Garland v. The SS Illiamna
Decision Date | 13 October 1961 |
Docket Number | No. A-7-61.,A-7-61. |
Parties | Floyd GARLAND, Libelant, v. THE S.S. ILLIAMNA, Her Boilers, Engines, Appurtenances and Equipment, and Alaska Steamship Company, a corporation, Its Owner and Operator, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Bell, Sanders & Tallman, Anchorage, Alaska, for libelant.
John E. Manders, Anchorage, Alaska, for respondents.
The libelant, for some years employed on the docks at Seward, Alaska, as a longshoreman,1 has filed a libel in rem against the vessel and in personam against the ship owner, his employer, claiming damages for personal injuries sustained by him while engaged in unloading freight from the S. S. Illiamna while tied at the dock at Seward, alleging both negligence and unseaworthiness of the vessel. The libel recites that on the date of his injury he was employed by the respondent steamship company "doing regular seaman's work as a part of the crew of the S. S. Illiamna," and "that during the night or early in the morning of July 8, 1958, this libelant was a member of the crew connecting the hoists to large vans loaded with merchandise" and that his injuries occurred when struck by one of the vans affixed to hoist cables operated by cranes of the vessel.
Respondents filed exceptions to the libel upon the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action in that, at the time of his injury, the libelant was employed as a longshoreman and harbor worker aboard the Illiamna, and that his sole and exclusive remedy for his injury is under the terms and provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act (Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424; Sec. 901 et seq., Title 33 U.S.C.A.). Respondents also filed "exceptive allegations" to the libel setting forth the same claim and alleging that the respondent steamship company had complied in all respects with the terms and obligations of the Act, especially Sec. 5 thereof, in that it had secured the payment of compensation to the injured employee. Respondents also filed an affidavit of counsel in support thereof alleging further that libelant was paid compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as an employee of the respondent steamship company covering the period from October 21 to November 3, 1958, and also received medical and hospital benefits under said Act on account of the injuries complained of. There were filed affidavits of officers of the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, the claim adjuster of the Alaska Steamship Company, and the marine secretary of the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company to the effect that respondent steamship company did secure compensation under the provisions of the Act, that libelant had been paid compensation in the total amount of $117.50 for the period mentioned and that he was employed as a longshoreman aboard the vessel at the time of his injury.
In response thereto libelant filed an affidavit denying that he had ever received or knowingly accepted any compensation or any medical or hospital services by reason of such injury and further denying, on information and belief, that the respondent steamship company had secured payment of compensation as required by the Act.
The pertinent portions of the Act referred to are as follows:
In a companion case to the one at bar, Garland v. Alaska Steamship Company, in which the libelant seeks to recover damages for the same injury under the provisions of the Jones Act (Sec. 688, Title 46 U.S.C.A.), this Court, in an opinion rendered June 15, 1961, (194 F.Supp. 792, 794), held that a longshoreman is not precluded from filing an action for damages under such Act where he is doing work aboard ship "traditionally performed by seamen," citing International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157, and other cases. Although the conclusion of the Court that the issue as to whether or not the plaintiff was at the time of his injury engaged in the duties of a seaman is a question of fact to be put to the jury was probably correct, it is necessary to re-examine the holding as to the Haverty case in the light of further research and subsequent decisions referred to in the brief of the respondents. In fact, the Haverty case was decided some six months prior to the passage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. It is now abundantly clear that the effect of the provisions of Secs. 3 and 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is to confine the benefits of the Jones Act against an employer of the person injured to masters or members of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters and to substitute for the right of recovery recognized in the Haverty case only such rights to compensation as are given by the Longshoremen's Act; and that this Act excludes from its terms and from the benefits of the Jones Act any remedies against the employer, excepting only the master and members of the crew of a vessel. Swanson v. Marra...
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Watson v. Gulf Stevedore Corporation
...(1962); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960); Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, supra; Garland v. The S.S. Illiamna, 198 F.Supp. 187 (D.Alaska 1961); Skow v. Gypsum Carrier, Inc., 164 F.Supp. 879 10 See also Grace Line, Inc. v. Kanton, 366 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1966) (......
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Garland v. Alaska Steamship Company
...same facts as alleged herein, on exceptions to the libel filed by respondents and an opinion rendered on October 13, 1961, Garland v. Illiamna, D.C., 198 F.Supp. 187, in which the court held that although the conclusion reached in the instant case that the issue as to whether or not the pla......
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