Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P.
| Decision Date | 03 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:14-cv-255-Orl-40TBS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | SONIA GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., Defendant. |
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof (Doc. 54), filed December 8, 2014. On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff responded in opposition (Doc. 57). On December 31, 2014, Defendant replied in support (Doc. 60). Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment is therefore ripe for adjudication. Upon consideration, the Court denies Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment.
On January 21, 2012, Plaintiff, Sonia Garcia ("Garcia"), entered a store owned and operated by Defendant, Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. ("Wal-Mart"), in Kissimmee, Florida. As Garcia walked through the store toward the garden center, she slipped and fell to the ground, landing on her left knee. Garcia states that she slipped on a clear liquid on the floor that resembled water. (Doc. 58-1, 49:25-50:7). After Garcia's fall, Wal-Mart staffcleaned up the liquid from the floor. Garcia states that she has suffered injuries to her neck, back, and left knee as a result of the fall. (Id. at 63:13-65:12).
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" to support its position that it is entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). However, "[t]he court need not consider only the cited materials" and may consider any other material in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
An issue of fact is "genuine" only if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if the fact could affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating a lack of genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). If the movant shows "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are, in fact, genuine disputes of material facts. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). To satisfy its burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).Rather, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must read the record and the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Porter, 461 F.3d at 1320. Summary judgment should only be granted "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state in which the case arose. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2010). To that end, the parties agree on the principles of Florida law governing this dispute. "Under Florida law, a premises owner owes two duties to a business invitee: (1) to take ordinary and reasonable care to keep its premises reasonably safe for invitees; and (2) to warn of perils that were known or should have been known to the owner and of which the invitee could not discover." Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). In the context of slip and falls, the Florida Legislature requires a plaintiff to "prove that the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it." Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1). A plaintiff may prove constructive knowledge in one of two ways: (1) by presenting circumstantial evidence showing that the condition existed for such a period of time that the defendant should have known of the condition through its exercise of ordinary care, or (2) by showing that the unsafe condition occurred with such regularity that it was foreseeable. Id. § 768.0755(1)(a)-(b).
The parties also agree, and the record confirms, that Wal-Mart did not have actual knowledge of the unsafe condition which caused Garcia's fall. Further, Garcia does not submit that the unsafe condition at issue in this case occurred with such regularity that it was foreseeable; rather, Garcia narrows her argument to showing through circumstantial evidence that the liquid on the floor which caused her fall existed for such a period of time that Wal-Mart should have known of its existence through the exercise of ordinary care. (Doc. 57, pp. 1-2). The Court similarly limits its analysis to that issue.
There should be no surprise at the abundance of slip and fall case law springing from Florida's courts and federal courts applying Florida law. Upon surveying those cases which focus on circumstantial evidence of the length of time a transient substance persisted on a business owner's floor, the Court is able to discern four primary factors which drive the courts' analyses: (1) lack of evidence indicating that a transitory substance existed, (2) evidence of how a substance ended up on the floor, (3) the condition of a substance upon discovery, and (4) evidence of the business owner's neglect in inspecting its premises.
First, a plaintiff who cannot indicate that some transitory substance caused her fall generally cannot establish constructive knowledge. The quintessential case is Feinman v. Target Corp., No. 11-62480-CIV, 2012 WL 6061745 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2012). There, Mrs. Feinman and her husband visited a Target store to purchase an iPad. Id. at *1. While walking through the store, Mrs. Feinman slipped and fell. Id. At their depositions, both Mrs. and Mr. Feinman testified that they could not identify what caused her to slip, although Mrs. Feinman stated that she felt "some kind of suction or something" under her shoe. Id. Moreover, Target's executive team leader testified that she responded to thearea immediately upon learning of the accident, but found nothing on the floor which might have caused Mrs. Feinman's fall. Id. at *2. Numerous other employees and witnesses confirmed that they had seen nothing on the floor either before or after Mrs. Feinman's fall. Id. at *2-3. Without any suggestion that some substance or object caused Mrs. Feinman to slip, the court could not infer that Target had constructive knowledge of an unsafe condition. Id. at *6. Therefore, where a plaintiff cannot come forward and say, at the very least, that some substance or object caused her to slip and fall, courts will not infer constructive knowledge.2
Second, where a substance or object is identified, circumstantial evidence of its source may establish a business owner's constructive knowledge. For example, in Doudeau v. Target Corp., 572 F. App'x 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2014), the court inferred a business owner's constructive knowledge of a substance based on an employee's testimony that the water on which the plaintiff slipped must have come from outside, as it had just rained. The Doudeau court specifically distinguished these facts from those in Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc. In Delgado, the court held that constructive knowledgecould not be inferred because there was no evidence of any possible source where the water on which the plaintiff slipped could have come. Delgado, 65 So. 3d at 1090. Therefore, the converse is also true that the lack of circumstantial evidence of a substance's source may preclude an inference of constructive knowledge.3
The third category of cases emphasizes the condition of a substance upon its discovery. Intuitively, the condition of a substance left on a floor deteriorates over time; frozen foods melt, vegetables and fruits are smashed or become dirty and wilt, solid objects become scraped and scuffed, and liquids become soiled, smeared, and show track marks and footprints. Circumstantial evidence of a substance's deterioration allows the inference that enough time had passed for a business owner to have constructive knowledge of the substance.4 Conversely, circumstantial evidence that a substance appears fresh, clean, or undisturbed when a plaintiff slips and falls usually precludesconstructive knowledge.5
Finally, circumstantial evidence of a business owner's neglect in inspecting its premises may establish constructive knowledge. The most common examples are when a business owner fails to follow its own implemented inspection procedures or fails to inspect its premises at a reasonable rate.6 In contrast, evidence that a business owner followed its inspection policies or inspected its premises on a regular basis may preclude a finding of constructive knowledge.7
In categorizing these cases, the Court does not mean to imply that there are no other factors which warrant consideration or that a court should conduct any weighing of factors in order to find a solution. In some cases, one factor is enough to resolve the issue of constructive knowledge. In others, examination of multiple factors answers the question. The Court simply wishes to add some cohesion to the myriad principles which apply to Florida slip and fall...
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