Gardens v. City of Passaic

• Decision Date: 27 September 1974
• Citation: Gardens v. City of Passaic, 327 A.2d 250, 130 N.J.Super. 369 (N.J. Super. 1974)
• Parties: Barry GARDENS, a joint venture, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PASSAIC, a municipal corporation of Passaic County, New Jersey, and Rent Levelling Board of the City of Passaic, Defendants. Anthony IAFELICE and F. William Koestner, a partnership, trading as K. & I. Laundromat, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PASSAIC, a municipal corporation in the County of Passaic, New Jersey, and Rent Levelling Board of the City of Passaic, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 369

130 N.J.Super. 369

327 A.2d 250

Barry GARDENS, a joint venture, et al., Plaintiffs, v.CITY OF PASSAIC, a municipal corporation of Passaic County,

New Jersey, and Rent Levelling Board of the City

of Passaic, Defendants.

Anthony IAFELICE and F. William Koestner, a partnership,trading as K. & I. Laundromat, Plaintiffs, v.CITY OF PASSAIC, a municipal corporationin the County of

Passaic, New Jersey, and Rent Levelling Board of

the City of Passaic, Defendants.

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division.

Decided Sept. 27, 1974.

Martin Klughaupt, Passaic, for plaintiffsBarry Gardens, Milan Associates, Inc., Paulison Associates, Inc. and The Tower Apartments.

Joseph L. Freiman, Union City, for plaintiffsAnthony Iafelice and F. William Koestner.

Leonard M. Bitterman and Joseph F. Scancarella, Passaic, for defendantCity of Passaic.

Joseph A. Pojanowski, III, Lyndhurst, for defendant Rent Levelling Bd. of the City of Passaic.

SCHWARTZ, L., J.C.C., Temporarily Assigned.

In these consolidated actions in lieu of prerogative writs brought by owners of apartment buildings in the City of Passaic, the validity of the rent levelling ordinance, as amended, is attacked.

Since the ordinance is presumed to be valid, Garden State Racing Ass'n v. Cherry Hill Tp., 42 N.J. 454, 464, 201 A.2d 554(1964), plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing its invalidity.Their original thrust was to urge the exercise of the police power in the area of rent stabilization was unjustified by reason of the absence of an emergency in available public housing accommodations in the city.

Plaintiff failed to support this contention by the presentation of affirmative evidence in this respect.On the other hand, I am satisfied from the testimony of Miss Grace Harris, who eminently qualified as a planning expert and who prepared a housing analysis in 1973, that the City of Passaic, as one of the oldest urban centers of population, has not been immune from a serious shortage of housing facilities, and I find as a fact from the testimony adduced that a housing shortage of emergency proportions exists in the City of Passaic.

However, the court has concluded that this issue may no longer be considered in determining the validity of a local rent control ordinance.

According to the statistics compiled by the United States Census Bureau from the 1970 census, New Jersey contains a more numerous population (953.1 persons) per square mile than any other of the 50 states in the Union.

The urgent nature of housing unavailability in the State to accommodate its citizens was outlined by Governor Cahill on December 7, 1970 in a special message to the Legislature, A Blueprint for Housing in New Jersey, describing the housing crisis:

The current problems with which we are confronted are familiar to each one of us.Most young married couples are prohibited from purchasing a home because of existing housing prices.Huge segments of our work force, although earning more today than ever before, are confronted with the same problem.Tenants in many areas of our State are facing substantial increases in rent, many of whom can ill afford it, but are unable to find apartment vacancies elsewhere.Our senior citizens living on fixed incomes cannot continue to pay the spiralling property taxes on their homes, nor the high rental cost of an apartment, if any at all are available.These people, the young and the aged, the teacher and the mechanic, white and black, are thrifty and respectable citizens, yet they are foreclosed from decent and adequate housing at a reasonable cost in areas of their choice.The reason is obvious.There is a complete inadequacy of single and multi-family dwellings, and the law of supply and demand is raising the cost of the existing housing out of the reach of the average man.So the problem is present, and it is critical!

The economy and the housing situation throughout the State continued to deteriorate, and N.J.S.A. 2A:18--53 was amended in sveral respects by the Legislature in L.1974, c. 49, including the following:

4.No landlord may evict or fail to renew any lease of any premises covered by section 2 of this act except for good cause as defined in section 2.

Section 2 specifies the only 'causes' permitting removal of a residential tenant by the court, such causes not including the right previously held by the landlord to secure possession after termination of a lease or to terminate a month-to-month tenancy upon a mere 30-days' notice.

The withdrawal from property owners in every municipality of the right of dispossession on the basis of a mere notice to quit or termination of leasehold, which has been a recognized incident of property ownership from the time of Henry VIII (Steffens v. Earl, 40 N.J.L. 128, 133(Sup.Ct.1878), would not be constitutionally justified unless an emergent housing shortage made it almost impossible for dispossessed tenants to locate other housing accommodations.The landlord is denied the right of eviction for the purpose of self-occupancy, of selection of his tenant, and of rehabilitation of the premises.

Though unexpressed in the statute, the conclusion must be reached that the Legislature implicitly but unquestionably recognized the existence of a rental housing emergency throughout this State, and in furtherance of a public policy to relieve hardships arising from such housing unavailability it withdrew the previously acknowledged reversionary interest of landlords from the bundle of property rights held by them.

One of the 'causes' for eviction under § 2, par. (b), of the statute is:

f. The person has failed to make payment after a valid notice to quit and notice of increase of said rent, providing the increase of rent is not unconscionable and complies with any and all laws or Municipal ordinances governing rent increases.

The Legislature thereby recognized the power of a municipality to adopt a rent control ordinance, furnishing the occasion for its exercise of the police power to alleviate a common peril or need (Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 514, 109 A.2d 640(1954)) and based upon the Legislature's implicit determination that a state of housing emergency exists in this State.

The standard of compliance with 'municipal ordinances governing rent increases' in the 1974amendment is a more specific recognition of municipal power to regulate residential rents than is N.J.S.A. 40:48--2 which the Supreme Court regarded as express delegation of authority to municipalities to legislate in this field, Inganamort v. Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298(1973), and the statute also provides a standard that the increase of rent shall not be 'unconscionable.'The implication is clear that the Legislature determined the emergent state of housing was state-wide, applying to all communities, as the constitutionality of rent control regulation rests upon a critical shortage of housing.Inganamortat 527 and 546, 303 A.2d 298.

Statutory provisions may have implied effects.'As in the case of all kinds of communication, there are emanations of meaning from a statute beyond what is directly and obviously indicated to be its primary application.'Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction(4 ed.), § 55.02 at 381.The scope of the statute's operation may be broadened to include implied consequences.

By analogy, although covenants in a lease do not in affirmative terms express an undertaking to repair, yet the obligation to do so may arise by implication.Michaels v. Brookchester Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 390, 140 A.2d 199(1958).Similarly, while the Motor Vehicle Act is a penal statute and gives no private right of action for injuries resulting from a violation, in suits based upon negligence, unobservance of the statute is regarded as negligence Per se in some states (Hamblin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 271 F.2d 562(10 Cir.1959)), and is a circumstance to be considered in determining if there is negligence in New Jersey.Varlaro v. Schultz, 82 N.J.Super. 142, 148, 197 A.2d 16(App.Div.1964).

The court finds no perceivable reason to differentiate between the emergent basis for and legislative consequence of restraints against tenant removal and corresponding restraints against rent increase.We cannot presume the Legislature intended to treat these subjects mentioned in the statute in an inconsistent manner.

This statute was enacted after Inganamort, supra, when state law did 'not deal with the evil at hand--a housing shortage and concomitant overreaching of tenants,' and subsequent to Albigese v. Jersey City, 127 N.J.Super. 101, 316 A.2d 483(Law Div.1974).It was not an issue presented to the Appellate Division which substantially affirmed the latter decision on August 7, 1974.

The statute is presumed to be valid, there being no decision Contra.I am satisfied that the subject of the housing emergency has been dealt with and determined at state level and the existence or nonexistence of a local housing emergency cannot be made a fact issue in a challenge to the constitutionality of a municipal rent levelling ordinance.

The legislative history indicates that this was the...