Garcia v. Superior Court (State)
| Decision Date | 20 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. H004117,H004117 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 215 Cal.App.3d 695 215 Cal.App.3d 695 Adrian GARCIA, Jr., et al., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Santa Clara County, Respondent; STATE of California, et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
Cliff Weingus, Garry, McTernan, Stender, Walsh & Schwartzbach, San Francisco, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Wayman M. Robertson, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for real parties in interest.
Napoleon Johnson, freed on parole after having served time for murdering his wife, killed Grace Morales. Plaintiffs, Morales's minor children and heirs, bring both wrongful death claims and a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983, hereafter § 1983) against state and local government entities and employees asserted to have helped bring about this tragedy. The defendants involved in this writ proceeding are Ybarra, who was Johnson's parole agent and who allegedly misled Morales into believing Johnson was not dangerous The wrongful death claims raise the issues whether defendants breached a duty to plaintiffs under these circumstances and in so doing proximately caused Morales's death, and if so, whether defendants are immune by virtue of Government Code sections 845.8 and 820.2 (). The § 1983 claim poses the questions whether the State may be sued under § 1983, and whether the defendants pursued an official policy under color of state law which caused Morales's death.
and the State of California, Ybarra's employer, sued both on account of Ybarra's act and also because of the alleged failure of a state-employed psychologist to warn Morales of her danger. The trial court sustained Ybarra's demurrer to all causes, and sustained State's demurrer to all claims based on Ybarra's conduct, leaving intact as against State only the claim based on the psychologist's failure to warn Morales of the danger. Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate to compel reversal of these rulings, and the California Supreme Court has directed that we issue an alternative writ, which we have done.
For reasons which we shall state, we have concluded as follows: (1) the state law claims do not state causes of action because Ybarra's advice to Morales was not a breach of duty on these facts; (2) regarding the federal claim, (a) State may not be sued under § 1983 because a state is not a person for purposes of a § 1983 claim and (b) the federal claim against Ybarra states no cause of action because his acts were not the result of an official state policy within the meaning of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle (1985) 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791. Accordingly we will deny plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate.
The first cause of action of the complaint, for wrongful death, alleges that plaintiffs are the minor children and heirs of decedent Grace Morales. Defendant Ybarra is a parole agent employed by defendant State of California. (Other defendants, including the County of Santa Clara and a medical treatment facility, are not involved in this proceeding.)
Napoleon Johnson (also a defendant) was convicted of murdering his wife in 1973. He was released on parole in 1985; Ybarra was his parole agent. Johnson began a romantic relationship with Morales, but moved out of her home in March 1986, at which time he began a campaign of violence and harassment of Morales including forced sexual relations at knife point and death threats.
Ybarra learned that Johnson had threatened Morales and her children. He met with both of them to discuss the situation. Johnson denied making the threats, and Ybarra believed him.
In April 1986, Johnson told Ybarra that he felt jealous, angry and abandoned by Morales and that he would kill her if he found her. Ybarra knew that Johnson had murdered his first wife in a jealous fit after their marriage broke up. He concluded Johnson was dangerous to Morales and had him committed to the custody of a medical facility, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. After the facility released Johnson, Ybarra told him to have intensive treatment with the parole department staff psychologist.
During treatment, Johnson made further threats against decedent to the staff psychologist, who did not warn Morales of these threats.
During this time an attorney, Vides, was representing Morales in connection with custody proceedings involving her children. Vides was concerned with the possible impact of Morales's relationship with Johnson, a parolee, on the custody dispute, and therefore asked Ybarra the nature of Johnson's crime. He would not tell her. However, Vides independently learned that Johnson had been convicted of murder and again contacted Ybarra, who would not give Vides any details but did say the crime was not of the type which would pose a danger to the children.
Vides then learned of Johnson's violence and threats to Morales and Vides told Ybarra these facts in April 1986. She told The complaint alleges that as a proximate result of Ybarra's conduct detailed above, as well as the failure of psychologists to warn her of danger, Morales failed to take steps to protect herself from Johnson.
Ybarra that Johnson had attempted to stab Morales. Ybarra then still believed that Johnson was jealous and potentially violent. Vides said she was going to apply for a temporary restraining order to protect Morales from Johnson, and Ybarra agreed to serve the order and arrest Johnson. However, instead of doing so, he telephoned Morales in an attempt to reconcile her with Johnson. In that conversation Ybarra told Morales that "I don't think you have anything to worry about. He's not going to come looking for you." He also told her that Johnson had said he was still in love with her and he repeatedly asked her if she really wanted to end the relationship. Later, Ybarra told Vides that he considered Morales to be "a lying sack of shit."
On April 16, 1986, Johnson kidnapped Morales and shot her to death.
In their second cause of action, for violation of civil rights under § 1983, plaintiffs allege Ybarra "and other employees of the STATE OF CALIFORNIA" acted recklessly and with deliberate indifference to Morales's needs, and in a manner that shocked the conscience. By so acting, Ybarra and other employees of the State (and other defendants) "acted under color of law and deprived Plaintiff [sic] of her life, without due process of law and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
The trial court sustained Ybarra's demurrer to both causes, without leave to amend; sustained without leave to amend State's demurrer to the federal claim; and overruled State's demurrer to the wrongful death claim, but granted its motion to strike allegations premising liability on Ybarra's conduct, leaving intact as a basis for the action only the claimed failure of the state-employed psychologist to warn Morales of danger.
In cases of this nature raising question both of tort liability and of sovereign immunity we are instructed first to decide whether a private actor would be liable in tort, and then, if so, whether governmental immunity bars the action. (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 22, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137.)
Unfortunately, separating the two questions is not as straightforward as might at first appear. Those cases which have thoughtfully examined what is meant by the concept of "duty" in tort law have accurately discerned that the concept is not an accurate analytic tool but is no more than a shorthand expression of the sum total of relevant factors leading a court to conclude that on the particular facts presented a plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's acts. (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912; Myers v. Quesenberry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 891, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334.) Included in those factors is concern over need for governmental immunity to prevent impairment of public functions. ( Myers v. Quesenberry, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 893, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894; Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 750, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728.) It is thus not possible to consider "duty" in isolation from "immunity" issues. Similarly circular is an attempt to discuss "duty" before considering causation, because again, foreseeability of the risk is an element to be considered in deciding whether a duty is owed. (See, e.g. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36; Myers v. Quesenberry, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 892, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561.) We agree with the analysis of the court in Myers v. Quesenberry, and similarly reasoned decisions, that the question of negligence liability is best analyzed by eliminating labels such as "duty" which beg the question and by focusing on the issue whether liability should be imposed. ( Myers v. Quesenberry, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 891, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733.) The general rule in this jurisdiction is liability, that is, that defendants are liable for injuries caused by their failure to exercise reasonable care. ( ...
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Garcia v. Superior Court (State), S004813
...of California et al., Real Parties in Interest. No. S004813. Supreme Court of California. Oct. 27, 1988. Prior report: Cal.App., 249 Cal.Rptr. 449. Petition for review MOSK, BROUSSARD, ARGUELLES, EAGLESON and KAUFMAN, JJ., concur. ...