Garcia v. Stephens
Citation | 793 F.3d 513 |
Decision Date | 17 July 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–70035.,14–70035. |
Parties | Gustavo Julian GARCIA, Petitioner–Appellant v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent–Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Seth Kretzer, Law Offices of Seth Kretzer, Houston, TX, James Wesley Volberding, Esq., Tyler, TX, for Petitioner–Appellant.
Fredericka Searle Sargent, Asst. Atty. General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
Gustavo Garcia was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury and sentenced to death. This is his second federal habeas petition. The district court denied relief on the merits, ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, and did not issue a certificate of appealability (COA). Garcia now requests a COA from this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to appeal the district court's denial of relief. Having carefully reviewed the record, we hold that Garcia failed to exhaust state court remedies with regard to one of the claims he now raises. To the extent Garcia's remaining claims might be barred by AEDPA's procedural strictures we invoke the statutory discretion afforded us to decline to address that possibility and proceed to deny those claims on the merits.1 We hold that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court's conclusions as to Garcia's remaining claims and accordingly DENY Garcia's request for a COA.
In 1991, a Texas jury found Garcia guilty of capital murder for shooting and killing Craig Turski in the course of committing a robbery at a liquor store where Turski worked.2 The jury sentenced Garcia to death. On automatic direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) initially reversed Garcia's conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that a written confession signed by Garcia violated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 § 2(b), which “requires that no written statement made by the defendant be admitted into evidence unless, on its face, the statement contains a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the rights set forth in [section 2(a), which operationalizes a standard Miranda warning].” 3
Although Garcia had initialed “G.G.” before numbered warnings mirroring the rights listed in section 2(a) and had signed his name adjacent to additional language reinforcing those warnings, the CCA concluded that the written confession did not include “on its face” an express waiver of those rights.4
The CCA subsequently granted a motion for rehearing and reversed course, affirming the trial court and holding, “though a close call,” that Garcia's individual initialing beside the warnings, taken in context with his signature adjacent to the additional reinforcing language, constituted sufficient evidence that Garcia “did, on the face of his voluntary statement, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his [s]ection 2(a) rights in a manner sufficient to comply with the legislature's intent when it enacted [s]ection 2(b).”5 Garcia did not file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Garcia filed his first application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court in 1997.6 In 1998, the state habeas court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that the application be denied. In February 1999, the CCA adopted the state habeas court's findings and conclusions and denied habeas relief without written order.7 The state trial court set Garcia's execution date for March 31, 1999. In March 1999, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Judge Schell, granted a motion to appoint new counsel and stayed Garcia's execution.
Garcia filed his first federal habeas petition in August 1999, which was supplemented in 2000.8 In response, the state confessed error as to Garcia's claim that the trial court allowed improper testimony by the state's expert witness during the punishment phase of the trial—so-called Saldano error.9 On September 6, 2000, the federal district court issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus, requiring the state to conduct a new sentencing hearing.
The state trial court held a second jury trial on sentencing in February and March of 2001, and the jury again sentenced Garcia to death.10 On automatic direct appeal, the CCA affirmed Garcia's sentence.11 The CCA denied Garcia's motion for rehearing. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 2004, and subsequently denied Garcia's motion for rehearing.12
Meanwhile, Garcia filed a second application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. On February 12, 2008, the state trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that relief be denied.13 The CCA denied relief in a brief written order on October 15, 2008.14
Garcia began the instant proceedings on November 27, 2008 in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas; he sought and received appointment of counsel by Judge Heartfield. He filed his second federal habeas petition on October 11, 2009. The district court denied relief in a 163–page opinion on November 10, 2014, dismissing the case and declining to grant a certificate of appealability (COA).15 Garcia now requests a COA from this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
We rely on the CCA's factual recitation,16 which summarized the facts of the offense as follows:
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Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective...
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