Garneau v. Eggers

• Decision Date: 14 August 1934
• Docket Number: No. 226.,226.
• Citation: 174 A. 250
• Parties: GARNEAU v. EGGERS, Judge. of First Criminal Court of Jersey City, et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

174 A. 250

GARNEAU

v. EGGERS, Judge. of First Criminal Court of Jersey City, et al.

No. 226.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Aug. 14, 1934.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The ordinance of Jersey City passed November 21, 1933, declaring that "it shall be unlawful for the driver of any commercial vehicle, as herein denned, to use, travel upon or traverse the highway known as the 'Pulaski Highway' within the corporate limits of the City of Jersey City," does not deprive one engaged in interstate commerce of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, nor does it unlawfully and arbitrarily interfere with interstate commerce; but rather, in view of the special conditions existent in the municipality, is a legitimate exercise of the police power.

2. The regulation of all commercial vehicles on particular streets, even to their complete exclusion therefrom, when deemed necessary in the public interest, is within the police power delegated to municipalities, and, even though such regulation may be considered drastic in its operation, a court is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of the municipality as to the best and most feasible manner of curing traffic evils and traffic congestion in a specified area in the interest of the welfare of the inhabitants and the persons who use the highway, where such regulation bears a direct relationship to the public safety and is reasonable and not arbitrary.

3. A contribution made by the federal government under the "Federal Aid Road Act" (23 USCA § 1 et seq.) for the purpose of defraying a portion of the cost of a public highway running through Jersey City does not, in the absence of legislation by Congress, prevent Jersey City from adopting an ordinance regulating traffic on such highway, which regulation is necessary for the public safety and welfare, is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and applicable to all commercial vehicles.

4. The city of Jersey City was empowered by article 16 of chapter 281 of the Laws of 1928 (Comp. St. Supp. 1930, § 179—715R (1601) et seq.) to enact the ordinance of November 21, 1933, declaring that "it shall be unlawful for the driver of any commercial vehicle, as herein defined, to use, travel upon or traverse the highway known as the 'Pulaski Highway' within the corporate limits of the City of Jersey City," in view of the special conditions then existing in such municipality.

5. The ordinance of Jersey City passed November 21, 1933, declaring that "it shall be unlawful for the driver of any commercial vehicle, as herein defined, to use, travel upon or traverse the highway known as the 'Pulaski Highway' within the corporate limits of the City of Jersey City," is not unreasonable nor discriminatory, considering the special conditions there existing at the time and the fact that the effect of the ordinance was merely to re-route commercial vehicles from the Pulaski Highway to the Lincoln Highway by a route half a mile longer than the Pulaski Highway route and requiring normally about four minutes more time, and over a route which by reason of the character of its construction was well designed to accommodate all kinds of motor vehicles and to avoid the evils which the ordinance was designed to avoid.

Certiorari proceeding by Albert Garneau against Frank H. Eggers, Judge of the First Criminal Court of Jersey City, and the Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, to review the action of the First Criminal Court of Jersey City in convicting him of violation of an ordinance.

Conviction affirmed.

Argued May term, 1934, before TRENCHARD, HEHER, and PERSKIE, JJ.

Riker & Riker, of Newark (Theodore McC. Marsh, of Newark, of counsel), for prosecutor.

James A. Hamill, of Jersey City (Charles Hershenstein, of Jersey City, of counsel), for defendants.

TRENCHARD, Justice.

The prosecutor, Albert Garneau, was convicted in the First criminal court of Jersey City of a violation of section 2 of an ordinance of Jersey City entitled "An ordinance regulating the vehicular traffic upon certain roadways or highways in the City of Jersey City," adopted by the board of commissioners of Jersey City on November 21, 1933, and approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles, pursuant to the statute, on November 22, 1933.

Section 2 of the ordinance reads: "It shall be unlawful for the driver of any commercial vehicle, as herein defined, to use, travel upon or traverse the highway known as the 'Pulaski Highway' within the corporate limits of the City of Jersey City."

For convenience we shall herein refer to this highway as the "Skyway," by which name it is most generally known.

In general, the record shows that the Skyway was opened to public travel on November 24, 1932. Immediately thereafter accidents became frequent and increased in their Severity. All were accompanied by property damage, mostly by serious personal injuries, and five persons were killed between November 24, 1932, and November 21, 1933, the date upon which the ordinance was adopted. The police department of Jersey City through its chief of police and its traffic bureau made complete surveys of conditions existing upon the Skyway with a view of making the same safe for vehicular traffic. Measure after measure was adopted; experienced traffic policemen were assigned to, duty; the motorcycle squad augmented; and several intensive drives and many prosecutions against traffic violators were instituted requiring the personal appearance of offenders before the traffic courts. All without avail. The accidents continued, and even during the last intensive effort before the ordinance was adopted one traffic officer was killed and two police officers very seriously and permanently injured. The Skyway is a connecting link of that portion of route 25 which extends from the opening of the Holland Tunnel in Jersey City to the Tonnele Circle, with that portion of route 25 which runs through Newark, Elizabeth, and various cities of the state. It created special conditions differing from any other in Jersey City. Prior to the adoption of the ordinance, many thousands of commercial vehicles made constant use of the highway. Many trucks traveled slowly on the right-hand side of the Skyway, and, where there was a rising grade, at not more than four miles an hour, with the result that fast-moving motor vehicles, particularly fast-moving commercial vehicles, often overtook the slow-moving commercial vehicles. By reason of the width and size of the commercial bodies, the overtaking vehicle would pass over or beyond the center line of the highway in the path of on-coming vehicles driven in the opposite direction, causing the on-coming vehicles to swerve from their straight line of travel. This created serious danger, and numerous serious accidents resulted, causing much concern to the mayor and commissioners of Jersey City. Suggestions were solicited; conferences were had with state and county officials. Various plans were examined over a period of six or seven months. It was ascertained that almost SO per cent. of the accidents were due to the presence of commercial vehicles upon the Skyway; that between 11 per cent. and 17 per cent. of the entire traffic consisted of commercial vehicles. With these facts before them, the city commissioners found that special circumstances existed along the Skyway which needed regulation of a definite nature in order to protect the safety and lives of the community, and they determined that the only feasible plan to minimize and practically eliminate such accidents upon the Skyway was by the passage of the ordinance under review, and the soundness of their judgment seems to be demonstrated by the fact that since the enforcement of the ordinance there has occurred only 4 accidents, all of a minor character.

The prosecutor at the time of his conviction was engaged in interstate commerce. As we shall hereafter point out, the effect of the ordinance was merely to re-route commercial vehicles.

The prosecutor attacks the ordinance for reasons now to be considered.

First, he contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it deprives him of the equal...