Garde by Garde v. Country Life Ins. Co.
| Citation | 101 Ill.Dec. 120,147 Ill.App.3d 1023,498 N.E.2d 302 |
| Decision Date | 19 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-85-0786,4-85-0786 |
| Parties | , 101 Ill.Dec. 120 Mary B. GARDE, a Minor, by her Guardian, Virginia GARDE, and Patrick C. Garde, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTRY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Verticchio & Verticchio, Gillespie, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rammelkamp, Bradney, Hall, Dahman & Kuster, Jacksonville (Forrest G. Keaton, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Decedent, Joseph Garde, applied for life insurance with defendant, Country Life Insurance Company (Country), was issued a binding receipt, and died while his policy application was pending. Plaintiffs, the beneficiaries, filed suit to compel payment of the proceeds. Country alleged decedent made material misrepresentations concerning his health and the existence of other insurance which voided any coverage under the binding receipt. The circuit court granted Country's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the cause. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
The salient facts are undisputed. In late January 1983, decedent met with James L. Bettis. Bettis, in an affidavit, stated that they initially completed an application for life insurance for a face amount of $100,000 with $100,000 accidental death benefits. Bettis accurately recorded decedent's answers to the application questions which Bettis read to decedent. After completing the application through question 23, decedent decided to apply dividends from another policy with Country to the first premium on the new policy. Subsequently, Bettis prepared the necessary letter, and on February 1, 1983, at his office, decedent completed and signed the application. Bettis then gave him a receipt.
Decedent answered "no" to the following application questions:
* * *
* * *
17. Have you ever been treated for or ever had any known indication of * * * d. chest pain, irregular or rapid heart rate, high blood pressure, rheumatic fever or other severe infection, heart murmur, heart attack or other disorder of the heart or blood vessels?
* * *
* * *
20. OTHER THAN ABOVE, have you within the past 5 years * * * (c) Had electrocardiogram, X ray, or other diagnostic test?"
Question 8 of the application stated:
"What is the amount of insurance now in force on Proposed Insured's life?"
Question 10 of the application stated:
"Has the Proposed Insured any applications for other life or health insurance or a request for reinstatement now pending?"
Decedent responded that he had a $10,000 ordinary life policy with Country and that he did not have any pending applications for insurance. The application also stated:
The receipt stated:
"Subject to the terms and conditions of this receipt as printed on this and the reverse side hereof, life insurance and any additional benefits in the amount applied for shall be deemed to take effect as of the date of the application for benefits due as a result of accidental or natural causes originating after the date of the application to the same extent as if the policy applied for had been issued and delivered.
* * *
* * *
Any insurance coverage which could otherwise be provided shall be void if the application contains any material misrepresentation." (Emphasis added.)
On August 5, 1985, Country filed a motion for summary judgment with attached affidavits and decedent's medical records. The affidavits revealed that decedent had the following life insurance when he applied for the instant life insurance policy:
ISSUE/ ACCIDENTAL
APPLICATION FACE DEATH
AFFIANT COMPANY DATE AMOUNT BENEFITS
Wesley D. Oglesby Country Life 12/11/61 $ 10,000.00 $ 10,000.00
Insurance Co
Rebecca Wingate United Benefit 11/9/73 $ 10,000.00 $ 10,000.00
Life
United of Omaha 5/20/82 $ 25,000.00 $ 25,000.00
United of Omaha 11/20/82 $100,000.00
United of Omaha 1/18/83 $ 50,000.00
Pauline Watson Equitable Life 1/9/75 $ 54,000.00
Assurance
Equitable Life 12/22/82 $125,000.00
Assurance
Eugene M. Gelfand Inter-Ocean 3/13/81 $ 25,100.00
Insurance Co
Gerald Philpott State Farm 11/19/82 $100,000.00
Insurance Application
Date-Issued
on 2/3/83
W. Edward Summer Illinois Mutual 12/10/82 $300,000.00
Life & Casualty
Karen Diane Meyers Ohio Life 1/6/83 $100,000.00 $200,000.00
Insurance Co. Pending on
2/1/83
Charles Jenrich American 1/13/83 $ 19,600.00
Mid-States Life Ins
Linda Greenberg Omaha Financial 1/13/83 $ 4,961.82
Life Insurance
Omaha Financial 1/17/83 $ 4,250.00
Life Insurance
Omaha Financial 1/17/83 $ 10,500.00
Life Insurance
Roger Juenger Massachusetts 1/13/83 $ 10,000.00
Indemnity &
Life
Bert Hutchison American Family 1/13/83 $100,000.00 $100,000.00
Life Insurance Pending on
2/1/83
Ronnie Fry Pekin Life 1/17/83 $ 40,000.00
Insurance
Philip B. Willette Truman National 1/17/83 $ 15,000.00
Life Insurance
Mary Logan World Service 1/17/83 $ 15,000.00
Life Insurance
David T. Hansen Time Insurance 1/24/83 $100,000.00
Company
James T. Armstrong Allstate Life 8/16/82 $200,000.00
Insurance
Bettis, in his affidavit, stated that the agent's manual directs agents to refuse to issue binding receipts when an applicant has been previously hospitalized for chest pain or answers question 17(d) or 12(b) in the affirmative. Decedent's medical records revealed that on October 31, 1977, decedent was admitted to the hospital complaining of angina pain and severe pain in his left chest with nausea. The medical report noted the pain in the left chest was accompanied by episodes of tachycardia, an abnormally rapid heartbeat. On October 31, 1977, an electrocardiogram was performed. The results were normal. Decedent was released from the hospital the next day with a diagnosis of cause unknown for the episode.
Harvey Crain, Jr., Country's associate director of underwriting, stated in his affidavit that decedent's application for insurance was pending on February 25, 1983. A policy had not yet issued. If question 12(b) on the application had been answered "yes," any coverage under the binding receipt would have been voided and a medical investigation done without a binding receipt in effect. If questions 8 or 10 on the application concerning other applied for or in effect insurance policies had been answered correctly, an analysis of whether to issue a policy would have been done. The determination about whether to issue the policy would have been based upon decedent's net worth, indebtedness, and financial ability to pay premiums. In any event, no accidental death benefit would have been included because company policy precludes issuance of accidental death benefits when such benefits are in effect in the amount that decedent already carried. Crain stated that based upon the other insurance in effect, Country would have rejected the application for insurance.
On October 17, 1985, the court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed, so allowed the motion for summary judgment. It concluded as a matter of law that reasonable minds could not differ as to the materiality of the misrepresentations on health and other insurance.
Plaintiffs initially argue that the trial judge in his memorandum of decision conceded that issues of fact existed as to the materiality of the misrepresentations by saying that reasonable men could not differ about the materiality of the statements. Therefore, plaintiffs argue the decision is erroneous. The trial judge stated:
Emphasis added.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file present no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 90 Ill.Dec. 892, 483 N.E.2d 210, cert. denied (1986), 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1199, 89 L.Ed.2d...
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