Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 August 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 06–2198–JTM.
• Citation: 890 F.Supp.2d 1273
• Parties: Adelina GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TYSON FOODS, INC. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

890 F.Supp.2d 1273

Adelina GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.TYSON FOODS, INC. et al., Defendants.

Case No. 06–2198–JTM.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

Aug. 21, 2012.

Adam T. Klein, Justin M. Swartz, Linda A. Neilan, New York, NY, Eric L. Dirks, George A. Hanson, Lee R. Anderson, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, Kansas City, MO, Peter J. Antosh Dodge City, KS, for Plaintiffs.

Emily Burkhardt Vicente, Pro Hac, Vice.

Craig S. O'Dear, Robert J. Hoffman, Terence J. Thum, Bryan Cave LLP, Kansas City, MO, Evangeline C. PaschalMichael J. Mueller, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

J. THOMAS MARTEN, District Judge.

Presently before the court are the following motions: plaintiffs' Post–Trial Motions to Alter or Amend the Judgment Regarding Liquidated Damages, Interest, and the Final Class Definition (Dkt. No. 1055); defendants' Motion for Remittitur to Receive Credit for “Sunshine Time” (Dkt. No. 1056); and defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Dkt. No. 1058). As detailed below, the court denies the defendants' Motions and grants the plaintiffs' Motion.

I. Background

This case has a lengthy procedural history spanning over six years, which needs a brief review. Adelina Garcia and other past and present employees of defendants Tyson Foods, Inc. and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., (collectively Tyson) filed a class action and collective action lawsuit on May 15, 2006, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA) against Tyson at its Finney County and Emporia, Kansas plants. In February 2007, Judge John W. Lungstrum denied defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Dkt. No. 599. Tyson filed a motion to amend the court's summary judgment order, which was denied, and Tyson appealed. On August 19, 2008, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Tyson's appeal. Thereafter, on February 12, 2009, this court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and conditional collective action certification. See255 F.R.D. 678 (D.Kan.2009).

Both parties filed summary judgment motions, which the court granted in part and denied in part. See Dkt. No. 952. The case was then reassigned to the undersigned, and the case proceeded to trial. See Dkt. No. 964. On February 10, 2011, the court held a hearing on Tyson's Motion to Bifurcate (Dkt. No. 951), which the court granted.¹ The court held an in limine conference, granting and denying several of the parties' requests and taking some under advisement. The matter went to trial on March 2, 2011, and the jury returned a verdict on March 16. Specifically, the jury found that Tyson failed to compensate plaintiffs for time spent during the continuous workday for pre-and post-shift activities; that Tyson willfully violated the FLSA; and that Tyson violated the KWPA. The jury awarded $166,345.00 for pre-and post-shift violations of the FLSA and awarded $366,666.00 for violations of the KWPA. The court denied Tyson's initial motion for a directed verdict on March 16, and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on March 17. Dkt. No. 1046.

II. Tyson's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of LawA. Legal Standard

Courts grant judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) only “cautiously and sparingly.” Zuchel v. City & County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir.1993) (quotations omitted). Granting judgment as a matter of law is improper “ ‘[u]nless the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in favor of the movant as to permit no other rational conclusion.’ ” Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep't of Human Res., 474 F.3d 747, 751 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir.1996)). When considering the motion, a court may not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870, 891 (10th Cir.2006). The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and affirm the verdict if it contains evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 914 (10th Cir.2004). The court, however, should enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party when “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the issue against that party.” Sims, 469 F.3d at 891.

B. Legal Conclusions

Tyson argues this court must grant its Motion for two reasons. First, that plaintiffs failed to submit adequate proof for purposes of the FLSA collective action and the Rule 23 class action. Second, Tyson contends plaintiffs did not prove it acted willfully under the FLSA. Tyson moves the court to grant it judgment as a matter of law on these issues or, in the alternative,to decertify the FLSA collective action and the Rule 23 class action. The court will analyze each argument in turn.

1. Collective and Class Action Viability

There are two separate standards for determining whether a court has properly certified a collective action under the FLSA and a class action under Rule 23. “To maintain a collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are similarly situated.” Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952 (11th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted); see also29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”). Plaintiffs need only show their positions are similar, not identical, to the positions held by the rest of the collective class members. Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir.1996); Chabrier v. Wilmington Fin., Inc., No. 06–4176, 2006 WL 3742774, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 13, 2006). Plaintiffs must, however, demonstrate a reasonable basis for their claim of class-wide treatment. See Harper v. Lovett's Buffet, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 358, 362 (M.D.Ala.1999).

The Tenth Circuit uses a two-step approach in determining whether plaintiffs are “similarly situated” under § 216(b). See Thiessen v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102–03 (10th Cir.2001). Under Thiessen, the court makes an initial determination of “similarly situated” at the “notice stage” and another at the conclusion of discovery. Id. The standard at the conclusion of discovery is a stricter standard than that at the notice stage. Id. Because this case is at the post-trial motion stage, this court must evaluate whether the plaintiffs were similarly situated using the stricter standard. Under this standard, the court evaluates several factors including, (1) the disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, (2) the defenses available to defendants which appear to be individual to each plaintiff, and (3) fairness and procedural considerations. Id. at 1103;see also Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 388 n. 17 (3d Cir.2007) (“A representative (but not exhaustive or mandatory) list of relevant factors includes whether the plaintiffs are employed in the same corporate department, division and location; advanced similar claims of age discrimination; sought substantially the same form of relief; and had similar salaries and circumstances of employment.”). The court must also consider whether the plaintiffs can show that the defendant has a common policy or plan in violation of the FLSA. O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., No. 04–CV00085, 2006 WL 3483956, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 30, 2006).

The requirements for class treatment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 are more stringent than those under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See, e.g., Vaughan v. Mortgage Source, L.L.C., No. 08–4737, 2010 WL 1528521, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010) (stating “courts have repeatedly stated that Section 216(b)'s ‘similarly situated’ requirement is considerably less stringent than the requirements for class certification under Rule 23.”). The prerequisites for class certification include Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)'s requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) requires predominance and superiority—that is, common questions must predominate over individual issues and class resolution must be superior to other methods of adjudication. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613–15, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997).

This court conditionally certified plaintiffs' FLSA collective action and Rule 23 class action on February 12, 2009. See255 F.R.D. 678. Nevertheless, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C) permits the court to alter or amend class certification before final judgment. See Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009, 1017–19 (8th Cir.1986); Key v. Gillette Co., 782 F.2d 5, 6–7 (1st Cir.1986). A decision to decertify after a trial on the merits must take into account the possible unfairness to the defendant. Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, 7AA Federal Practice & Procedure § 1785.4 (3d ed. 2005) (“If the class has lost on the merits, this result may be inappropriate when the opponent has devoted the time and resources necessary to defend a class suit and now finds that only the named plaintiffs are bound and the same issues may have to be retried. Similarly, if the class prevailed, then decertification wrongly may deprive them of the fruits of their victory.”). Because the class prevailed at trial here, the court must carefully weigh its decision to decertify as it may wrongly deprive plaintiffs of the fruits of their victory. See id.

2. The Plaintiffs Are Similarly Situated

a. Tyson Had a Common Policy or Plan

First, it is clear that Tyson had a common policy or plan of paying all class members on gang time and paying them K code. And the K code was based on average estimated amounts...