Garmire v. The State
| Decision Date | 05 January 1886 |
| Docket Number | 12,680 |
| Citation | 4 N.E. 54,104 Ind. 444 |
| Parties | Garmire v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the LaGrange Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
O. L Ballard and H. G. Zimmerman, for appellant.
F. T Hord, Attorney General, F. D. Merritt, Prosecuting Attorney and W. B. Hord, for the State.
There are two counts in the indictment upon which the appellant was convicted; one charges the forgery of the instrument of writing set forth, and the other charges the appellant with feloniously uttering the forged instrument. The instrument reads thus:
We regard this instrument as within the provisions of our statute defining the crime of forgery, for we think it is not merely a request for the delivery of property, but that it is a writing obligatory promising to pay for property. The hire of the team was property of value to Allen, and the instrument purports to contain a promise to pay the hire. Such a promise is clearly implied in the clause, "and charge same to me," for it would be unreasonable to assert that where a person asks that the value of property furnished on his order be charged against him, he intends that the charge shall be a mere idle and senseless form. We do not understand the case of State v. Cook, 52 Ind. 574, to decide that the forgery of such an instrument as the one set out in the indictment before us is not within our statute; on the contrary, we understand that case to decide, that where proper extrinsic facts are alleged, an indictment founded on such an instrument will be good. We need not critically examine the statements found in the opinion in that case to ascertain whether they do, or do not, correctly state the law, for we are only bound to regard as authoritative the conclusion reached and announced. It is not improper, however, to say that many of the statements contained in that opinion are of doubtful soundness, and the entire opinion so inharmonious and inconsistent as to make the case one of questionable authority. The very decided weight of authority sustains the view we have taken of the character of the instrument set forth in the indictment. United States v. Book, 2 Cranch C.C. 294, 24 F. Cas. 1202; United States v. Brown, 3 Cranch C.C. 268, 24 F. Cas. 1246; State v. Morgan, 35 La. Ann. 293; State v. Ferguson, 35 La. Ann. 1042; Anderson v. State, 65 Ala. 553; Burke v. State, 66 Ga. 157; Peete v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 513; State v. Keeter, 80 N.C. 472; People v. Shaw, 5 Johns. 236; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 17 Mass. 46.
The rule unquestionably is, that the indictment must show that the instrument is one having some legal effect, but it is not necessary that it should be shown to be a perfect instrument. 2 Bishop Crim. Law, section 536; Reed v. State, 28 Ind. 396. An instrument such as the one before us is one of legal efficacy, for it purports to create a pecuniary obligation against the person whose signature is forged. Anderson v. State, supra.
Where an instrument is set forth, a mistake of the pleader in designating its character does not vitiate the indictment. Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359; Powers v. State, 87 Ind. 97; Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379.
The indictment alleges that the instrument was forged and uttered with the "felonious intent to feloniously cheat and defraud the said Aaron W. Allen." This is a sufficient statement of the criminal intent, although there is a useless repetition of epithets. In this class of cases, "all that need be done is to characterize by appropriate words the intent essential to the existence of the particular offence charged." State v. Miller, 98 Ind. 70.
We think that the indictment does show that the instrument set forth purported to be signed by Timothy Hudson. It is not necessary to employ the exact words of the statute, for it is well settled that it is sufficient if equivalent terms are used. State v. Miller, supra.
The objection based upon the fact that the date...
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