Garlock v. Calkins

• Decision Date: 05 December 1900
• Citation: 84 N.W. 393,14 S.D. 90
• Parties: THOMAS V. GARLOCK, Plaintiff and respondent, v. R. W. CALKINS, et al., Defendants and appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

14 S.D. 90

84 N.W. 393

THOMAS V. GARLOCK, Plaintiff and respondent,

v.

R. W. CALKINS, et al., Defendants and appellants. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Custer County, SD Hon. Levi McGee, Judge Reversed Ed L. Grantham, B. R. Wood Attorneys for appellants. W. E. Benedict Attorneys for respondent. Opinion filed December 5, 1900 (See 90 NW 136)

FULLER, P. J.

Conformably to an order to show cause, the circuit court held in effect that a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, a sufficient transcript of which had been docketed therein, should be vacated and all proceedings thereunder stayed pending a trial of the action upon its merits in that court, and from such order this appeal was taken. While it is contended that the judgment, as against certain of the defendants, is void for want of jurisdiction, the transcript, as docketed, affirmatively shows that the justice of the peace had jurisdiction both of the person and subject-matter. The entries which the justice is required to make in his docket are prima facie evidence of what they recite, and a transcript thereof is not void, though it fails to show all the essential jurisdictional facts. Williams v. Rice, 60 NW 153. To sustain the action of the court below, counsel for respondent relies measurably upon Section 4939 of the Compiled Laws, by virtue of which the court may relieve a party from a judgment “taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;” and it is confidently maintained that as soon as the transcript of the justice was docketed the circuit court acquired jurisdiction to make any order with reference to the judgment that it might have made if the trial had taken place in that court. This section, with other provisions relating to the same subject matter, furnishes a rule of practice governing the exercise of a common-law power, possessed inherently by courts of record, to vacate their own judgments, when improvidently entered; and the contention of counsel that the statute embraces transcribed judgments rendered by inferior courts derives no support from the enactment, and the view seems repugnant to our statutory system of administering justice. If the judgment rendered in justice court is erroneous or void for want of jurisdiction, relief therefrom must be obtained in some manner authorized by law or equity; and the circuit court was powerless to review the same on motion, and grant a trial...