Gargagliano v. Secretary of State

• Decision Date: 10 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 19759,3
• Citation: 233 N.W.2d 159,62 Mich.App. 1
• Parties: Victoria GARGAGLIANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 159

233 N.W.2d 159

62 Mich.App. 1

Victoria GARGAGLIANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 19759.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

June 10, 1975.

Released for Publication Oct. 1, 1975.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., John D. Pirich, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.

Legal Aid Society of Grand Rapids, by Norman K. Kravitz, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P.J., and KAUFMAN and O'HARA, ^* JJ.

KAUFMAN, Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant Secretary of State from a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction entered by Kent County Circuit Court Judge John T. Letts.

The court ruled that Section 303a of the Michigan Vehicle Code, 1949 P.A. 300, is unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the defendant from enforcing Section 303a against plaintiff. The court also revoked the order with which defendant had suspended plaintiff's driver's license pursuant to the terms of Section 303a, M.C.L.A. § 257.303a; M.S.A. § 9.2003(1). Section 303a requires:

'(1) Upon the admission of any person to a hospital for care and treatment of a mental illness or at any time thereafter until the person is no longer hospitalized for treatment of a mental illness, the medical superintendent of any hospital at which the person is a patient for treatment shall notify the department if the person has an operator's or chauffeur's license and has become afflicted with mental or physical infirmities or disabilities rendering it unsafe for him to drive. Upon receipt of such notice the department Shall suspend the license of the person. The license Shall remain suspended and no renewal license shall be issued until the medical superintendent of the hospital at which the person is a patient for care and treatment of a mental illness shall notify the department that the condition no longer exists.

'(2) Any person adjudicated mentally ill prior to the effective date of this amendatory section shall be eligible to have his driving privileges restored or a renewal of his operator's or chauffeur's license if the medical superintendent of any hospital at which he is a patient for care and treatment, or if the licensed physician from whom the person is receiving treatment, shall certify to the department that he is no longer afflicted with mental or physical infirmities or disabilities rendering it unsafe for him to drive.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Plaintiff was released from Kalamazoo State Hospital and placed on convalescent status on December 7, 1973. On December 12, 1973, the medical superintendent of the hospital notified the Department of State pursuant to Section 303a. On January 7, 1974, plaintiff received a notification from the department that her operator's license would be suspended indefinitely as of January 12 and would remain suspended until she met the requirements of the licensing authority. The notice stated that the suspension could be appealed to the license appeal board and must be appealed within 10 days of the suspension. Instead of filing an administrative appeal, plaintiff brought suit in Kent County Circuit Court. There, as she does here, plaintiff claimed that Section 303a is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons: (1) because it deprived her of property without the procedural due process required and (2) because the standards it provides are so vague as to provide no guidance for administrative decision-making and no notice to a driver of when his license might be suspended.

Before we can make any determination concerning the constitutionality of Section 303a, we must consider defendant's claim that there are significant nonconstitutional grounds on which this case can be decided. Defendant cites the well established rule of judicial construction that constitutional questions will not be considered where there exist other decisive grounds for disposing of the case. Brown v. Hill, 216 Mich. 520, 185 N.W. 751 (1921). Defendant contends that the trial court could have held that the defendant had not complied with Section 303a and avoided a ruling on the constitutionality of that section. Defendant claims that the section does not allow a medical superintendent to send notice to the Department of State after a patient has been released from his care. In the instant case, defendant admits that it erred by taking cognizance of the notice because the notice was sent five days after plaintiff was released.

Plaintiff responds by arguing that the nonconstitutional grounds urged by defendant do not exist. Plaintiff claims that, at the time the notice was sent, she was still 'hospitalized' under the terms of Section 303a and has not been 'released'. We agree with plaintiff. When plaintiff was released, she was an convalescent status. As plaintiff notes, under Michigan jurisprudence, a person on convalescent status remains in the legal custody of the hospital and is therefore still hospitalized. Convalescent status has been defined by law as including any patient 'who is not discharged, but who is permitted by the medical superintendent to live apart from the state hospital * * * under the special regulations of the medical superintendent'. M.C.L.A. § 330.54; M.S.A. § 14.844. (Repealed by 1974 P.A. 258.) Further, M.C.L.A. § 330.37a; M.S.A. § 14.837a provided that an individual on convalescent status 'shall be subject at any time to be taken back within the enclosure of said hospital for any reason that may be satisfactory to the medical superintendent (repealed by 1974 P.A. 258.)'. ¹ In fact, plaintiff had been returned to the hospital on one prior occasion.

Indeed, this may be the best factual situation on which we may consider the constitutionality of Section 303a. Where an individual is confined to a hospital, suspension of an operator's license, which he cannot in fact use, may not be a severe deprivation. Where, however, the individual is on convalescent status and trying to function in society, the summary loss of mobility may be a severe deprivation. The procedure utilized in the latter case thus requires careful scrutiny.

Both parties base their arguments concerning the constitutionality of Section 303a on the U.S. Supreme Court case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). Plaintiff claims that an application of the standards set forth in Bell mandate the law to provide a hearing prior to suspension of a driver's license. Defendant agrees that due process standards apply to this case but argues that a hearing held after the license has been suspended meets the Bell v. Burson due process standards. Such a hearing, defendant notes, was made available to plaintiff by Department of State regulations.

In Bell, supra, the Court examined Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which required that unless an uninsured motorist 'involved' in an accident posted a security to cover damages claimed by aggrieved parties, his vehicle registration and operator's license would be suspended. A hearing was provided prior to suspension but any consideration of the driver's 'fault' was excluded. The Court held that, since 'fault' was a significant element in the decision to deprive a motorist of his license, 'before the State may deprive (him) of his driver's license and vehicle registration it must provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident'. ²

In determining the timing of a due process hearing, the Court set out as a guideline:

'* * * it is fundamental that except in emergency situations * * * due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' Before the termination becomes effective.' (Emphasis in original.) ³

The later case of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) reaffirmed the Bell standards and explained its concept of 'emergency situations' where a prior hearing would not be required:

'There are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. (371), at 379, 91 S.Ct. (780), at 786 (28 L.Ed.2d 113, 119 (1971)). These situations, however must be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary that justified in the particular instance. Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food.' (Footnotes omitted.) ⁴

Relying on Bell, both plaintiff and defendant focus their analyses on whether or not the instant case presents an 'emergency situation'. However, the Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974), has apparently abandoned the more definite 'emergency situation' standard in favor of the more traditional 'balancing of interests' test. In Mitchell, the Court, quoting a Pre-Bell case, stated '(t)he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation'. ⁵ The Court upheld Louisiana's sequestration statute which allows a creditor to obtain a...