Garland v. Boston & M. R. R.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1913
• Citation: 76 N.H. 556,86 A. 141
• Parties: GARLAND v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

86 A. 141

76 N.H. 556

GARLAND

v. BOSTON & M. R. R.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Strafford.

Feb. 4, 1913.

Transferred from Superior Court, Strafford County; Plummer, Judge.

Action by George W. Garland, as administrator of the estate of Frank W. Garland, deceased, against the Boston & Maine Railroad for the negligent killing of plaintiff's decedent. At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant's motion for a nonsuit was granted, subject to exception, and the case was transferred from the superior court Overruled.

George E. Tebbetts, of Boston, Mass., and Mathews & Stevens, of Somersworth, for plaintiff.

Kivel & Hughes and Robert Doe, all of Dover, and Leslie P. Snow, of Rochester, for defendant.

PEASLEE, J. The plaintiff's decedent, Garland, was killed in a head-on collision between two trains owned and operated by the defendant. Garland was riding in the engine cab on the up train, and his presence was not known to the defendant's servants, other than the enginemen on that train. There was no claim that these men were negligent; the charge being that the collision was caused by the fault of the men operating the down train, or of those ordering the movement of trains. It was admitted that Garland was a trespasser, and that there was no reason to anticipate his presence in the call. There is no serious dispute as to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the substantial question in the case is one of law.

May one recover for an injury inflicted upon him through the defendant's failure to use reasonable care toward a third person? It is urged that such liability ought to exist, because the rule imposes on the defendant no added burden of conduct, because he is admitted to be in the wrong, and when acting wrongfully he should be held responsible for all the consequences of such conduct.

The law governing actions for negligence has for its foundation the rule of reasonable conduct. However much this rule has been infringed upon in certain lines of decisions as to the law of master and servant, it has been adhered to and applied as to other relations. The underlying reason for decisions that liability did not exist has not always been stated. The usual formula is that under these circumstances, or as to this plaintiff, the defendant owed no duty. But this dogmatic statement gives no answer to the arguments now advanced on behalf of the plaintiff.

The conclusion that there was no duty must be preceded by one that there was no unreasonable act or omission. Unless it has this foundation, it has no place in the law of negligence. The general rule is more fully stated as due care under all the circumstances of the particular case. That is, the standard is a relative one. It is not a fixed measure for action or inaction, applicable independent of the surrounding facts of time, place, and the like. "Nothing would follow from the act except for the environment. All acts, apart from their surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to the law." Holmes, Com. Law, 54.

The rule of reasonable care necessarily includes two persons, or one person and some right or property of another. It has to do with one's acts in reference to the person, property, or rights of another. It is a rule of relation. If there be no relation, there is nothing upon which the rule can operate. The rule of reasonable care, under the circumstances, could not limit the conduct of Robinson Crusoe as he was at first situated; but as soon as he saw the tracks in the sand the rule began to have vitality. He then had notice that there might be other persons on the island; and this knowledge of their presence made it his duty as a reasonable man to use reasonable care to the end that no act of his should injure them.

Unless and until one is brought into relation with other men, or property, or rights, he has no obligation to act with reference to them; and this is true whether the obligation be called legal, moral, or reasonable. "Most of the rights of property, as well as of person, in the social state are not absolute, but relative." Losee v. Buchannan, 51 N. Y. 476, 485, 10 Am. Rep. 623; Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442, 448, 16 Am. Rep. 372. The relation may" be to a single person, as where two travelers meet unexpectedly in the desert. It may be to a class; or it may be to the public generally.

It has usually been held that facts which create a relation, and therefore a duty, as to one do not establish the same obligation to all mankind. To be within the right created, the complaining party must show facts which make the reason for claiming a relation applicable to him. The proposed rule is an abandonment of this idea and seeks to make the obligation to use care, which springs from the relationship, a duty owed to everybody who, by chance, comes within range of the influence of the act complained of. The argument is that, since the act is one the defendant should have refrained from doing, it is just that he be responsible for all its consequences. But this is a partial view of the situation only. The act is not wrongful in itself. Its wrongfulness is found in its probable effect upon others who are in some relation to the actor. Remove these related parties from the situation, and the act is entirely lawful. As to unrelated parties, the happening is a pure accident.

When it is said that one has been guilty of the negligence denounced by the law, a fault in personal morality is not necessarily implied. The standard by which he is judged is not internal, but external. An outward criterion for legal culpability has been set up. Moral considerations undoubtedly entered into the establishment of the legal standard, but they form no part of the test to be applied. "If the external phenomena, the manifest acts and omissions, are such as it requires, it is wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience." Holmes, Com. Law, 110; Jewell v. Colby, 66 N. H. 399, 24 Atl. 902. The defendant's liability being equally great whether he is or is not morally in fault, the argument that his liability should be enlarged, because he has been guilty of a moral wrong, has no application.

The ordinary act of negligence has in it no element of moral turpitude. There need be no purpose to commit a wrong as to any one, nor a conscious remissness in legal duty. When such a purpose or consciousness exists, there is an added reason for holding the wrongdoer responsible for all the consequences of his act it is this idea which is at the foundation of the law in many jurisdictions, imposing liability in a case like this when the fault was wanton or willful, or what is sometimes called "grossly negligent."

If, in the case of purely unintentional injuries, the relation is not necessary to the existence of the duty—if the duty exists as to all men, because a relation makes it reasonable to impose it as to one man—it follows that the law as to duty to trespassers has been wrongly stated. Hobbs v. Company, 75 N. H. 73, 70 Atl. 1082, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 93. The same thing is true of the law as to statutory signals (Batchelder v. Railroad, 72 N. H. 528, 57 Atl. 920) and other safeguards. Hill v. Railroad, 67 N. H. 449, 32 Atl. 766; Casista v. Railroad, 69 N. H. 649, 45 Atl. 712; Flint v. Railroad, 73 N. H. 141, 59 Atl. 938. "It must appear, to render the defendants liable, that the action or omission to act, of which complaint is made, constituted a breach of duty owed the plaintiff by the defendants." McGill v. Company, 70 N. H. 125, 127, 46 Atl. 684 (85 Am. St. Rep. 618); Hughes v. Railroad, 71 N. H. 279, 51 Atl. 1070, 93 Am. St. Rep. 518.

This heretofore recognized rule of law or of conduct was adopted, and has been maintained and approved, because of its inherent reasonableness. Undoubtedly, some reason can be advanced why the liability should be more extensive. But this is true of nearly all rules by which human conduct and responsibility are governed. A rule is not unreasonable because some men would not...