A'Gard v. Perez

• Decision Date: 09 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11 Civ. 1933 (JGK).,11 Civ. 1933 (JGK).
• Citation: 919 F.Supp.2d 394
• Parties: Kenith A'GARD, Plaintiff, v. Ada PEREZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

919 F.Supp.2d 394

Kenith A'GARD, Plaintiff,

v.Ada PEREZ, et al., Defendants.

No. 11 Civ. 1933 (JGK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Jan. 26, 2013.

Opinion Denying Reconsideration Feb. 11, 2013.

Opinion Denying Reconsideration April 9, 2013.

Kenith A'Gard, Dannemora, NY, pro se.

Jeb Harben, Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

The plaintiff, Kenith A'Gard, brings this action against the following defendants: Superintendent Perez, Lieutenant Buys, Sergeant Candidus, Corrections Officer Sanin, Director of Special Housing Units/Inmate Disciplinary Program Prack, former Deputy Commissioner Leclaire, and Commissioner Fischer (collectively, “the defendants”).¹ Each of the individual defendants is or was an employee of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), and each is being sued in his or her official and individual capacities. The plaintiff, a pro se inmate, claims that his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated when he was subjected to discipline for breaching prison regulations relating to the possession of certain Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) materials. The plaintiff claims that the regulations are unconstitutional and that his disciplinary proceeding violated his right to due process.² He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. He also alleges that the defendants violated several provisions of the New York State Constitution. Each defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) ³ and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively.

I.

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is “not to weigh the evidencethat might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.

When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir.2002); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002).

When faced with a pro se complaint, the Court must “construe [the] complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “Even in a pro se case, however, ... threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although the Court is “obligated to draw the most favorable inferences” that the complaint supports, it “cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled.” Id.

II.

The following facts are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, unless otherwise indicated.

In October 2010, the plaintiff was an inmate incarcerated at the Downstate Correctional Facility. (Am. Compl. at 2.) On October 20, 2010, pursuant to Sgt. Candidus's instruction, Officer Sanin searched the plaintiff's cell and found UCC paperwork. (Am. Compl. at 2.) On October 21, 2010, Officer Sanin issued the plaintiff a Tier III Misbehavior Report for violations of the following DOCCS Standards of Inmate Behavior (“DOCCS Standards”): 113.30 ⁴ (Possession of Unauthorized UCC Materials); 107.21 ⁵ (Unauthorized Lien); 106.10 ⁶ (Refusing a Direct Order), the charge for which was eventually dismissed; and 180.11 ⁷ (Correspondence Violation). (Am. Compl. at 2.) The plaintiff alleges that the copy of the DOCCS Standards (“Rule Book”) he received did not contain DOCCS Standards 113.30 or 107.21 stapled into it as an addendum. The plaintiff concedes, however, that other inmates told him about the prohibition relating to UCC materials and that he saw that the addendum was stapled into other inmates' rule books. (Harben Decl. Ex. D at 14–15.) Prior to the search at issue in the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff had requested permission to possess the UCC documents but he had not received a response. (Harben Decl. Ex. D at 17, 20.)

On October 22, 2010, Officer Sinisi served the plaintiff with the Tier III Misbehavior Report written by Officer Sanin. (Am. Compl. at 2.) Prior to a disciplinary hearing known as the Superintendent's Hearing, the plaintiff was appointed a Tier III Assistant (defendant “John Doe”) to assist the plaintiff with obtaining materials helpful to the plaintiff's defense at the hearing. (Am. Compl. at 2.) The plaintiff requested that inmates Dudley and Shafer testify as witnesses because they were housed in cells neighboring the plaintiff's cell, but ultimately they did not testify. (Am. Compl. at 2; Harben Decl. Ex. D at 6.)

Lt. Buys conducted the plaintiff's Tier III Superintendent's Hearing, which concluded on November 3, 2010. (Am. Compl. at 2.) The plaintiff was found guilty of violating the DOCCS Standards 113.30, 107.21, and 180.11, and he was given an eighteen-month term of confinement in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), with a corresponding loss of packages, commissary, and telephone privileges. (Am. Compl. at 3.) On administrative appeal, the disciplinary term was reduced to six months in the SHU and a corresponding loss of privileges. (Am. Compl. at 3.)

III.

Each defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A.

The plaintiff argues that the defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights, in part by disciplining him pursuant to allegedly unconstitutional prison regulations. In particular, the plaintiff has challenged the constitutionality of DOCCS Standards 113.30 and 107.21. ⁸ (Am. Compl. at 27–28, Causes of Action 30–33.) To the extent that the plaintiff is alleging that the regulations restricted his ability to study and learn the laws of the United States in violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts, that allegation fails. “The Constitution guarantees prisoners meaningful access to the courts and ... reasonable access to a law library is a required part of that access.” Shepherd v. Fraisher, No. 96 Civ. 3283, 1999 WL 713839, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1999) (citations omitted). “To state a claim for denial of access to the courts ... a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took or was responsible for actions that hindered [a plaintiff's] efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the prison's prohibition on his possession or use of UCC materials unconstitutionally restricted him from studying and learning the laws. The plaintiff had the ability to study and learn the laws of the United States, including those set forth in the UCC, by accessing the prison's law library. In fact, the plaintiff indicated that he did visit the law library and communicated with the law librarian. (Harben Decl. Ex. D at 5, 22, 36, 37.) The plaintiff has also failed to allege plausibly that the DOCCS Standards otherwise violated his right of access to the courts. The plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that the defendants, by prohibiting the possession of UCC materials, somehow hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim that the DOCCS Standards unconstitutionally restricted his ability to study and learn the laws or otherwise violated his right to access to the courts.

Moreover, a prison regulation impinging on inmates' constitutional rights “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Prison administrators are not required to use the least restrictive means possible to further legitimate penological interests. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989). Rather, the Supreme Court “has afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world.” Id. at 408, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (citation omitted).

The DOCCS Standards that the plaintiff challenges here are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Standard 113.30 prohibits the possession of certain UCC forms, and Standard 107.20 prohibits...