Garlotte v. Fordice
| Decision Date | 30 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | 946790 |
| Citation | 115 S.Ct. 1948,515 U.S. 39,132 L.Ed.2d 36 |
| Parties | Harvey F. GARLOTTE, Petitioner, v. Kirk FORDICE, Governor of Mississippi |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
A Mississippi trial court ordered that petitioner Garlotte serve, consecutively, a 3-year prison sentence on a marijuana conviction, followed by concurrent life sentences on two murder convictions. State law required Garlotte to serve at least 10 months on the first sentence and 10 years on the concurrent sentences. Garlotte unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction collateral relief on the marijuana conviction. By the time those proceedings ended, he had completed the period of incarceration set for the marijuana offense, and had commenced serving the life sentences. The Federal District Court denied his subsequent federal habeas petition on the merits, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals adopted the State's position that Garlotte had already served out the prison time imposed for the marijuana conviction and, therefore, was no longer "in custody" under the conviction within the meaning of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The court rejected Garlotte's argument that he remained "in custody" because the marijuana conviction continued to postpone the date on which he would be eligible for parole.
Held: Garlotte was "in custody" under his marijuana conviction when he filed his federal habeas petition. Pp. __.
(a) In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426, this Court allowed two prisoners incarcerated under consecutive sentences to apply for federal habeas relief from sentences they had not yet begun to serve. Viewing consecutive sentences in the aggregate, the Court held that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in custody" under any one of them for purposes of the habeas statute. A different construction of the statutory term "in custody" will not be adopted here simply because the sentence imposed under the challenged conviction lies in the past rather than in the future. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540—in which the Court held that a habeas petitioner could not challenge a conviction after the sentence imposed for it had fully expired—does not control this case, for the habeas petitioner in Maleng, unlike Garlotte, was not serving consecutive sentences. Pp. __.
(b) Allowing a habeas attack on a sentence nominally completed is unlikely to encourage delay in the assertion of habeas challenges. A prisoner naturally prefers release sooner to release later, and delay is apt to disadvantage a petitioner—who has the burden of proof—more than the State. Moreover, under Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a), a district court may dismiss a habeas petition if the State has been prejudiced in its ability to respond because of inexcusable delay in the petition's filing. Pp. __.
29 F.3d 216 (CA5 1994), reversed and remanded.
Brian D. Boyle, appointed by this Court, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Marvin L. White, Jr., Jackson, MS, for respondent.
To petition a federal court for habeas corpus relief from a state court conviction, the applicant must be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968), we held that the governing federal prescription permits prisoners incarcerated under consecutive state court sentences to apply for federal habeas relief from sentences they had not yet begun to serve. We said in Peyton that, for purposes of habeas relief, consecutive sentences should be treated as a continuous series; a prisoner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution," we explained, "if any consecutive sentence [the prisoner] is scheduled to serve was imposed as the result of a deprivation of constitutional rights." Id., at 64-65, 88 S.Ct., at 1555.
The case before us is appropriately described as Peyton's complement, or Peyton in reverse. Like the habeas petitioners in Peyton, petitioner Harvey Garlotte is incarcerated under consecutive sentences. Unlike the Peyton petitioners, however, Garlotte does not challenge a conviction underlying a sentence yet to be served. Instead, Garlotte seeks to attack a conviction underlying the sentence that ran first in a consecutive series, a sentence already served, but one that nonetheless persists to postpone Garlotte's eligibility for parole. Following Peyton, we do not disaggregate Garlotte's sentences, but comprehend them as composing a continuous stream. We therefore hold that Garlotte remains "in custody" under all of his sentences until all are served, and now may attack the conviction underlying the sentence scheduled to run first in the series.
On September 16, 1985, at a plea hearing held in a Mississippi trial court, Harvey Garlotte entered simultaneous guilty pleas to one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and two counts of murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State recommended that Garlotte be sentenced to a prison term of three years on the marijuana count, to run consecutively with two concurrent life sentences on the murder counts. App. 43. State law required Garlotte to serve at least ten months on the marijuana count, Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(c)(ii) (Supp.1994), and at least ten years on the concurrent life sentences. § 47-7-3(1).
At the plea hearing, the trial judge inquired whether the State wanted Garlotte to serve the life sentences before the three-year sentence: "[A] three year sentence [on the marijuana possession count] to run consecutive to th[e] two life sentences?" the judge asked. The prosecutor expressed indifference about the order in which the sentences would run: App. 43. The judge next asked Garlotte's counsel about his understanding of the State's recommendation. Defense counsel replied, without elaboration: "[I]t's my understanding that the possession case is to run first and then the two life sentences." Id., at 44. The court saw "no reason not to go along with the recommendation of the State." Id., at 50. Without further explanation, the court imposed the sentences in this order: the three-year sentence first, then, consecutively, the concurrent life sentences. Ibid.
Garlotte wrote to the trial court seven months after the September 16, 1985 hearing, asking for permission to withdraw his guilty plea on the marijuana count. The court's reply notified Garlotte of the Mississippi statute under which he could pursue post-conviction collateral relief. Id., at 51. Garlotte unsuccessfully moved for such relief. Nearly two years after the denial of Garlotte's motion, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected his appeal. Garlotte v. State, 530 So.2d 693 (1988). On January 18, 1989, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied further post-conviction motions filed by Garlotte. By this time, Garlotte had completed the period of incarceration set for the marijuana offense, and had commenced serving the life sentences.
On October 6, 1989, Garlotte filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, naming as respondent Kirk Fordice, the Governor of Mississippi.1 Adopting the recommendation of a federal magistrate judge, the District Court denied Garlotte's petition on the merits. App. 18.
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the State argued for the first time that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Garlotte's petition. 29 F.3d 216, 217 (CA5 1994). The State asserted that Garlotte, prior to the District Court filing, had already served out the prison time imposed for the marijuana conviction; therefore, the State maintained, Garlotte was no longer "in custody" under that conviction within the meaning of the federal habeas statute. Ibid. Garlotte countered that he remained "in custody" until all sentences were served, emphasizing that the marijuana conviction continued to postpone the date on which he would be eligible for parole. Id., at 218.
Adopting the State's position, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Garlotte's habeas petition for want of jurisdiction. Ibid. The Courts of Appeals have divided over the question whether a person incarcerated under consecutive sentences remains "in custody" under a sentence that (1) has been completed in terms of prison time served, but (2) continues to postpone the prisoner's date of potential release.2 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 929, 130 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995), and now reverse.3
The federal habeas statute authorizes United States district courts to entertain petitions for habeas relief from state court judgments only when the petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968), we held that the statute authorized the exercise of habeas jurisdiction over the petitions of two State of Virginia prisoners, Robert Rowe and Clyde Thacker. Rowe and Thacker were incarcerated under consecutive sentences; both sought to challenge sentences slated to run in the future. Virginia, relying on McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934), argued that the habeas petitions were premature. Overruling McNally, we explained:
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