Garcia v. Zenith Electronics Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1995
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,No. 94-3137,D,94-3137
• Citation: 58 F.3d 1171
• Parties: 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2740, 64 USLW 2064, 130 Lab.Cas. P 11,355 Miguel GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZENITH ELECTRONICS CORPORATION and Local 1031, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,efendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1171

58 F.3d 1171

149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2740, 64 USLW 2064,

130 Lab.Cas. P 11,355

Miguel GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZENITH ELECTRONICS CORPORATION and Local 1031, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-3137.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 12, 1995.

Decided June 28, 1995.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc Denied

July 27, 1995.

Robert F. Lisco (argued), Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.

John L. Collins, John T. Murray (argued), Theodore C. Stamatakos, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for Zenith Electronics Corp.

Marvin Gittler, Susan Brannigan (argued), Asher, Gittler, Greenfield, Cohen & D'Alba, Chicago, IL, for Local 1031, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO.

Before CUDAHY, ESCHBACH and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

Miguel Garcia, a former employee of Zenith Electronics Corporation (Zenith) and a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1031 (the Union), appeals the dismissal of his claim of breach of duty of fair representation against the Union. We affirm.

I. FACTS

In October, 1991, someone put two anonymous letters under the door of an administrative office in Zenith's Melrose Park, Illinois facility. The first letter accused a "Rico V." of theft and an "Art L." of incompetence, and threatened sabotage if both were not fired. R.O.A. 5, Exh. 1. The second letter again threatened sabotage, demanding to know why "Art Lemmon" was a plant engineer and giving the company two weeks to fire Lemmon to avoid sabotage. The letter warned "[r]emember the oil in the Di water system about 4 months ago," and threatened that "this time it will be worse." R.O.A. 5, Exh. 2. The person delivering the letters was caught on a video surveillance camera videotape, but the image was blurry and difficult to identify. Nevertheless, the Zenith officials viewing the tape suspected that the person depicted was Garcia. Garcia had worked for Zenith for nearly 25 years, held the position of master maintenance mechanic and was a member of the Union.

When Zenith initially contacted Garcia about the letters, he first stated that he knew about the letters but had not written or distributed them. Shortly thereafter, however, he signed a statement in which he denied writing the letters but did admit to finding them on the floor by the offices, reading them and sliding them under the door. He also admitted to disliking Art Lemmon and stated that "Art bothers people day and night." R.O.A. 5, Exh. 4. Garcia provided yet another version of the story in his deposition testimony in the district court, contending there that he merely saw the letters on the floor, read them, and then left them on the floor rather than sliding them under the door. Mem.Op. at 3. Garcia now claims that he saw the letters but did not slip them under the door and that he did not understand the initial statement when he signed it. He also contends that he was not the person shown on the videotape slipping the notes under the door, although he does admit that he picked up the notes and read them. Nevertheless, Zenith concluded that Garcia had both written and delivered the letters and fired him for his actions.

The Union had a collective bargaining agreement with Zenith which provided for a three-step grievance procedure. When Garcia was fired, the Union immediately filed a grievance on Garcia's behalf in accordance with this agreement. The Union then pursued the grievance through the established three-step grievance process and on to arbitration, demanding reinstatement with no loss of seniority or wages. The Union also hired Richard M. Stanton (Stanton), a private labor law attorney, to represent Garcia at the arbitration.

Garcia says that he first met Stanton on the morning of the arbitration hearing. He further alleges that Stanton told Garcia not to testify on his own behalf, and that Stanton did not interview or call to the stand a Mr. Khalil Khalil, a coworker who Garcia claims could corroborate Garcia's story. Garcia also complains of Stanton's alleged failure to review the videotape himself ¹ and his alleged perfunctory handling of the hearing. Finally, Garcia alleges that he told Chief Union Steward Donald Haynes and Union Business Representatives Jose Caez and Roy Cortes that he wished to speak to his own attorney, and that they all told him that it was against Illinois law for him to have his own attorney. The Union representatives deny ever making this statement.

The arbitrator upheld Garcia's termination. Garcia then brought this case before the district court alleging that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation. The district court granted the Union's motion for summary judgment, and Garcia appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A union has broad authority as the exclusive bargaining agent for a class of employees. This authority stems from the employees' choice to exercise their right to self organization. By pooling economic strength employees are able to achieve improvements in conditions of employment. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2006, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). The union represents all the employees as a unit acting by majority vote, but each individual employee in the unit is a beneficiary of this collective action.

Thus, these employee benefits are a result of collective action, of which majority rule is an important characteristic. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006. The interests of individual employees sometimes may be compromised for the sake of the larger bargaining collective. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006 ("power [is] vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees," and "the complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected"). Therefore, a "union is accorded considerable discretion in dealing with grievance matters, and it may consider the interests of all its members when deciding whether or not to press the claims of an individual employee." Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir.1982). The union may also consider the merits of the case or the effect on the larger collective bargaining unit in making various strategic decisions during the grievance procedure. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191, 87 S.Ct. 903, 917, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1966); Griffin v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 32 F.3d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir.1994). The union represents the majority of employees, even while it is representing a single employee in a grievance process. Thus even during an individual grievance procedure, the union's own credibility, its integrity as a bargaining agent and the interests of all its members may be at stake. The union is therefore entitled to enjoy a somewhat different perspective than the individual employee it represents in a grievance matter.

This broader view has its limits, however. The power the union has to exclusively represent all employees in employment disputes entails "a concomitant duty of fair representation to each of its members." Cleveland v. Porca Company, 38 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir.1994). The Supreme Court in Air Line Pilots v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991), set out a tripartite standard for determining whether this duty has been breached. "A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. at 1130, and the court should look to each standard separately when determining whether a union violated its duty. Griffin, 32 F.3d at 1083; Rakestraw v. United Airlines, 989 F.2d 944, 945 (7th Cir.1993). ²

While arbitrary conduct is a breach of a union's duty, the test for determining whether particular conduct is arbitrary can be quite forgiving. Trnka v. Local Union No. 688, 30 F.3d 60, 61 (7th Cir.1994). Courts "should not substitute their judgment for that of the union, even if, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the union could have made a better call." Ooley v. Schwitzer, 961 F.2d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 208, 121 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992). Thus, a union's actions are considered arbitrary only if "in light of the factual and legal landscape," these actions are "so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational." Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. at 1130. The union must provide "some minimal investigation of employee grievances," but the thoroughness of this investigation depends on the particular case, and "only an egregious disregard for union members' rights constitutes a breach of the union's duty." Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir.1985). What is required to be shown goes considerably beyond the requirements of a malpractice suit.

The plaintiff must also establish both that the union acted at least arbitrarily and that the plaintiff was actually harmed by the union's actions. Black v. Ryder, 15 F.3d 573, 585 (6th Cir.1994); Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1303-04. Failure to "present favorable evidence during the grievance process ... may constitute a breach of ... duty only if that evidence probably would have brought about a different decision." Black, 15 F.3d at 585. Garcia must therefore establish that the outcome of the arbitration would probably have been different but for the union's activities. Id.; Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1304.

Garcia attacks five different aspects of the Union's behavior. He claims 1) that Stanton should have presented the testimony of Khalil Khalil, 2) that Stanton should have called Garcia himself to the stand at the arbitration hearing, 3) that Stanton should have reviewed the videotape himself at some point, 4) that Stanton handled the hearing in a perfunctory manner,...