Gardner v. Smith
Decision Date | 11 October 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 22392.,22392. |
Citation | 368 F.2d 77 |
Parties | John W. GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellant, v. Luther L. SMITH, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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David L. Rose, Frederick B. Abramson, Attys., Dept. of Justice, John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., William Wayne Justice, U. S. Atty., Sherman L. Cohn, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Kyle Wheelus, Jr., Beaumont, Tex., Marcus, Weller, Wheelus & Green, Beaumont, Tex., of counsel, for appellee.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, RIVES, Circuit Judge, and CHOATE, District Judge.
This is an action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Secretary's decision denying the claimant's application to establish a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423.1 The district court in passing upon the claim found that erroneous, improper and repudiated legal standards were applied and, hence, that the decision should not enjoy the insulation of the substantial evidence test. The court further found that, if the proper legal standards were applied, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's decision denying the claimant benefits under the Act. A judgment was entered reversing the decision of the Secretary and directing him to grant the claimant's application.
The primary question to be determined on this appeal is whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards. If he did, then the only remaining question is whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence.2 If the correct legal standards were not applied, then the question is whether the district court erred in making its own findings of fact and granting relief, or whether the case should have been remanded for further action by the Secretary.
The claimant was born near Buna, Texas, on September 15, 1911, and lived in that vicinity all of his life. His formal schooling ended with the fourth grade. He worked on his father's farm until 1947 when, at age 36, he went to work in the Kirby Lumber Company sawmill, and worked steadily for 13 years, or until July 6, 1960. On June 14,À 1957, while lifting a board, his foot slipped and he felt a pulling in his side. Five days later he realized that his back had been hurt. He was taken to a hospital in Beaumont, Texas, where a surgeon removed his appendix. He got no relief to his back and that has bothered him ever since. He missed eight weeks' work in 1957. He received a notice from the Industrial Accident Board with a form of claim for workmen's compensation. He filled out the form but, instead of filing it, simply "stuck it down in my drawer," and held the report for about three years. During this last three-year period he had worked up by seniority to the job of "top man," the softest job available at the sawmill. That involved nothing more than walking up and down along the catwalk high in the building and pushing buttons to release lumber when it had accumulated and should be removed. There was a seat from which he could see the lumber accumulating and he was able to alternate sitting, standing and walking. Notwithstanding the ease of this work, on about July 6, 1960, he felt that he could not continue and was away from wo until August 23. He returned and worked until September 9, 1960, when he finally gave up and has not worked a day since.3
For several months in 1962, from June 8 to September 2, the claimant was confined in a mental institution, the Rusk State Hospital at Rusk, Texas. A niece, giving a personal interview, stated that she thought the mental illness started five years prior to that date or in 1957. The superintendent of the hospital certified that no electro shock therapy was administered but that tranquilizers and other drugs were used, and "the patient seemed to make a very nice adjustment." His psychiatric impairment was variously diagnosed as a depressive psychosis, a manic depressive reaction, a chronic anxiety reaction with marked hypochondriasis and a chronic conversion reaction. The superintendent of the hospital certified that "work tolerance was not considered during the patient's hospitalization," but that, "it was felt that the patient, so long as he was in the remission he was in at the time of his discharge, could handle himself well in the ordinary circumstances of life."
The 365-page administrative record contains the varying opinions of five general practitioners, two psychiatry and neurology specialists, a neurological surgeon, two psychiatric specialists and an internist. Numerous other opinions were contained in hospital and clinical records. None of the doctors suggested that the claimant is a malingerer. His family physician who had treated him since 1938 diagnosed his trouble as On the other hand, the neurological surgeon found that, "This patient seems to have no neurologic disease of any type." Opinions of other doctors varied between these two extremes. There was less variation in the medical evidence as to the claimant's physical impairment.
A vocational consultant gave his evaluation of the clamant's vocational capabilities. He thought that the claimant had the capacity to perform jobs which were primarily sedentary in nature and fairly routine. Specifically, he felt that the claimant could work as a "bander" or baked goods wrapper, an egg inspector or defeatherer of chickens, a gateman, laundry marker, hand labeler, working with coils for small motors, and inspecting types of glass, lenses, and bottles. The district court gave careful consideration to the testimony of this vocational expert, and summarized his testimony as follows:
The district court concluded as follows:
The difference in viewpoint as to the proper legal standards to be employed is fairly stated in the decision of the Appeals Council as follows:
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