Garcia v. Summit Tech. Sols.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-03077-CNS-MDB |
| Parties | MARY A. GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. SUMMIT TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, BRIAN SUTTON, and TAMIE SHARP, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on “Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint,” filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ([“Motion”], Doc. No 14.) Plaintiffs have responded in opposition to the Motion and Defendants have replied. ([“Response”], Doc No. 31; [“Reply”], Doc. No. 33.) For the following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion be DENIED.
Plaintiff Mary A. Garcia [“Plaintiff”] brings this lawsuit against her former employer, Summit Technical Solutions, LLC [“Summit”], and two individuals working for Summit, Brian Sutton and Tamie Sharp [together with Summit, “Defendants”], alleging race discrimination and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. ([“Complaint”], Doc. No. 1.)
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was hired by Summit on August 19, 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-15.) She alleges that she is Hispanic and that she began experiencing racial discrimination when Mr. Sutton arrived on September 9, 2019 and became her new supervisor. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 1529.) Specifically, in her first encounter with Mr. Sutton, Mr. Sutton allegedly asked Plaintiff about her race and told Plaintiff that someone “like her” could not do the work. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also alleges that, beginning on or around September 16, 2019, Mr. Sutton repeatedly requested that Plaintiff report to his office on an almost daily basis, and “ranted at her that ‘people like her' cannot possibly know how to do the job.” (Id. at ¶ 30.) She alleges that she was “[s]ubjected to escalating racial harassment,” and that Mr. Sutton denied her equal opportunity in training. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34.) Mr. Sutton also allegedly told Plaintiff that he was training “a new white manager;” that he was a master at “making it look like he is giving an employee what he's supposed to before terminating them,” and that he “would create a CPI program to make it look like he fully trained Plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶ 49.)
Plaintiff allegedly reported the “racial discrimination” to Summit's Human Resources Manager, Tamie Sharp, but Ms. Sharp told Plaintiff to “deal with it.” (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 35.) Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Sharp told her that she was “unimportant,” that she and several of the white technicians at Summit were “Klan,” and that Plaintiff needed to “apologize” to the white technicians. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-46.) Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Sharp told her to deal with racial discrimination from Mr. Sutton and everyone else, and that if she did not drop her complaints of racial discrimination, Ms. Sharp would use complaints from technicians against Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff describes a hostile encounter with Ms. Sharp, where Ms. Sharp allegedly “displayed hatred in her tone, used a loud voice, and had her face within less than an inch of Plaintiff's left eye[.]” (Id.)
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was terminated on October 25, 2019, “because of her race,” and subjected to orders from Ms. Sharp that put her in harm's way the day before. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-57.) She also alleges that, even though she was subjected to an investigation and cleared by the military within ten days, Ms. Sharp and Mr. Sutton withheld this information from the Department of Defense, and as a result, Plaintiff has been prevented from obtaining employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.)
Based on these allegations, on November 16, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit against the three above-named Defendants, asserting the following claims for relief: (1) § 1981 race discrimination against all Defendants; (2) § 1981 retaliation against Summit; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-72.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks “compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the costs of this suit.” (Id. at 13.)
Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint, in its entirety, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 14.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination and retaliation should be dismissed, because the facts do not plausibly show that racial animus was the “but for cause” of her injuries. (Id. at 6-9.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff “failed to timely bring suit under Title VII and . . . is improperly attempting to assert her time-barred claims under §1981.” (Id. at 9.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should also be dismissed, because the allegations in the Complaint, even if true, do not reach the high standard of outrageousness required by law. (Id. at 13.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). “The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded facts which allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Iqbal evaluation requires two prongs of analysis. First, the court identifies “the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” i.e., those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679-81. Second, the court considers the factual allegations “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, the claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 679.
That being said, the court need not accept conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments. S. Disposal, Inc., v. Tex. Waste Mgmt., 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678. Moreover, Id. (citation omitted). Still, all that is required is plausibility, not probability. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, a well-pleaded Complaint can survive a motion to dismiss even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court typically may not look beyond the pleadings. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1125 (10th Cir. 2010). “Pleadings,” for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, however, include attachments to the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and information subject to judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006). Documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims. GFF Corp. v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997).
Here, Defendants have attached to their Motion a charge of discrimination, which Plaintiff apparently filed with the North Dakota Department of Labor and Human Rights (“DOLHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [“EEOC”], under those agencies' work-sharing agreement. (Doc. No. 14 at 4-5 n.1; see Doc. No. 14-1.) Defendants urge the Court to consider the filing in its evaluation of the present Motion, because Plaintiff references a “Charge of Discrimination” in her Complaint, and because the charge documents are central to Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. No. 14 at 4-5 n.1; see Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 50.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the documents submitted by Defendants should be “disregarded.” (Doc. No. 31 at 5.) Plaintiff contends that the Complaint does not reference an “EEOC Charge,” but instead only references a charge made in accordance with Defendant's policy. (Id.; see Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 50.) Plaintiff likewise contends that the charge of discrimination filed with the DOLHR and the EEOC is not “central” to her § 1981 claims. (Doc. No. 31 at 5.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The Complaint alleges that ...
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