Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc., 08-2287.

Citation572 F.3d 45
Decision Date14 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 08-2287.,08-2287.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
PartiesPaul A. GARGANO and Gargano & Associates, P.C., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS, INC., Greenwich Insurance Company, and NCMIC Insurance Company, Defendants, Appellees.

David T. Barrat, with whom Paul A. Gargano was on brief, for appellant.

William T. Bogaert, with whom Hinna M. Upal was on brief, for Liberty International Underwriters, Inc., appellee.

Marissa I. Delinks, with whom David A. Grossbaum was on brief, for Greenwich Insurance Company, appellee.

Brooks L. Glahn, with whom Alexandra B. Harvey was on brief, for NCMIC Insurance Company, appellee.

Before LIPEZ, HANSEN,* and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Paul A. Gargano and his law firm, Gargano & Associates P.C., (collectively "Gargano"), appeal the district court's dismissal of the complaint in this diversity-based lawyer's professional liability insurance coverage dispute. Because Gargano's insurance claim was not both made and reported within the relevant policy coverage periods, Gargano states no plausible claim for breach of contract or for deceptive business practices under Massachusetts law, and we affirm the judgment of the district court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

I.

Gargano brought suit in Massachusetts state court against Liberty International Underwriters, Inc. ("Liberty"), Greenwich Insurance Company ("Greenwich"), and NCMIC Insurance Company ("NCMIC"), asserting breaches of contract and violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapters 176D and 93A (protecting consumers from deceptive business practices) for each insurance company's alleged failure to investigate or settle the claim. Gargano had obtained three separate professional liability insurance policies, one from each company, covering three different successive years. This suit is based on each company's denial of Gargano's claim for coverage and its alleged refusal to pay without conducting a reasonable investigation. The case was removed to federal court, and the insurance companies each moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The complaint indicates that Gargano obtained a professional liability "claims made and reported" policy from NCMIC, covering himself and his law firm for the period from September 1, 2004, through September 1, 2005. The next year, the policy was allowed to expire, and Mr. Gargano obtained a similar "claims made and reported" policy from Greenwich, covering the period from September 1, 2005, through September 1, 2006. When that policy expired, Gargano obtained a "claims made and reported" policy from Liberty for coverage from September 1, 2006, through September 1, 2007. The policies are referenced in, and attached to, the complaint. It is significant that each of these professional liability insurance policies expressly "provides coverage only for claims that are both first made against the insured and reported to the insurance company during the term of the policy." Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 575 F.Supp.2d 300, 303 (D.Mass. 2008).

The complaint avers that Gargano reported a claim to NCMIC, Greenwich, and Liberty, seeking investigation and payment of a state-court judgment that was entered against Gargano in July 2007. See Hug v. Gargano & Assocs., P.C., No. 05-1147, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 322, 2007 WL 4358191 (Mass.Super.Ct. July 5, 2007).1 The suit had been filed in March 2005, seeking to enforce an attorney's lien for fees and for damages resulting from deceptive business practices under Massachusetts law, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The state court entered an order establishing Gargano's liability to Mr. Hug in December 2005 and held a hearing on damages in March 2007.

The underlying facts in the Hug case, taken from the ruling of the Massachusetts Superior Court, indicate that Christopher N. Hug, an attorney, had represented one Anthony Pirelli on a worker's compensation claim for permanent disability benefits. Pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement with Pirelli, Mr. Hug had worked on the case for four years, during which time he had succeeded in ratcheting up the settlement offer to $200,000, a sum that Mr. Hug thought he could still increase with further negotiations. At that point, Pirelli discharged Mr. Hug and hired Mr. Gargano. Mr. Hug relinquished his case file to the Gargano law firm, spoke to the firm about recovering his share of the fees, and filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien for the work he had done on the case. He sent the lien notice to the appropriate state agencies and twice to Gargano by certified mail. In January 2005, Mr. Hug learned that Pirelli's case had been settled in June 2004 for a lump-sum payment of $300,000 and that the Department of Industrial Accidents ("DIA") had authorized a payment of attorney's fees to the Gargano firm in the amount of $58,760. The state court found that, to secure the fee award, Gargano had assisted Pirelli in falsely representing to the DIA that Mr. Gargano and his firm had represented Pirelli all along and that there were no outstanding attorney's fee liens. The Massachusetts Superior Court concluded that Gargano's "numerous misrepresentations or material omissions of fact" amounted to an "unfair and deceptive business practice," and ordered Mr. Gargano and his law firm to pay over $102,000 in damages, treble damages, and attorney's fees. Id. at *5.

After the entry of the Hug judgment in July 2007, Mr. Gargano reported it as a claim on each of his professional liability policies. Mr. Gargano did not report the claim when the Hug lawsuit was initially filed in March 2005, and the Gargano law firm itself defended the suit. Because Mr. Gargano did not report the claim until 2007, NCMIC and Greenwich denied coverage on the ground that the claim was not reported during the term of coverage under their policies. Liberty denied coverage because, although the claim was reported within its policy's coverage period, it was first made prior to that term of coverage. Gargano asserts in the complaint that each insurance company failed to deliver its policy to him and should therefore be precluded from relying on policy language to deny the claim. The district court granted the insurance companies' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the insurance companies were not obligated to provide coverage under their "claims made and reported" policies, and thus the facts did not state either a breach of contract claim or a viable Chapter 93A claim for deceptive business practices. Gargano appeals.

II.

"We review de novo the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)." Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir.2008). We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Fitzgerald v. Harris, 549 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2008). The general rules of pleading require "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal marks omitted), quoted in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); see also Thomas, 542 F.3d at 948. "To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Fitzgerald, 549 F.3d at 52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (discussing the plausibility standard). In this diversity case, there is no dispute that Massachusetts law governs, and we review de novo the district court's interpretation of state law. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).

Even accepting as true all of the well-pleaded facts of the complaint, Mr. Gargano and his firm have failed to state a claim of breach of contract or deceptive business practices in violation of Massachusetts law, because the claim they made for coverage did not fall within the coverage period of any of the three professional liability insurance policies. Each was a "claims made and reported" policy, stating explicitly that its coverage applied only to claims first made against the insured during the policy period and reported to the company during the policy period. See Appellants' App. at 24 (NCMIC policy); 40 (Greenwich policy), 55 & 62 (Liberty policy).

"A claims-made policy covers the insured for claims made during the policy year and reported within that period or a specified period thereafter regardless of when the covered act or omission occurred." Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 862, 551 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1990); see also J.I. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 118, 120 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1990) (construing Massachusetts law). It is clear under Massachusetts law that for a "claims made and reported" policy, "the insured event" is the combination of both requirements: (1) the claim must be first made against the insured during the policy period, and (2) the claim must be reported to the insurer within the policy period. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 551 N.E.2d at 30. This notice within the policy period "is of the essence in determining whether coverage exists." Id.

The claim in this case was first "made" when Mr. Hug filed suit against Gargano in March 2005, at the latest. The NCMIC policy provided coverage from September 2004 through September 2005. The Hug suit was filed within that coverage period, but Gargano did not report it to NCMIC until 2007, well outside the coverage period. While the Hug proceedings remained pending throughout the term of the Greenwich policy, from September 2005 through ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
350 cases
  • Contreras v. Somoza
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • June 23, 2015
    ...is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ Medina v. Toledo, 718 F.Supp.2d 194, 201 (D.P.R.2010) (quoting Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2009) )". Luis Santiago v. Santiago, 731 F.Supp.2d 202, 205 (D.P.R.2010), cited in Reyes v. Puerto Rico, 977 F.Supp.2......
  • Toledo-Colon v. Puerto Rico
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • September 21, 2011
    ...require a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This short and plain statement need only ‘give the defenda......
  • Baez-Figueroa v. Attorney Gen. of Puerto Rico, CIVIL 14-1600 (FAB)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • August 20, 2015
    ...is and the grounds upon which it rests.' Medina v. Toledo, 718 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (D.P.R. 2010) (quoting Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009))'". LuisSantiago v. Santiago, 731 F. Supp. 2d 202, 205 (D.P.R. 2010). In the opposition to the motion to di......
  • Smith v. Raytheon Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • November 30, 2021
    ...to dismiss stage, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc. , 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009).It is well settled that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT