Garmany v. Southern Ry. Co
Citation | 149 S.E. 765 |
Decision Date | 18 September 1929 |
Docket Number | (No. 12731.) |
Parties | GARMANY. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. TERRY. v. SAME. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Appeal from Common Pleas, Circuit Court of Jasper County; T. J. Mauldin, Judge.
Actions by J. R. Garmany and by P. F. Terry against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Frank G. Tompkins, of Columbia, and J. W. Manuel, of Hampton, for appellant.
John P. Wise and H. K. Purdy, both of Ridgeland, for respondents.
These suits by J. R. Gar-many, as plaintiff, against the Southern Railway Company, and P. F. Terry, as plaintiff, against the same defendant, were commenced In the court of common pleas for Jasper county, September 25, 1926, for the recovery of damages to lands and crops of the plaintiffs in said county of Jasper, at or near the town of Hardeeville, on account of alleged diversion and obstruction of surface water by the defendant. The defendant set up a general denial. By agreement the cases were tried together, at the December, 1926, term of court of common pleas, for said county, before his honor, Judge T. J. Mauldin, and a jury. At the conclusion of the testimony the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict. His honor, Judge Mauldin, after due consideration, refused the motion and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff J. R. Garmany in the sum of $700 as actual damages and $300 as punitive damages, and a verdict for the plaintiff P. F. Terry in the sum of $100 as actual damages. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which motion the court refused. From the entry of judgment on the verdicts, the defendant pursuant to due notice has appealed to this court, and asks a reversal of the judgment in each case upon the grounds stated in the exceptions.
The exceptions are eight in number, and several of the exceptions contain a number of subdivisions, but it will not be necessary to consider the same separately. Under the view we take of the case, there are three main questions involved in the appeal, namely:
(1) Did the presiding judge err in refusing defendant's motion for direction of a verdict?
(2) Did the presiding judge err in his instruction to the jury?
(3) Did the presiding judge err in refusing defendant's motion for a new trial?
While there are several minor questions presented, the answer to these questions will dispose of the appeal.
As to the first question: Did the presiding judge err in refusing defendant's motion for a directed verdict? This motion was based upon the following grounds:
There is no question about the water alleged to have caused the damage being surface water, it is so stated in the agreed statement of facts; but the question to be considered is whether or not, under the law of this state as to surface water, there was any testimony in the case which tended to establish liability against the defendant and warranted the presiding judge in submitting the case to the jury.
The rule of law of force in this state governing the control of surface water has been so often stated by this court that we do not deem it necessary to enter into a discussion of the rule at this time. For a full discussion of the subject, reference may be had to the cases of Brandenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S. 0. 18, 39 S. E. 790, 55 E. R. A. 414, 89 Am. St. Rep. 88T, and authorities therein cited; also Cain v. South Bound R. R. Co., 62 S. C. 25, 39 S. E. 792; Touchberry v. Railroad Co., 87 S. C. 415, 69 S. E. 877; Rentz v. So. Ry. Co., 82 S. C. 170, 63 S. E. 743;' Deason v. So. Ry. Co., 142 S. C. 328, 140 S. E. 575; Rivenbark v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 124 S. C. 136, 117 S. E. 206.
For the purposes of this case we deem it sufficient to state that surface water is regarded as a common enemy, and every landed proprietor has the right to use such means as he deems necessary or expedient for the protection of his property from damages it may cause, except that the landed proprietor must not handle it in such a way as to create a nuisance, and must not by means of a ditch or other artificial means collect water and cast it in concentrated form upon the lands of another, to the damage of his lands or health, nor by such means conduct surface water in concentrated form to a point where it results in injury to another's property or health. Such artificial channel need not necessarily extend to the line or edge of the injured person's lands, in order to sustain an action for damages, but must extend to such a point that the surface water conveyed therein or thereby results in injury to such person's lands or health.
Was there any testimony in the case at bar tending to establish such a state of facts; that is, did the defendant, by means of a ditch or other artificial means, collect surface water and cast it in concentrated form upon the lands of the plaintiffs, to their damage, or by such means conduct it to such a point that it damaged plaintiffs' lands or crops thereon? The question of nuisance or injury to health is not involved in this case.
In this connection we call attention to the following testimony, and especially to that we have italicized:
In the course of his testimony, Mr. H. W. Thomas, a witness for the plaintiffs, stated:
On this point the plaintiff in his testimony stated:
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