Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds

Decision Date14 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. 04–16–00209–CV,04–16–00209–CV
Citation514 S.W.3d 257
Parties Candelaria GARCIA, Appellant v. State Farm LLOYDS and Sylvia Garza, Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Michael Alexander Nava, Bernie Kray, Allan, Nava, Glander & Holland, PLLC, Troy A. Glander, Allan, Nava & Glander, PLLC, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.

Sofia Amabel Ramon, Atlas & Hall, L.L.P, Elizabeth Sandoval Cantu, Daniel K. Worthington, Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, LLP, McAllen, TX, Linda J. Burgess, Elliot Clark, Winstead PC, Austin, TX, for Appellees

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice. Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

OPINION

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

In the underlying lawsuit, Candelaria Garcia alleged State Farm Lloyds and Sylvia Garza (collectively, "appellees") failed to properly investigate and adjust an insurance claim made under Garcia's State Farm homeowner's policy. After the lawsuit was filed, the parties agreed to an appraisal for the purpose of determining the amount of the loss. After completion of the appraisal, State Farm paid the appraisal award and appellees moved for summary judgment on all of Garcia's claims. Garcia then amended her petition to ask that the appraisal award be set aside. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of appellees and signed a final judgment disposing of all of Garcia's claims. Garcia now appeals the trial court's summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2014, State Farm issued a homeowner's policy to Garcia providing coverage for her home. Following storm damage to her house, Garcia retained a private adjustor to "examine, investigate, estimate, collect documentation, and communicate" with State Farm with regard to any and all claims for damages. One day later, on January 22, 2015, Garcia submitted a claim to State Farm for hail-related and possibly wind-related damage to her house. State Farm assigned the claim to its own adjustor, Sylvia Garza. On February 26, 2015, Garza inspected Garcia's house and prepared an estimate of damage, which concluded the $902.37 loss did not exceed Garcia's $1,760.00 deductible. On March 2, 2015, State Farm advised Garcia that no payment would be made to her.

On April 8, 2015, Garcia sued appellees, alleging breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, as well as violations of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, the Insurance Code, and the DTPA. Thereafter, State Farm demanded the appraisal process provided in the insurance policy and appointed Lee Moynahan as its appraiser. Garcia responded and appointed Jamie Wesselski as her appraiser. Litigation was stayed pending the appraisal. On September 23, 2015, the appraisers signed an agreement estimating an actual cash value of $6,142.92 and a replacement cost value of $7,835.70 for hail damage to the house. The award was subject to the policy's provisions and deductibles. Three business days later, State Farm tendered payment of the award (the replacement cost value, less depreciation and deductible) in the amount of $4,382.92.

On December 11, 2015, State Farm notified Garcia the litigation stay was lifted. Appellees then moved for summary judgment, alleging State Farm's payment of the appraisal award estopped Garcia from maintaining a breach of contract claim and, without a contract claim, she could not maintain her extra-contractual claims.

On January 27, 2016, Garcia's attorney notified State Farm's attorney that Garcia was rejecting State Farm's offer to pay $4,382.92. On February 25, 2016, Garcia filed an amended petition, in which she added a request that the appraisal award be set aside and disregarded. Garcia also filed a response to appellees' motion for summary judgment. Appellees filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment responding to Garcia's claim that the appraisal award should be set aside and disregarded. On March 10, 2016, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of appellees.

WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT RENDERED ON GROUNDS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

In their answer to Garcia's petition, appellees pled the affirmative defense of estoppel, asserting Garcia's breach of contract claim, extra-contractual claims, and any claims under the Prompt Payment of Claims Act were all barred by State Farm's payment of the appraisal award. In the motion for summary judgment, appellees asserted that payment of the appraisal award resolved and disposed of all claims in the lawsuit.

In her first issue on appeal, Garcia asserts the trial court erred when it rendered summary judgment on her claim to set aside and disregard the appraisal award because appellees' motion for summary judgment did not address that claim and appellees did not file an amended or supplemental motion for summary judgment after she filed her amended petition raising that claim. Garcia also asserts the trial court could not consider appellees' reply in support of their motion for summary judgment in ruling on the motion. Appellees counter that their motion for summary judgment was broad enough to encompass Garcia's amended petition because the validity of the appraisal award was central to their motion for summary judgment; therefore, the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment on all of Garcia's claims.

A trial court may grant a party summary judgment only on a ground raised in that party's motion. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001). Although a trial court generally commits reversible error by granting summary judgment on a ground or claim not addressed in the motion, such error is rendered harmless if "the omitted cause of action is precluded as a matter of law by other grounds raised in the case." G & H Towing Co. v. Magee , 347 S.W.3d 293, 297–98 (Tex. 2011). Similarly, when a summary judgment movant fails to amend its motion after an amended or supplemental petition, we may affirm the summary judgment if (1) the amended or supplemental petition essentially reiterates previously pleaded causes of action, (2) a ground asserted in the motion for summary judgment conclusively negates a common element of the newly and previously pleaded claims, or (3) the original motion is broad enough to encompass the newly asserted claims.

Callahan v. Vitesse Aviation Serv., LLC , 397 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2013, no pet.) ; Coterill–Jenkins v. Texas Med. Ass'n Health Care Liability Claim Trust , 383 S.W.3d 581, 592 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). To determine whether appellees' motion for summary judgment was broad enough to encompass Garcia's claim that the appraisal award should be set aside, we examine the parties' respective burdens of proof.

"We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo ." Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez , 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010). Estoppel is an affirmative defense. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. A defendant moving for summary judgment on an affirmative defense has the burden to conclusively establish that defense. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio , 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). A defendant who conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment. Fernandez , 315 S.W.3d at 508. "When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all competent evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Diversicare Gen. Partner , 185 S.W.3d at 846. Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant must expressly present any reasons seeking to avoid the movant's entitlement and must support the reasons with summary judgment proof to establish a fact issue. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). If the nonmovant does not raise a fact issue as to every element of the estoppel defense, summary judgment is proper. See Toonen v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n , 935 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1996, no writ) ("As a general rule, a party seeking to avoid a summary judgment by virtue of an affirmative defense bears the burden of raising a material issue of fact on that defense.").

In this case, appellees bore the initial summary judgment burden on their estoppel defense to conclusively establish that all of Garcia's claims were barred by the payment of the appraisal award. If they satisfied that burden, the burden shifted to Garcia to raise a fact issue on whether the appraisal award should be set aside. See Barnes v. Western Alliance Ins. Co. , 844 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1992, writ dism'd by agr.) (burden of proof on party seeking to avoid award). In her response to appellees' motion for summary judgment, Garcia argued genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the appraisal award should be set aside. Therefore, whether she raised this argument in her amended petition or in her response to appellees' motion for summary judgment, the issue of whether the appraisal award should be set aside was encompassed within appellees' motion for summary judgment.

APPELLEES' ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR ESTOPPEL DEFENSE TO GARCIA'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

Appraisal awards made pursuant to the provisions of an insurance contract are binding and enforceable. Providence Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Crystal City Indep. Sch. Dist. , 877 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1994, no writ). The effect of an appraisal provision is to estop one party from contesting the issue of damages in a suit on the insurance contract, leaving only the question of liability for the court. Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n , 154 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). An appraisal award made pursuant to an insurance policy is binding and enforceable unless the insured proves that the award should be set aside. Toonen , 935 S.W.2d at 940.

Here, the parties do not dispute the contractual validity of the appraisal clause...

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