Gardner v. City of Lakewood
| Decision Date | 28 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:16-cv-05121-RJB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | RENATA LYNN GARDNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, a Washington Municipal Corporation; and DAVID BUTTS and JANE DOE BUTTS, husband and wife; and JOHN DOE ESTES and JANE DOE ESTES, husband and wife, Defendants. |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal of All Claims with Prejudice. Dkt. 17. The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the file herein. Dkts. 30, 31, 35.
This case stems from the interaction of three Lakewood Police Department officers, Officer David Butts, Sergeant Andy Estes, and Sergeant Eakes, with Plaintiff, Mrs. Renata Gardner, after a traffic stop. The incident was video recorded by a patrol car dash cam belonging to Officer Butts and was partially audio recorded by Mrs. Gardner (see Dkt. 18, Ex. B).
(1) Officer declarations.
Officer Butts narrates the following sequence of events, according to his declaration. ON January 31, 2014, at approximately 10:50pm, Officer Butts initiated a speed stop for a vehicle traveling 52mph in a 35mph zone. Dkt. 21 at ¶8. After pulling the vehicle over, Officer Butts approached the driver's side of the vehicle and initiated conversation with the driver of the vehicle, identified as Jabliani Gardner. Mrs. Gardner, his wife, was sitting in the passenger seat. Id. at ¶10. An administrative check of Mr. Gardner's driving record, based on information provided to Officer Butts by Mr. Gardner, revealed a suspended license and several prior convictions for driving with a suspended license. Id. at ¶9. An administrative check of the vehicle, based on the license plate and make of the car, revealed the vehicle owner to be Darius Bargans. Id.
Officer Butts explained to Mr. Gardner and Mrs. Gardner that the car was going to be impounded. Dkt. 21 at ¶10. The "basis" or authority for Officer Butts to impound the car, he states, is the Lakewood Code, LWC 10.28.010 et seq. Id. Mrs. Gardner moved from the passenger seat to the driver's seat. Id. Another officer, Sergeant Estes, arrived at the scene about the same time as a tow truck.
Officer Butts and Sergeant Estes "told [Mrs. Gardner] if she did not exit the car, she would be arrested for obstruction," but Mrs. Gardner refused to exit the vehicle. Id. at ¶¶12, 13. The officers used "de-escalation tactics," including repeated verbal requests and commands, to persuade Mrs. Gardner to get of the vehicle. Id. With "no alternative to using physical force to achieve our law enforcement purpose, impoundment of the vehicle," Officer Butts and SergeantEstes told Mrs. Gardner she was under arrest and took physical control of Mrs. Gardner's arms. Id. With the help of a third officer, non-party Sergeant Eakes, the three officers moved Mrs. Gardner out of the car to the ground, where they placed her in the prone position and in handcuffs. Id. ¶¶13-16. Officer Butts relied on his training to use the "escort hold" and "hair hold" to wrest Mrs. Gardner from the car. Id. at ¶16. Mrs. Gardner physically resisted arrest. Id.
The declaration of Sergeant Estes parallels, and does not contradict, the narration offered by the declaration of Officer Butts. See Dkt. 22.
(2) Declaration of Defendants' Expert, Thomas Ovens.
According to the declaration of Defendants' expert, Thomas Ovens, Officer Butts had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Gardner for Obstructing. Dkt. 20 at ¶16. Mr. Ovens has analyzed the officers' use of force on Mrs. Gardner, including their use of control tactics, and he has concluded that the officers used reasonable force under the circumstances. Id. at ¶¶20-24.
(3) Audio recording and in-car video.
The audio recorded, transcribed, reads as follows:
See Dkt. 18, Ex. B.
The in-car video provides footage of the incident from the vantage point of Officer Butts' patrol car. Dkt. 19, Ex. A. At timestamp 23:23:05 (26:28), the officers approach the vehicle, with Mrs. Gardner in the passenger seat, and at timestamp 23:25:49 (29:13), the officers removed her from the vehicle and placed her in handcuffs.
(4) Statements by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's Response (Dkt. 31) is notarized and signed by Plaintiff under penalty of perjury, and it sets out facts known personally to Plaintiff under the subtitle, "Affidavit of Renata Gardner," so the Court construes the relevant factual portions of Plaintiff's Response like a factual declaration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Throughout Plaintiff's Response, Plaintiff appears to refer to herself as "Beneficiary," and it is obvious that portions of the brief were lifted from an inapplicable case. See, e.g., Dkt. 31 at p. 3.
Nonetheless, the pleading sets out facts known personally to Plaintiff, such as the harm suffered. Plaintiff declares that she "suffered a serious scalp injury's [sic] as well as a broken wrist and lower leg lacerations." Dkt. 31 at 2. Beyond the initial injuries, Plaintiff represents that she has suffered emotional distress, as well as "permanent hair loss and employment of wages." Id. According to Plaintiff's pleadings, Resisting Arrest charges were later dismissed by Lakewood Municipal Court. Id.
The Complaint alleges a state law claim for false imprisonment and two constitutional civil rights violations, for excessive force and racial profiling. The Court previously grantedPlaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Racial Profiling Claim. Dkts. 32, 40.
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply "some metaphysical doubt."). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 .S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Association, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at trial - e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, T.W. Elect. Service Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. T.W. Elect. Service Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 ( Anderson, supra). Conclusory, non-specific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and"missing facts" will not be "presumed." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).
Under Washington law, to establish a claim for false imprisonment a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally confined the plaintiff without justification. Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wn.2d 582 (1983). The existence of probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed "is a complete defense" to an action for false imprisonment. McBride v. Walla Walla County, 95 Wn.App. 33, 38 (1999), citing Hanson v. Snohomish, 121 Wn.2d 552, 558, 563 (1993). See also, Dunn v. Hyra, 676 F.Supp. 2d 1172, 1195-96 (W.D. Wash. 2009). Probable cause is a "reasonableness test, considering the time, place, and circumstances" in light of the officer's training and experience. Id. However, "[u]nless the evidence conclusively and without contradiction establishes the lawfulness of the arrest, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether an arresting officer acted with probable cause." Id., quoting Gurno v. Town of LaConner, 65 Wn.App. 218, 223 (1992).
According to Defendants, Mrs. Gardner's behavior gave the officers probable cause to arrest for Obstructing. Dkt. 17 at 8, 9. See RCW 9A.76.020(1). Defendants point to Mrs. Gardner's refusal to exit the vehicle under circumstances where the officers: (1) had authority to tow the vehicle and communicated their intent to do so; (2) requested repeatedly that Mrs. Gardner exit the vehicle; (3) warned her that the failure to exit the vehicle was hindering their ability to tow the vehicle and would be grounds for her arrest. Id. at 4, 5, 8, 9. Defendants'...
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