Garcia v. Watts

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: HENRY PITMAN
• Decision Date: 15 February 2013
• Docket Number: 08 Civ. 7778 (HBP)
• Citation: Garcia v. Watts, 08 Civ. 7778 (HBP) (S.D. N.Y. Feb 15, 2013)
• Parties: ALVARO R. GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. HARRELL WATTS, et al., Defendants.

ALVARO R. GARCIA, Plaintiff,

v.HARRELL WATTS, et al., Defendants.

08 Civ. 7778 (HBP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: February 15, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

PITMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Alvaro Garcia, a former federal inmate at the Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC") in New York, New York commenced this pro se action on September 5, 2008 against twenty-four named defendants and four John and Jane Does for alleged violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 399 (1971). Most of plaintiff's claims have been dismissed (see Docket Items 46, 50, 51, 55, 60 and 62), except for his claims against Laticia Hicks, an MCC teacher, and Hector Suarez, an MCC case manager, alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated by disciplinary action taken against him for writing a letter to an attorney in the MCCcomputer lab. The parties have consented to my exercising jurisdiction for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Docket Item 83).

By notice of motion dated March 8, 2012 (Docket Item 92), defendants Hicks and Suarez move for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining claims. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is denied.

II. Facts

The alleged facts that give rise to the present action are set forth in my Reports and Recommendations dated April 22, 2009, August 27, 2009, and June 21, 2010 (Docket Items 46, 50 and 60), familiarity with which is assumed.

On November 14, 2006, plaintiff was sentenced to a term of thirty months imprisonment after pleading guilty to a conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (Deposition of Alvaro R. Garcia, dated Nov. 16 2011 ("Pl. Dep."), annexed as Ex. A to Declaration of Sapna W. Palla, Esq. in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated Feb. 27, 2012 (Docket Item 99)("Palla Decl."), at 22-24, 28). On May 24, 2007, plaintiff was transferred from the Allenwood Federal Correctional Institution in Pennsylvania to the MCC in New York (Affidavit of AlvaroR. Garcia, sworn to Feb. 27, 2012 (Docket Item 98)("Pl. Aff."), ¶ 3).

In September 2007, plaintiff enrolled in a computer class at MCC, which taught inmates how to use Microsoft Word, Access and Excel (Pl. Dep. at 77-78; Deposition of Laticia Hicks, dated Nov. 29, 2011 ("Hicks Dep."), annexed as Ex. B to Declaration of Alicia M. Simmons, Esq., dated Feb. 8, 2012 (Docket Item 94)("Simmons Decl."), at 67). The computer class was taught by Roger Carter, an independent contractor, and was given at the MCC's computer lab (Pl. Dep. at 77-78; Hicks Dep. at 57). Documents created by inmates during the class were stored on removable hard drives, which had to be requested from prison staff by inmates prior to the class and returned to prison staff at the end of class (Pl. Dep. at 90-92; Hicks Dep. at 93-95). Inmates enrolled in the computer class were permitted to practice their computer skills both during and outside regular class time (Pl. Dep. at 92-96). According to plaintiff, inmates were permitted to use their practice time to draft personal letters using Microsoft Word, and he observed other inmates using the computers for this purpose (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 11; Pl. Dep. at 108-09). Plaintiff states that during a practice period, he wrote letters to several attorneys and organizations seeking legal assistance with respect to sexual assaults allegedly committedagainst him by a prison officer (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 20; Pl. Dep. at 137-38). According to plaintiff, Carter printed his letters for him on multiple occasions (Pl. Dep. at 134-35). Plaintiff asserts that the inmates were not required to seek permission before using any particular computer program during a practice period (Pl. Aff. at ¶¶ 17-18; Pl. Dep. at 101-02).

It is undisputed that on November 14, 2007, while in the computer lab, plaintiff was writing a letter to an attorney with the Federal Defenders seeking legal representation with respect to the alleged sexual assaults (Pl. Dep. 110-11; see Incident Report, dated Nov. 14, 2007 ("Incident Report"), annexed as Ex. F to Palla Decl., at BOP_00341-BOP_00350). It is also undisputed that at some point, Defendant Hicks observed plaintiff writing the letter and issued an Incident Report to him charging him with unauthorized conduct, namely, using Microsoft Word when he had only been given permission to use Microsoft Excel, a spreadsheet program (Incident Report at BOP_00341-BOP_00350).

Plaintiff claims that prior to entering the computer lab on November 14, 2007, he signed a log sheet and asked Hicks for a removable hard drive, which she gave him without asking him any questions or issuing any instructions (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 23; Pl. Dep. at 115). Plaintiff further alleges that at some point while he was drafting his letter, Hicks entered the computer lab andstood closely behind him facing the computer screen (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 26; Pl. Dep. at 121-23). Hicks then instructed plaintiff to save the letter and shut down the computer, and plaintiff complied (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 26; Pl. Dep. at 122-24). Plaintiff claims that Hicks never gave him any warning that he should have been using Microsoft Excel instead of Microsoft Word before ordering him to shut down his computer, and defendants do not appear to controvert this point (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 27). Hicks does claim that she would only grant an inmate access to the computer lab if the inmate specifically identified the program he or she intended to use (Hicks Dep. at 130-32).

Plaintiff also claims that on November 15, 2007, he was taken to defendant Suarez's office (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 31; Pl. Dep. at 157-58). Plaintiff asserts that while he was alone with Suarez, Suarez, who was in possession of the Incident Report and plaintiff's letters, called plaintiff "crazy," cursed at plaintiff for writing to an attorney, called the allegations in plaintiff's letter "BS," and said that he was going to "take care of business" (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 31; Pl. Dep. at 157-62). Plaintiff further asserts that during this meeting, Suarez never admonished him for using Microsoft Word instead of Microsoft Excel (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 31).

It is also undisputed that on November 15, 2007, Suarez conducted the Unit Disciplinary Committee ("UDC") hearing at which plaintiff was found guilty of engaging in the prohibited act of "Using any Equipment or Machinery Contrary to Instructions or Posted Safety Standards (Code 319)" (Incident Report at BOP_00341-BOP_00343). The punishment for this prohibited act was 90 days loss of commissary, 60 days loss of phone privileges suspended 180 days pending clear conduct, and transfer to Unit 5 North for 90 days (Incident Report at BOP_00341). According to plaintiff, Unit 5 North housed pre-trial inmates at all levels of security risk, including inmates facing charges of murder (Pl. Aff. at ¶¶ 34-37). In contrast, Unit 5 South, where he had been housed before the hearing, contained mostly low-risk "cadre" inmates, who were given privileges such as a later lock-down time, more visitation hours and better exercise facilities (Deposition of Stephen Espinet, dated Dec. 8, 2011 ("Espinet Depo."), annexed as Ex. J to Palla Decl., at 22, 88-90, 211; Deposition of Joyce Moore, dated Jan. 5, 2011, annexed as Ex. K to Palla Decl., at 120-21; Pl. Dep. at 178-79; Suarez Dep. at 24-25, 125). Plaintiff claims that while housed in Unit 5 North, he witnessed constant physical altercations among inmates and was regularly threatened with violence (Pl. Aff. at ¶¶ 35-39). As aresult, plaintiff claims, he suffered mental harm and had to seek counseling (Pl. Aff. at ¶ 40).

III. Analysis

A. Standards Applicable to a Motion for Summary Judgment

The standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment are well-settled and require only brief review.

Summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party . . . is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To grant the motion, the court must determine that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine factual issue derives from the "evidence [being] such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by "simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), or by a factual argument based on "conjecture or surmise," Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court teaches that "all that is required [from a nonmoving party] is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); seealsoHunt v. Cromartie, 526U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999). It is a settled rule that "[c]redibility assessments, choices between conflicting versions of the events, and the weighing of evidence are matters for the jury, not for the court on a motion for summary judgment." Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997).

McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2006); accord Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2011); Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553-54 (2d Cir. 2005); Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).

"Material facts are those which 'might...