Garland v. Sybaris Clubs Internaitonal, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-16-0745,1-16-0745 |
| Citation | 2017 IL App (1st) 160745 -U |
| Parties | JENNIFER E. GARLAND, Independent Administrator of the Estate of SCOTT A. GARLAND, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SYBARIS CLUBS INTERNAITONAL, INC., a corporation, SYBARIS VENTURES ONE, LLC, a corporation, H.K. GOLDEN EAGLE, INC., a corporation, RANDALL D. REPKE, Independent Executor of the Estate of KENNETH C. KNUDSON, Deceased, HOWARD D. LEVINSON and HARK CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
The Honorable Irwin J. Solganick, Judge Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: Doctrine of law of the case inapplicable where issue was not previously determined; summary judgment reversed where issues of material fact remain. Reversed and remanded.
¶ 2 Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer E. Garland, Independent Administrator of the Estate of Scott A. Garland, Deceased (Garland) appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment against her and in favor of defendants-appellees Sybaris Club International, Inc., and Sybaris Ventures One, LLC (Sybaris), in a suit based in negligence. On appeal, Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment where this court's prior ruling on the case bound the trial court as law of the case such that the trial court should have been precluded from entering summary judgment; and, regardless of this court's prior ruling, summary judgment was inappropriate in this cause where there are genuine issues of material fact. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.
¶ 4 This is the fourth time this case has come before this court. We will, accordingly, give but a brief recitation of the facts, which can also be found in the previous appeals: Waugh v. Morgan Stanley and Co., Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 102653; Garland v. Morgan Stanley and Co., Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112121; Garland v. Sybaris Clubs, International, Inc., et al, 2014 IL App (1st) 112615 (Garland I). The appeals all stemmed from a fatal airplane crash which resulted in the deaths of all four individuals onboard the aircraft. On January 30, 2006, Mark Turek, the pilot in command of a Cessna 421B aircraft, and three passengers, Kenneth Knudson, Scott Garland, and Michael Waugh, were en route from a Kansas airport to the Palwaukee Municipal Airport in Wheeling, Illinois, following a business trip. As Turek piloted the Cessna 421B for landing at the airport, the aircraft crashed, killing all four occupants onboard.
¶ 5 Briefly, Turek, Garland, and Waugh were onboard for a Morgan Stanley business trip and Knudson had a prospective business customer in Kansas with whom he wanted to meet. Turek was interested in possibly becoming a part owner of the subject aircraft. The accident aircraftwas owned, operated, and maintained by HK Golden Eagle, Inc. Decedent Knudson and Howard Levinson co-owned HK Golden Eagle. Sybaris had purchased the accident aircraft in August 2004. In May 2005, the airplane registration was transferred to HK Golden Eagle, Inc., a corporation formed by Knudson and Levinson to own the aircraft. Hark Corporation, an entity owned by Levinson and his wife and created for the purpose of owning the aircraft, was a co-owner of the accident aircraft, along with Knudson, as shareholders of HK Golden Eagle. On the day of the crash, Knudson and Levinson were the owners of the accident aircraft through HK Golden Eagle. They were considering new partners, and Turek was interested in purchasing a partial ownership in the aircraft. Turek arranged with Knudson to fly Garland and Waugh to Kansas in the accident aircraft for the purpose of engaging in a test and demonstration flight that would allow Knudson, who was an experienced pilot, to evaluate whether he wanted to bring Turek in as a partner in the aircraft.1 Turek received flight training tailored specifically to a Cessna 421B aircraft at Recurrent Training Center.
¶ 6 The estates of each decedent filed wrongful death and survival actions, including the three cases this court has previously ruled upon, Waugh, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653; Garland v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 112121; and Garland I, 2014 IL App (1st) 112615. In Waugh, appellant Morgan Stanley, the estate of Scott Garland, and the estate of Mark Turek appealed from orders of the trial court granting partial summary judgment in favor of appellees Howard Levinson and Hark Corporation on all claims alleging educational malpractice. Waugh, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶ 1. On appeal, appellants contended that the trial court erred by characterizing their claim as sounding in the tort of educational malpractice rather than inordinary negligence. Waugh, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶ 1. Counterdefendant-appellee Recurrent Training Center, Inc., challenged this court's jurisdiction of the cause and asked that this court dismiss the cross-appeal filed against it as untimely. Waugh, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶ 1. We affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding that the claims at issue did, in fact, sound in educational malpractice, which is a noncognizable tort in the state of Illinois. Waugh, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶ 48. We also found that this court had proper jurisdiction over the cause. Waugh, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653, ¶ 54.
¶ 7 The second case, Garland v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 112121, involved claims filed by plaintiff Jennifer Garland, the widow and administrator of the estate of decedent Garland, seeking recovery from decedent Garland's employer, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., as well as Garland's co-employee and the estate of the deceased pilot of the aircraft at the time of the accident, Mark Turek. Garland, 2013 IL App (1st) 112121, ¶ 1. Morgan Stanley and Donna Turek, Mark Turek's widow and the administrator of the estate of Mark Turek, sought dismissal of Garland's common law tort claims based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2010)). Garland, 2013 IL App (1st) 112121, ¶ 2. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005) (West 2010)) as to her claims against the estate of Turek, as well as a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)) on the claim seeking recovery from decedent Garland's employer, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. Garland, 2013 IL App (1st) 112121, ¶ 2. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the application of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act was appropriate where the death was accidental and theemployer, Morgan Stanley, was not acting in a dual capacity at the time of the aircraft crash. Garland, 2013 IL App (1st) 112121, ¶ ¶ 31, 48, 50.
¶ 8 The third case before this court, Garland I, 2014 IL App (1st) 1126152, also arose from the death of Scott Garland. Garland's surviving spouse, plaintiff Jennifer Garland, filed a complaint3 against numerous persons and entities following Garlands' death. By her complaint, plaintiff sought recovery for Garland's death on a number of grounds. As to the Levinson defendants, plaintiff alleged that Levinson had been negligent in entrusting the aircraft to Turek, whom she alleged was not qualified to fly that particular type of aircraft. As to Knudson, plaintiff alleged both negligent entrustment of the aircraft and negligent supervision, alleging that Knudson, who was onboard the doomed flight, failed to properly supervise Turek during the flight itself. As to HK, owner of the aircraft, plaintiff alleged it was vicariously liable for its agents, Levinson and Knudson.
¶ 9 Plaintiff also sued Sybaris, a group of hotels whose president and founder was Knudson, who conducted the doomed flight in the course of Sybaris business and who was, allegedly, a de facto owner of the aircraft. Plaintiff alleged that Sybaris was liable for injuries caused to decedent Garland, that Sybaris was vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of its alleged agent, Knudson, and that Sybaris is directly liable for its own actions related to the accident flight. Sybaris filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code arguing, in pertinent part, that there was no evidence that Sybaris was or could be vicariously liable for Knudson's actions; and that Sybaris could not be liable for negligent entrustment because it did not own the subject aircraft.
¶ 10 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's ninth amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. Garland I, 2014 IL App (1st) 112615. On appeal, this court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Garland I, 2014 IL App (1st) 112615, ¶ 104. Most important to the case at bar, Garland successfully challenged the dismissal of the negligent entrustment claims, and this court reversed that issue in October 2014. Garland I, 2014 IL App (1st) 112615, ¶ 104. We also held that Garland's claims were sufficient to withstand a section 2-619 motion to dismiss regarding negligent entrustment as to Knudson and reversed as to that issue; that Sybaris was not a de facto owner of the aircraft; and that there was insufficient evidence in the record regarding "whether and to what extent Knudson was traveling on Sybaris business" for the issue of vicarious liability against Sybaris for Knudson's alleged negligence to be dismissed by a section 2-619 motion. Garland I, 2014 IL App (1st) 112615, ¶¶ 94,103.
¶ 11 In September 2015, Sybaris filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2014)). By that motion, which...
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