Gardner v. Muniz
| Decision Date | 15 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-02663-EMC |
| Parties | ROBERT JOSEPH GARDNER, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM MUNIZ, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Petitioner Robert Joseph Gardner has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Gardner was convicted in state court of murder, torture, burglary, and grand theft. Mr. Gardner seeks to overturn his conviction on the grounds that (1) he was improperly denied the constitutional right to represent himself and (2) his constitutional right not to incriminate himself was violated. Having considered the parties' briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby DENIES Mr. Gardner's petition.
In March 2012, a jury found Mr. Gardner guilty of four different crimes: the murder of Eric Bean on or about December 20, 2009; the torture of Eric on the same date; burglary on or about December 17, 2009; and grand theft of firearms on the same date. The evidence presented to the jury reflected as follows, as indicated in the state appellate court opinion affirming Mr. Gardner's conviction.
On December 17, 2009, Eric's father discovered that someone had broken into his gun safe and taken multiple firearms. The gun safe had been pried open, but the front and back doors of the residence where the safe was kept showed no signs of forced entry.
Four days later, on December 21, 2009, a bicyclist discovered Eric's dead body. Marks on his body indicated that he had been tied and beaten. It was later determined that Eric had been murdered at the Benicia residence of Timothy Delosreyes, Jr., also known as "Big Tim." Big Tim has a son, Timothy Delosreyes III, who is also known as "Little Tim" or "Timmy." On December 30, 2009, the police first questioned Mr. Gardner about potential involvement with the crimes. Mr. Gardner acknowledged knowing both Eric and Little Tim but claimed that he did not know anything about Eric's death. Mr. Gardner stated that, on December 20 and 21, 2009, he was in San Francisco. After Mr. Gardner was told that his cell phone records did not corroborate his presence in San Francisco, he had no explanation.
Several months later, on March 6, 2010, the police arrested Mr. Gardner, as well as Big Tim, Little Tim, and Mr. Gardner's wife, Melody Rives. The police also interviewed Mr. Gardner a second time on the same date. During the interview, Mr. Gardner stated that he and Big Tim were in Vallejo on December 19, 2009. The next morning, December 20, 2009, both Melody and Little Tim called Mr. Gardner. Mr. Gardner and Big Tim then drove from Vallejo to Big Tim's residence in Benicia. Melody, Little Tim, and Eric were all present at the residence. Eric was in a bedroom, beaten and hogtied. Mr. Gardner stated that Eric and Little Tim had stolen some guns, and Melody told Mr. Gardner that Eric was going to "squeal." Mr. Gardner estimated that Eric died later, about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. that day. He helped Little Tim dispose of Eric's body, and he gave Little Tim advice about cleaning the residence.
The March 6 arrest and interview took place on a Saturday. Several days later, on March 10, 2010 (a Wednesday), the police finished interviewing Big Tim, Little Tim, and Melody and thereafter went to interview Mr. Gardner a third time. During this interview, Mr. Gardner admitted that he had helped Eric and Little Tim steal the guns from Eric's father's house. Mr. Gardner also stated that, when he got to the Benicia residence on December 20, 2009, Melody told him that Eric was going to "snitch" to his father about the stolen guns. Although Mr. Gardner denied punching or kicking Eric, he did tell Little Tim that Eric needed to be tied up more. See 4 CT 960, 964 (, that "I had little Timmy do it . . . to tie him up a little bit more"; also stating "I was like, 'You might need to do the feet a little bit more . . . .'"). He also told Little Tim that, "if you tie somebody up . . . , then you can't let them go" because 4 CT 964, 966. Mr. Gardner indicated that he wanted Eric to die "smoothly" and not suffer. 4 CT 965.
As part of the defense case, Melody testified. She testified, inter alia, that, on the day at issue, she never saw Mr. Gardner in the bedroom where Eric was tied up. See 5 RT 913. She also stated that, at one point, Mr. Gardner escorted her outside. See 5 RT 921. While the two were outside, she heard "heavy noises" coming from inside the residence and then, after a few minutes, there were no more noises. 5 RT 921-22.
In its rebuttal case, the state challenged Melody's trial testimony by offering the testimony of Sergeant Tiffany Hook. Sgt. Hook had interviewed Melody on several prior occasions - more specifically, on December 29, 2009; March 6, 2009; and March 10, 2009. Sgt. Hook testified that, during the last interview, Melody stated that Mr. Gardner had tightened Eric's restraints. Melody also stated that she overheard a conversation between Mr. Gardner and Big Tim during which "Big Tim instructed [Mr.] Gardner to tighten the restraints because Little Timmy didn't know what he was doing." 6 RT 987.
After considering, inter alia, the above evidence, the jury convicted Mr. Gardner of murder, torture, burglary, and grand theft. Mr. Gardner subsequently appealed the convictions. On November 21, 2014, the appellate court largely affirmed the judgment. In particular, the court rejected Mr. Gardner's arguments that (1) the trial court improperly denied his request for self-representation and (2) the trial court improperly failed to suppress statements that he had made during the last police interview, held on March 10, 2009. See generally Ex. A. Mr. Gardner then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review but his petition was summarily denied on February 18, 2015. See Ex. B.
Having exhausted his state remedies, Mr. Gardner now petitions this Court for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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Mr. Gardner's case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under AEDPA, habeas relief may be granted if the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding" or "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
In cases where a petitioner identifies clearly established federal law and challenges the state court's application of that law, our task under AEDPA is not to decide whether a state court decision applied the law correctly. Rather, we must decide whether the state court decision applied the law reasonably. If the state court applied the law reasonably, we must deny relief. Thus, relief is proper only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court's] precedents."
Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Williams v. Talor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000) ( ).
Mr. Gardner argues first that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court improperly denied his request to represent himself, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. At the trial level, the state court found that, although Mr. Gardner was mentally competent to stand trial, he was not mentally competent to represent himself.
In evaluating Mr. Gardner's argument, the Court takes guidance from Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), which addresses the situation in which a criminal defendant is found mentally competent to stand trial but not mentally competent to conduct the trial himself. The question in Edwards was whether a state could lawfully insist that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel, without violating the defendant's right to self-representation. See id. at 167 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
The Supreme Court held that a state may, in fact, deny a defendant's request to represent himself where that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct the trial, a standard which differs from the standard for competency to stand trial. See id. at 174. The Court reasoned as follows.
"First, the Court's precedent, while not answering the question, points slightly in the direction of [an] affirmative answer." Id. at 175. In fact, "Faretta, the foundational self-representation case, rested its conclusion in part upon pre-existing state law set forth in cases all of which are consistent with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a competency limitation on the self-representation right." Id.
Second, it did not make sense for there to be a single standard that would govern both competency to stand trial and competency to represent oneself at trial. Id. Thus, "[i]n certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy [the] mental competence standard, for which he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel." Id. at 175-76 (...
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