Garcia v. STATE TAX COM'N OF STATE OF ID
| Decision Date | 09 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 25561.,25561. |
| Citation | 38 P.3d 1266,136 Idaho 610 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jose Mary GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION OF the STATE OF IDAHO, Defendant-Respondent. |
Roark Law Firm, Hailey; Hampton & Elliott, Boise, for appellant. R. Keith Roark argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Charles E. Zalesky, Deputy Attorney General, argued.
OPINION ON REHEARING THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED DECEMBER 29, 2000, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN
On rehearing from this Court's previous opinion affirming an order granting the State Tax Commission's motion for summary judgment, we affirm.
State and local law enforcement authorities, acting under search warrants, seized suspected controlled substances from the home and workplace of Jose Mary Garcia ("Garcia"). The Bureau of Forensic Services laboratory ("state laboratory") identified the seized substances as marijuana and cocaine and provided weights for each sample. Based upon the same evidence used for the jeopardy assessments, Garcia plead guilty in federal district court to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and was sentenced to ten years in prison. The State initiated civil forfeiture actions against Garcia's real and personal property.
Immediately after the seizure, pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-4208(2), the State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") served Garcia with "Notice[s] of Jeopardy Assessment and Demand[s] for Immediate Payment." The two demands assessed a total illegal drug tax liability of $126,087. The Tax Commission seized over $49,479 in cash, as well as two vehicles belonging to Garcia, as partial payment for the assessments.
Garcia filed a timely protest and petition for re-determination of the drug tax jeopardy assessments. The Tax Commission set the matter for an informal hearing, but the date of the hearing was deferred by mutual consent of the parties. Approximately three years later, and nine weeks before the hearing, Garcia requested an opportunity to examine and weigh the evidence supporting the tax assessment. The Tax Commission ultimately acknowledged that the seized substances could not be located and had apparently been destroyed. At the hearing, Garcia argued that imposition of the tax not only constituted double jeopardy but also was improper because Garcia had had no opportunity to examine and weigh the seized substances. The Tax Commission affirmed Garcia's tax liability but adjusted the amount of liability down to $113,192 to reflect the substance weights provided by the state laboratory. In June 1998, Garcia filed a complaint in district court asking for the Tax Commission's decision to be vacated. The Tax Commission and Garcia both moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Tax Commission. It affirmed a total liability of $113,192, less the money seized by the Tax Commission and the proceeds realized from the sale of Garcia's two vehicles.
On December 20, 2000, this Court issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the district court. Garcia timely filed a petition for rehearing, which this Court granted on March 5, 2001.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not, of itself, establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, especially where the opposing motions seek summary judgment upon different issues or theories. First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). However, when both parties file motions for summary judgment relying upon the same facts, issues, and theories, "the parties essentially stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the court from entering summary judgment." Lowder v. Minidoka County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 837, 979 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1999). "On appeal, this Court exercises free review over the entire record that was before the district court in order to determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
The order on rehearing in this case grants review of the entire case. However, the parties do not present any new argument as to the double jeopardy and the I.C. § 19-315 issues. Therefore, the previous opinion of this Court is restated below with regard to issues A and B, without further analysis.
A. Imposing the Illegal Drug Tax On Garcia After His Federal Conviction Did Not Violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution Because Article I, Section 13 Does Not Bar Successive Actions By Different Sovereigns.
The Idaho Illegal Drug Tax Act (I.C. §§ 63-4201 to -4211) imposes a tax on the illegal possession of more than minimal quantities of controlled substances. "Every person who in violation of Idaho law" possesses the requisite amount of drugs is liable for the tax. I.C. § 63-4203(1). These persons must affix drug tax stamps to the illegally-possessed drugs. I.C. § 63-4205(1). Persons violating the law are subject to a civil penalty of 100% of the tax, collected as part of the tax, as well as to criminal penalties. I.C. § 63-4207(1), (2). Garcia asserts that imposing the illegal drug tax on him after he had been convicted of possession in federal court violates the double jeopardy provision of the Idaho Constitution.
The United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Idaho Constitution similarly provides that "[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Like the Fifth Amendment, Art. I, § 13 prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. See State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 756, 810 P.2d 680, 694 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991)).
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court determined that Montana's illegal drug tax was a punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 783, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1948, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994). It reasoned that a combination of four features showed the Montana act to be punishment for double jeopardy purposes. These four features were its "remarkably high" tax rate, deterrent purpose, dependence on the commission of a crime, and levy upon goods not possessed by the taxpayer. Id. at 780-83, 114 S.Ct. at 1946-48, 128 L.Ed.2d at 779-81. Looking at all these features, the Supreme Court concluded that the Montana tax "depart[ed] so far from normal revenue laws as to become a form of punishment." Id. at 783, 114 S.Ct. at 1948, 128 L.Ed.2d at 780-81. Garcia asserts that, like the Montana tax, Idaho's illegal drug tax constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Even if imposition of Idaho's illegal drug tax on Garcia after his federal conviction amounted to a second punishment, it would not offend the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar successive prosecutions by different sovereigns. Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582, 593 (4th Cir.1998); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88, 106 S.Ct. 433, 437, 88 L.Ed.2d 387, 393-94 (1985). Garcia contends, however, that the dual sovereignty doctrine does not apply to Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
In interpreting provisions of the Idaho Constitution, this Court is free to interpret its constitution as more protective than the United States Constitution. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1988). However, independent analysis under the Idaho Constitution does not mean that this Court will reach a different result from that reached by the U.S. Supreme Court under a similar constitutional provision. State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669, 673, 904 P.2d 939, 943 (1995).
Our previous jurisprudence makes it clear that Idaho's constitutional double jeopardy provision is co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. See State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 693, 662 P.2d 1135, 1137 (1983) (); State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 457-58, 915 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1996) (); Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 Idaho 752, 757, 932 P.2d 875, 880 (1996) (). Accordingly, we hold that Article I, Section 13 does not bar successive actions by different sovereigns. Because the dual sovereignty doctrine applies, imposing the illegal drug tax on Garcia after his federal conviction did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution.
B. The Imposition of the Illegal Drug Tax After Garcia's Federal Conviction Does Not Violate Section 19-315 of the Idaho Code.
Section 19-315 of the Idaho Code bars "the prosecution or indictment" of an act charged as a public offense that is "within the venue of another state, territory, or country, as well as of this state" once the defendant has been convicted or acquitted of the act by another sovereign. I.C. § 19-315. Garcia asserts that this statute bars the Tax Commission from imposing Idaho illegal drug taxes on him following his federal conviction for drug trafficking.
Section 19-315, clearly applies only to subsequent criminal actions, not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Delling
...Court is free to interpret its constitution as more protective than the United States Constitution." Garcia v. State Tax Comm'n of Idaho, 136 Idaho 610, 614, 38 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2002) (quoting State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1988) ). " However, independent analys......
-
Cook v. State
...this state" once the defendant has been convicted or acquitted of the act by another sovereign. See Garcia v. State Tax Com'n of State of Id., 136 Idaho 610, 614, 38 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2002). As the lower court noted, to succeed on his I.C. § 19-315 claim, Cook would have to show that he had ......
-
State v. Head
...to a criminal trial may differ from those applicable to restitution proceedings. See Garcia v. State Tax Comm'n of State of Idaho, 136 Idaho 610, 617 n.3, 38 P.3d 1266, 1273 n.3 (2002). While a defendant in a criminal restitution hearing does not forfeit due process rights after a guilty pl......
-
Smith v. Glenns Ferry Highway Dist.
...the protections of the Idaho Constitution as more protective than the United States Constitution. See Garcia v. State Tax Comm'n, 136 Idaho 610, 614, 38 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2002) (citation omitted).Much has been made by the District and the trial court of "front pay" being a remedy in lieu of ......