Garcia v. Teitler

• Decision Date: 22 March 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 04-4886 CV.
• Parties: Rene GARCIA and Carmen Vazquez Alvarez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Jane S. TEITLER as Personal Representative of Stanley A. Teitler, Deceased,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

443 F.3d 202

Rene GARCIA and Carmen Vazquez Alvarez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Jane S. TEITLER as Personal Representative of Stanley A. Teitler, Deceased,¹ Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 04-4886 CV.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Submitted: December 14, 2005.

Decided: March 22, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Wikstrom Esq., Law Office of, David Wikstrom, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Stanley A. Teitler Esq., Law Offices of Stanley A. Teitler, P.C., Belle Harbor, NY, Defendant-Appellant.

Before: Hon. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Hon. RICHARD C. WESLEY, Hon. PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

HALL, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Stanley Teitler ("Teitler"), an attorney, was retained by plaintiffs-appellees Rene Garcia ("Garcia") and Carmen Vazquez Alvarez ("Alvarez") (together "appellees"), who are husband and wife, to defend them in United States v. Benjamin Ramos, 03-Cr-1198 (E.D.N.Y.), against criminal charges that they participated in an international drug and money laundering conspiracy. The issue of an apparent conflict of interest created by Teitler's joint representation of the two defendants in that case arose early in the proceedings. The District Court held a joint representation hearing pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 44 and United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1982), and ruled that Teitler would not be permitted to represent both Garcia and Alvarez. Ultimately, Teitler represented neither.

Garcia and Alvarez demanded a return of the initial fees paid to Teitler, and Teitler claimed he was owed additional fees for services rendered. Following a hearing, the District Court concluded that Teitler had been discharged for cause and ordered him to return the retainer fees paid on behalf of Garcia and Alvarez. Teitler now appeals that judgment, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction and its findings of fact, and further asserting that he was denied certain constitutional rights. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Background

The following is based on the statement of background facts set forth in the July 22, 2004 Memorandum and Order of the District Court; we perceive no clear error in these findings. See Garcia v. Teitler, No. 04 CV 832, 2004 WL 1636982, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004).

A. The arrest of Garcia and Alavarez and the retention of Teitler

On October 29, 2003, Garcia and Alvarez were arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, and ordered removed to the Eastern District of New York. Id. Garcia faced charges of conspiracy and possession of narcotics with intent to distribute; Alvarez was charged as a lesser participant in the same conspiracy. Id.

Immediately following the arrest, Rebeka Four ("Four") — a family friend — undertook efforts to obtain defense counsel for Garcia and Alvarez. After interviewing several attorneys, Four decided to retain Teitler. When asked which of the two he would represent, Teitler informed Four that the best strategy was for him to represent both and assured her that there would be no conflict of interest. In addition, Teitler cautioned that separate counsel would turn Garcia and Alvarez against each other and increase the risk of conviction. Id. at **1-2.

On November 10, 2005, Teitler sent to Four, as agent for Garcia and Alvarez, a single retainer agreement providing for dual representation and requiring an initial payment of $50,000 plus a $5,000 deposit for costs and disbursements. Alvarez's family, however, objected to subsidizing Garcia's defense, so Teitler dispatched separate retainer agreements, each of which called for a $25,000 retainer fee and $2,500 expense deposit. Both agreements were executed and Teitler received a total of $40,000 in retainer fees — $27,500 on behalf of Alvarez and $12,500 on behalf of Garcia. Four conferred with Teitler a number of times and advised him that neither of his clients wanted to incur expenses litigating the joint representation issue. Teitler assured her that the arrangement would be acceptable to the District Court. Id. at **2-4.

B. The Curcio hearing

Teitler appeared before the District Court at a status conference on December 2, 2003, although Garcia and Alvarez had not yet been produced in New York. The Government raised the issue of Teitler's representation of both Garcia and Alvarez, and the District Court deferred the matter until Teitler had an opportunity to meet and confer with his clients. On December 5, 2003, appellees met with Teitler for the first time at their arraignment, where the presiding magistrate judge expressed concern about the dual representation arrangement. Because Teitler had not yet discussed the indictment with his clients, a brief adjournment was allowed, during which Teitler told Garcia and Alvarez that the Government's case was "bullshit" and that he would insist on a speedy trial. Garcia and Alvarez each pleaded not guilty, bail was denied with leave to represent, and a temporary order of detention was entered. Id. at *3.

In a letter dated December 8, 2003, the Government requested that the District Court convene a Curcio hearing to address a number of alleged actual or potential conflicts of interest arising from Teitler's representation of both Garcia and Alvarez. That application was granted, and Teitler represented both Garcia and Alvarez at the December 12, 2003 hearing. The District Court explained the inherent risks in joint representation and questioned Alvarez in order to determine her understanding of the significance of joint representation generally and in the context of the pending prosecution specifically. When asked to explain how "having [appellant] as [her] lawyer could affect [her] decision whether or not to plead guilty," Alvarez responded "I don't know what to answer." Alvarez's response to a question about Teitler's ability to advise her on the issue of cooperation revealed a similar lack of comprehension. Teitler insisted that the circumstances did not present an actual conflict or even the potential for a conflict, but the District Court nonetheless refused to accept a waiver from either Garcia or Alvarez and directed Teitler to inform the court within one week which of his two clients he would continue to represent.² Id. at **3-4.

C. The fee dispute

Within days of the Curcio hearing, Four informed Teitler that neither Alvarez nor Garcia desired his services. Teitler threatened to withdraw as counsel and predicted that Alvarez's bail would be revoked. Teitler further refused to return any of the retainer fees, despite earlier assurances to Four that he would do so, claiming that he first needed to do a statement of billable hours for each defendant. Id. at *4.

At a status conference on December 29, 2003, the District Court granted Teitler's motion to be relieved as counsel. Following a failed attempt by the parties to resolve the fee dispute, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter and ruled that Teitler had been discharged for cause. The District Court further ruled that he had fabricated the additional billing statement "in an effort to justify keeping the $40,000 he had been paid, and to try to obtain another $27,250 in additional fees." Id.

II. Discussion

A. The District Court's Exercise of Ancillary Jurisdiction

Teitler first argues that the District Court's power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in criminal matters was abolished by Congress when it codified supplemental jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367, passed as part of the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, provides in relevant part:

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Appellant argues that because this section applies only to "civil action[s]," by implication, criminal ancillary jurisdiction must have been eliminated. We disagree.

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a court begin with "the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms." Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir.2002). We think the statute means exactly what it says; in civil cases, a court may exercise "jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims" over which the court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Although § 1367 says nothing of criminal matters, it does not follow that a court may not exercise ancillary jurisdiction in a criminal case. Indeed, a district court's jurisdiction over criminal matters is defined by an entirely separate title of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (providing that "the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction . . . of all offenses against the laws of the United States"). In adding § 1367 to the provisions of Title 28 dealing with civil jurisdiction, Congress could not have intended to effect so sweeping a change to criminal jurisdiction as appellant would have us hold.

Our holding is buttressed by the fact that courts have long exercised ancillary jurisdiction in criminal matters. In United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir.1977), for example, we held that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to address a motion by a criminal defendant to have his arrest record expunged, and fingerprints and arrest photographs returned, following the dismissal of his indictment. We have also held that a district court has ancillary jurisdiction to address a motion for the return of seized property. See Rufu v. United States, 20 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir.1994); Soviero v. United States, 967 F.2d 791, 792 (2d Cir.1992); Mora v. United States...