Gardner v. Couch

• Citation: 137 Mich. 358,101 N.W. 802
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 22 December 1904
• Parties: GARDNER v. COUCH.

101 N.W. 802

137 Mich. 358

GARDNER v. COUCH.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 22, 1904

On motion for rehearing. Denied.

For former opinion, see 100 N.W. 673.

PER CURIAM.

This is an action of false imprisonment. It appears from the testimony that plaintiff was arrested December 1, 1902 remained in custody until December 8th, was then tried convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for 60 days. In disposing of this case we held that it must be presumed under the charge of the court, that the jury found that the plaintiff pleaded guilty, and therefore that he could not recover in this case. By this application for a rehearing appellant represents that this disposition of the case did not determine his contention that his imprisonment for the eight days before trial was illegal. We think he is right and that, for the purpose of determining the validity of that claim, we must consider another question, viz., was defendant liable in an action for false imprisonment because he issued the warrant for plaintiff's arrest? The complaint and warrant contained no detailed statement of the facts which constituted plaintiff's alleged offense. It merely charged in general language that plaintiff was a vagrant, in violation of a specified ordinance. We would be bound to hold that a conviction under such a complaint and warrant would not justify a detention if plaintiff sought relief by habeas corpus proceedings. See In the Matter of Sarah Way, 41 Mich. 299, 1 N.W. 1021. But does it follow that defendant, who was a justice of the peace, acting judicially, is responsible as a trespasser because he reached an erroneous decision? Plaintiff contends that it does, and he relies upon our decisions (see Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. 390; Shadbolt v. Bronson, 1 Mich. 85; La Roe v. Roeser, 8 Mich. 537; Sheldon v Hill, 33 Mich. 171; Stensrud v. Delamater, 56 Mich. 144, 22 N.W. 272) which hold a justice to be a trespasser when he acts without or in excess of jurisdiction. We do not think these decisions applicable. In the case at bar defendant had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and it was his duty to judicially determine whether or not a warrant should issue. Had he determined that it should not issue, surely that determination would have been a judicial act, which might have been corrected of erroneous. His determination was none the less judicial because he erroneously decided that the warrant should issue. To hold him civilly responsible for such an erroneous decision would not only be unjust, but injurious to public interests. In deciding whether or not a warrant should issue, the magistrate should be free to act according to his judgment. If the law made a magistrate civilly responsible if he erroneously issues a warrant, it is obvious that he would be tempted to resolve all doubts against its issuance, and that, in consequence, public interests would suffer because crimes which should be, will not be, investigated or punished.

The distinction between the above cases and the case at bar is shown by a quotation from the opinion of Justice Christiancy in La Roe v....