Gardner v. Wetzel, 1:18-cv-2285
| Decision Date | 16 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-cv-2285 |
| Parties | ANTHONY GARDNER , Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY JOHN E. WETZEL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Hon. John E. Jones III
Plaintiff Anthony Gardner ("Gardner"), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas (SCI-Dallas), commenced this action on November 29, 2018, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of a legal mail policy implemented by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") in September 2018. The sole Defendant is the Secretary of the DOC, John Wetzel.
Presently pending is Defendant's motion (Doc. 25) for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion.
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Id.; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1996). Although the moving party must establish an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it need not "support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can meet its burden by "pointing out ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims." Id. at 325.
Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (); Wooler v. Citizens Bank, 274 F. App'x 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2008). The party opposing the motion must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). "[T]he non-moving party 'may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its ownpleadings; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.'" Picozzi v. Haulderman, 2011 WL 830331, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). "Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America. Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The adverse party must raise "more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor" and cannot survive by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the non-movant will not be adequate to support a denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the non-movant on that issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Gardner seeks to enjoin Defendant Wetzel from unlawfully seizing, copyingand destroying legal mail pursuant to the DOC policy, DC-ADM 803, effective October 3, 2018. (Doc. 1, pp. 3, 4). The Court approved a Settlement Agreement on March 25, 2019, between the DOC and the Plaintiffs in the matter of 1:18-cv-2100, PILP, et al. v. Wetzel, et al., addressing the parties' challenges to the DOC's legal mail policy, DC-ADM 803 (effective October 3, 2018). As of April 6, 2019, the DOC ceased copying legal mail and reinstituted the procedures governing the inspection and delivery of legal mail utilized prior to September 2018. See Exhibit F, DC-ADM 803, Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications (Section 1 updated on April 6, 2019 to conform to the Settlement Agreement). Additionally, any legal mail saved by the DOC was destroyed or returned to the sender. Id.; see also Exhibit E, Settlement Agreement for 1:18-cv-2285.
DOC inmates are notified of the Inmate Grievance System policy, DC-ADM-804, in the Inmate Handbook. (Doc. 28, ¶ 6, 7). The policy is intended to deal with a wide range of issues, procedures, or events that are of concern to the inmate who is personally affected by a DOC or facility action and policy. (Id. at 8, 10). Because it provides formal resolution of an inmate's issues or concerns, inmates are encouraged to first try informal avenues, such as communicating with the staff at his or her institution prior to filing a grievance. (Id. at 9, 11). Ifinformal avenues prove unsuccessful, the policy provides a three-step process for resolution of inmate grievances: (1) the initial grievance and staff response that must be submitted to the Facility Grievance Coordinator; (2) the appeal to the Facility Manager or Superintendent and response; and (3) and the final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals ("SOIGA") and response. (Id. at 12).
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the decision of the Grievance Coordinator, he may appeal to the Facility Manager. (Id.) If dissatisfied with the outcome of that appeal, he may seek review with the SOIGA, which is the final level of appeal from a grievance under the DOC's Inmate Grievance System. (Id. at 13, 14).
Kyle Fagan ("Fagan"), Assistant to the Superintendent at SCI-Dallas, is responsible for the review, tracking and referral of all grievances to an appropriate grievance officer. (Id. at 15). Fagan reviewed the grievance records and found that Gardner has not filed a grievance in the last five years. (Id. at 17).
Dorina Varner ("Varner") is the Chief for the SOIGA who, inter alia, is the custodian of the records of inmate grievances appealed to final review. (Id. at 18). Varner reviewed the grievance appeal records; there is no record of Gardner having filed any grievances. (Id. at 19, 20).
Gardner does not dispute the facts set forth above. Rather, he contends that he utilized other avenues of administrative exhaustion prior to suit and that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) does not state that the "DOC exhaustion requirement is the only form applicable to administrative exhaustion." (Doc. 34, p. 7).
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Gardner's claim seeking to enjoin the DOC from inspecting and copying his legal mail as moot. (Doc. 26, p. 5). The amendment to DC-ADM 803, effective April 6, 2019, which ceased the seizing, copying, and destroying of legal mail, and reinstated the prior legal mail policies in place, renders Gardner's request for injunctive relief moot. See Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl., L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2001) (); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (). Defendant Wetzel is entitled to an entry of summary judgment on this claim.
Defendant also seeks an entry of summary judgment based on Gardner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)a. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (the "PLRA") "mandates that an inmate exhaust 'such administrative remedies as are available' before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions." Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016); see Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (). "A prisoner may not satisfy the ... exhaustion requirement by exhausting administrative remedies after initiating suit in federal court."...
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