Gargotta v. United States
Decision Date | 10 May 1935 |
Docket Number | No. 10091.,10091. |
Citation | 77 F.2d 977 |
Parties | GARGOTTA v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
William L. Vandeventer, of Springfield, Mo. (Calvin, Vandeventer & Kimbrell, of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
Randall Wilson, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Sam C. Blair, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Kansas City, Mo. (Maurice M. Milligan, U. S. Atty., of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for the United States.
Before WOODROUGH and FARIS, Circuit Judges, and DONOHOE, District Judge.
Appellant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted on all three counts of an indictment, which charged him with receiving, concealing, and retaining in his possession with intent to convert to his own use, two certain pistols, property of the United States, with knowledge of the fact that such property had heretofore been stolen. His punishment was fixed at three years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, and a fine on the third count of $5,000. By appropriate proceedings, an appeal has been prosecuted to this court, which presents for our consideration certain errors alleged to have occurred during the trial, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
One of the errors alleged is based on the fact that Mrs. Florence McCoy, a contract stenographer employed on behalf of the government in the office of the district attorney, was present during the sessions of the grand jury that returned the indictment against the defendant, and took down the testimony. She was sworn not to divulge any of the testimony so recorded, and in the course of the proceedings she was called upon to read to the grand jury testimony pertaining to another case. She was not present during the deliberation. On the strength of these facts, a plea in abatement was entered on the ground that an unauthorized person was permitted to be present in the grand jury room during the time it was hearing testimony on which the indictment herein was based. The plea in abatement was overruled, and that order is assigned as error.
Section 556, title 18 USCA (as amended May 18, 1933), disposes of this alleged error. The testimony which she read to the jury during its deliberation had to do with a Mr. Claiborne's case, rather than the case of the defendant, and consequently no prejudicial error could be predicated on that circumstance.
Another alleged error is based on a statement made by the district attorney in his closing argument to the jury, which it is contended referred to the fact that the defendant did not take the stand in his own behalf. The language is as follows:
While we think that this language approaches dangerously close to the forbidden zone, still it hardly encroaches thereon. The criticism seemed to be directed to the attorneys, who were conducting the case for the defendant. The attorneys might have called other witnesses, if any there were, to explain the possession of the guns. For the attorney in his argument to refer to the fact that there were no such other witnesses called would not be objectionable. Then, too, it will be observed that the pronoun "they" was used in the last question quoted instead of the pronoun "he." From this it would seem that the language could not be fairly construed as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf, and hence we do not find the statement to constitute reversible error.
The question of the sufficiency of the evidence is the serious question in the case. The first contention, that there was no competent evidence proving that the pistols in question were the property of the United States previously stolen, is readily disposed of. The testimony of Major Chafin in that connection, received without objection, was positive and direct, and sufficient in itself to take the case to the jury on that point. Hence we do not consider it necessary to dwell upon the other corroborating testimony. We think that the ownership and theft of these pistols was sufficiently and amply proven.
The remaining contention, that there is not on the record sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury touching defendant's knowledge that the pistols were stolen when he possessed them and when he concealed one of them, is to our mind the real and only question in the case. We will quote the testimony in detail in order that the evidence, or rather the lack of evidence, may speak for us:
The witness, Thomas B. Bash, sheriff, testified:
(Here the witness identified the pistol as delivered to him by his deputy, and which contained the number "377,675," marked as Government Exhibit 1.)
Officer Hale testified that he was one of the officers who took the defendant to the station when he was arrested, immediately after the shooting referred to by the sheriff, and related the following as having taken place on the way:
The witness, Miss Houston, identified a written statement, prepared shortly after the shooting, which she read to Mr. Gargotta sentence by sentence. She stated that after reading a sentence, a Mr. Mastin propounded the question to the defendant, "Is that true?" and...
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