Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect

• Decision Date: 23 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-2869.,02-2869.
• Parties: Jose GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF MOUNT PROSPECT, Mount Prospect Police Pension Board, and George Steiner, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

360 F.3d 630

Jose GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF MOUNT PROSPECT, Mount Prospect Police Pension Board, and George Steiner, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-2869.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 25, 2003.

Decided February 23, 2004.

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Keith L. Hunt (argued), Lara A. Anderson, Hunt & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Everette M. Hill (argued), George A. Wagner, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellee.

Michael J. Gray, Jones Day, Chicago, IL for Defendant-Appellee.

Before CUDAHY, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

I. History

Jose Garcia, an Hispanic, was a police officer for the Village of Mount Prospect, Illinois from January 1984 until April 1998. During his tenure as a police officer, Garcia contributed to the Village's pension fund. This fund had been established, along with the Mount Prospect Police Pension Board,¹ by the Village under article 3 of the Illinois Pension Code, 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 (1998). On April 13, 1998, Garcia suffered a heart attack, leaving him totally and permanently disabled, unable to perform his duties as a police officer. Consequently, on or about June 20, 1998, Garcia applied to the Board for duty-related disability benefits equal to sixty-five percent of his total salary. At the time of his application and during its pendency, Sergeant George Steiner was a member of the Board.

Prior to his heart attack and disability application, Garcia had been a deposition witness in the case of Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F.Supp.2d 780 (N.D.Ill.2000). In Martinez, an Hispanic former police trainee accused the Village Police Department of national origin employment discrimination. (R. 20-1 Ex. E.) On September 30, 1997, counsel for Martinez deposed Garcia at length about various discriminatory practices engaged in by the Village Police Department's command ranks, including Steiner. In January 1998, Garcia's deposition was used by Martinez in responding to the Village's ultimately unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.²

Following Garcia's June 20, 1998 duty-related disability pension application, the Board selected three physicians to examine Garcia to determine if he was disabled. 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-115 (1998). At an April 19, 1999 hearing, the Board reviewed the physicians' initial reports and other evidence submitted by both parties (i.e., Garcia's pension benefit application, the initial physical examination of Garcia). While clear that Garcia was disabled, whether the disability occurred in the line of duty remained uncertain. Thus, the Board awarded Garcia non-duty-related disability benefits equal to fifty percent of his total salary. The hearing was continued in order to later consider whether the duty-related benefits were warranted.

Hearings were held on May 12, 1999, and December 22, 1999, where additional evidence was submitted, including: Garcia's own testimony, supplemental medical reports from the Board-selected physicians, medical records from three Garcia-selected physicians, depositions of the Board-selected physicians, and miscellaneous employment records. At no time during any of the three hearings were any claims of employment discrimination made to the Board. After the December 22 hearing concluded, the Board met in a closed session and voted to deny Garcia's duty-related benefits, but to continue the non-duty-related benefits. A written Decision and Order to that effect was issued by the Board on February 14, 2000.

On March 15, 2000, Garcia filed a timely³ complaint for administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County, seeking reversal of his denial of duty-related pension benefits. In his state-court complaint, Garcia alleged only that the decision "[was] against the manifest weight of the evidence and ... [was] arbitrary and capricious." (R. 20-2 Ex. G-1.) Both Garcia and the Village filed briefs addressing that issue. Nowhere in Garcia's initial July 21, 2000 brief or September 15, 2000 reply brief was there any mention of illegal employment discrimination generally or as a factor in the Board's decision. Nor did the Village make any reference to such claims in its response brief of August 22, 2000. On October 24, 2000, the state-court judge heard oral argument, set forth her reasoning on the record, and affirmed the Board's decision by written order.⁴

During the pendency of Garcia's ultimately unsuccessful administrative appeal, on September 15, 2000, he filed Title VII charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) He alleged that when the Board denied him duty-related disability pension benefits, the Village and the Board engaged in unlawful retaliation for his Martinez-related testimony and unlawful employment discrimination based upon race and national origin. (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) The EEOC dismissed Garcia's charge and issued a right-to-sue letter on January 11, 2001. Thus, on April 11, 2001, Garcia filed a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois against the Village, the Board, and George Steiner in his individual and official capacities. In the complaint, Garcia alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. Motions for summary judgment based upon res judicata were filed by the Village and the Board under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b). But on May 21, 2002, District Court Judge Elaine Bucklo sua sponte raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). She also dismissed the summary-judgment motions as moot. This appeal followed. For the following reasons we affirm the district court's dismissal, but on res judicata, rather than Rooker-Feldman, grounds.⁵

II. Analysis

In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982), the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, applies to state-court judgments entered in proceedings to review a state administrative agency. But cf. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (holding that full faith and credit is inapplicable to endow unreviewed administrative proceedings preclusive effect in Title VII cases). A judgment of a state court sitting in an administrative review capacity will have preclusive effect on claims and issues brought in subsequent lawsuits according to the law of the state where the judgment was rendered.⁶ 456 U.S. at 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1883. But a federal court can deny preclusion if the state-court proceedings denied the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate by falling below the minimum requirements of due process. Id. at 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1883; see 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4471.3 (2002).

In the instant case, the Village, Board, and Steiner urge that the Illinois circuit court's administrative review of the Board's denial of duty-related benefits has a res judicata effect on Garcia's federal civil-rights claims. Our analysis, based upon Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82, 102 S.Ct 1883, has two prongs. First, we will assess the applicability of res judicata under Illinois law. Second, we will review Garcia's opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his civil-rights claims.

A. Illinois res judicata law

Under Illinois law, in order for res judicata to apply to Garcia's current civil-rights claims, the circuit court's previous affirmance of the Board's decision must: (1) have reached a final judgment on the merits; (2) involve the same parties or their privies as the current claims; and (3) constitute the same cause of action as the current claims. Pirela v. Vill. of N. Aurora, 935 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir.1991) (citations omitted); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 234 Ill.Dec. 783, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889 (1998). Here, only the second two elements are at issue.

1. Same parties

Garcia was the plaintiff in both the circuit court administrative appeal and in this case. Therefore, the second element of res judicata is easily met with respect to Garcia. There are three defendants in this case: the Board, the Village, and Steiner, in his individual and official capacities. Only the Board was a named party in Garcia's administrative appeal to the circuit court. Hence, the second element of res judicata is clearly met with respect to the Board. We must then consider whether the Village and Steiner are in privity with the Board.

Garcia offered no authority in his initial brief to this court for his assertion that neither the Village nor Steiner would be in privity with the Board. In his reply brief, Garcia cited but one case, Rhoads v. Board of Trustees, 293 Ill.App.3d 1070, 228 Ill. Dec. 394, 689 N.E.2d 266 (1997), in support of this argument. However, Rhoads is distinguishable from the instant case and is against the greater weight of authority.

The Rhoads court held that a municipality's police pension board was not in privity with the municipality itself. Id., 228 Ill.Dec. 394, 689 N.E.2d at 269-270. In Rhoads, a police officer injured his knee in two separate incidents while performing his duties as a police officer. In 1988, his knee was injured when his arm was trapped in the window of a car whose driver attempted to drive away to avoid being snared in a prostitution "sting," dragging Rhoads. In 1991, the same knee was again injured when a suspect kicked him. Id., 228 Ill.Dec. 394, 689 N.E.2d at 268. Rhoads made worker's compensation and, when it became apparent that he would no longer be able to work as a police officer,...