned to handle the matter, advised plaintiff's attorney by letter that it had received the medical bills and requested various physicians' reports. In the letter, the carrier noted that "the liability aspect of [plaintiff's] claim was currently under investigation" and that he would be "advised accordingly at the conclusion" of its review. Despite this representation, the Fund never rendered a decision with respect to the efficacy of plaintiff's claim. On March 25, 1983, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Fund and the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles. In the complaint, plaintiff sought an order declaring the Fund responsible for all medical bills and lost wages arising out of the accident. On September 19, 1983, plaintiff instituted a declaratory judgment action against Underwriters Adjusting Company and the Fund. The actions were subsequently consolidated. Defendants' motions for summary judgment were thereafter granted upon the basis that the limitations period set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a) had expired. This appeal followed.

I

We note at the outset that the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, N.J.S.A. 39:6-61 et seq., is totally silent with respect to restrictions upon the time within which a claim must be prosecuted. See Corrigan v. Gassert, 27 N.J. 227, 235, 142 A.2d 209 (1958). Nevertheless, we are entirely satisfied that the provisions of the Fund Law governing recovery of PIP benefits fully incorporate the limitations period mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:6A- 13.1(a). N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1 presently reads in pertinent part as follows:

When any person qualified to receive payments under the provisions of the 'Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law,' suffers bodily injury or death through being struck, as a pedestrian, as defined in section 2 of P.L.1972, c. 70 (C.39:6A-2), by a motor vehicle, including an automobile as defined in section 2 of P.L.1972, c. 70 (C.39:6A-2), and a motorcycle, or by an object propelled therefrom, or arising out of an accident while occupying, entering into, alighting from, or using an automobile, registered or principally garaged in this State for which personal injury protection benefits under the 'New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act,' P.L.1972, c. 70 (C.39:6A-1 et seq.), or section 19 of this 1983 amendatory and supplementary act, would be payable to such person if personal injury protection coverage were in force and the damages resulting from such accident or death are not satisfied due to the personal injury protection coverage not being in effect with respect to such accident, then in such event the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund shall provide, under the following conditions, the following benefits.... ² (emphasis added).

In our view, the underscored statutory language evidences a clear legislative design to compel a claimant to prosecute his claim within the time period set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a). Cf. Pearman v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judg. Fd. Bd., 185 N.J.Super. 397, 401, 448 A.2d 1043 (Law Div.1982). In order to recover from the Fund, it is incumbent upon the claimant to establish that PIP benefits would be "payable" were such coverage in force. We are convinced that the Legislature, thus, intended to compel a claimant to comply with the time restrictions set forth in the No Fault Law. The statutes are to be read in pari materia. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 85 N.J. 277, 292, 426 A.2d 488 (1981), app. dism. 454 U.S. 804, 102 S.Ct. 76, 70 L.Ed.2d 73 (1981); Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 51, 362 A.2d 566 (1976); State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 554-555, 303 A.2d 312 (1973). A contrary construction would lead to the anomalous result that those seeking to recover benefits from the Fund would have greater rights than claimants proceeding on an insurance policy. Cf. Montedero v. Asbury Park, 174 N.J.Super. 305, 308, 416 A.2d 433 (App.Div.1980).

As we perceive it, the legislative objective was to protect the public from losses sustained and injuries inflicted by uninsured, financially irresponsible motorists. See, e.g., Gorton v. Reliance Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 563, 572, 391 A.2d 1219 (1978); Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 279, 173 A.2d 1 (1961); Giacobbe v. Gassert, 29 N.J. 421, 425, 149 A.2d 214 (1959); Giles v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 22, 34, 127 A.2d 161 (1956). That purpose would not be materially advanced were we to accord claimants of the Fund greater protection than that normally provided under the No Fault Law. Simply stated, we can discern no legislative design to provide claimants with blanket immunity from the time restrictions set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1(a).

Plaintiff contends that the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law is a measure of social legislation and, thus, should be construed liberally. He argues that the right to recover PIP benefits from the Fund constitutes a statutory entitlement and, hence, no limitations period is legislatively prescribed. We disagree. The result we reach is compelled by the plain meaning of the language set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, sound public policy considerations also strongly militate in favor of our conclusion. Perhaps it bears repeating that a statute of limitations has several salutary purposes. "The most important of these purposes recognizes that eventual repose creates desirable security and stability in human affairs." Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 191-192, 412 A.2d 122 (1980). See also Tevis v Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 430, 400 A.2d 1189 (1979); Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115, 299 A.2d 394 (1973); State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 358, 126 A.2d 168 (1956). Time restrictions "penalize dilatoriness." Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., supra 90 N.J. at 112, 447 A.2d 163 (1982). By penalizing unreasonable delay, "such statutes induce litigants to pursue their claims diligently so that answering parties will have a fair opportunity to defend." Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., supra 82 N.J. at 192, 412 A.2d 122. See also Union City Housing Auth. v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 335, 136 A.2d 401 (1957). So too, statutes of limitations "spare the courts from litigation of stale claims." State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 295, 74 A.2d 565 (1950) (quoting Chase Security Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628, 1635 (1945)), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 71 S.Ct. 822, 95 L.Ed. 1078 (1951). "Once memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is lost, courts no longer possess the capacity to distinguish valid claims from those which are frivolous and vexatious." Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., supra 82 N.J. at 192, 412 A.2d 122. As "guardian[s] of the trust monies represented by our statutory Fund," see Szczesny v. Vasquez, ...